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This study explores the contemporary working lives of prison managers. It 
attempts to understand the ways in which globalised changes in management 
practices have intersected with localised practices and occupational cultures. 
Through an ethnographic study of the lived experience of the practitioners of 
prison management, the research explores the ways in which the operation of 
managerialism in a prison environment creates a series of tensions, pressures and 
expectations on senior managers, and the ways in which these are experienced, 
understood and negotiated. This study is therefore concerned with the 
relationships between global and local, and between agency and structure that are 
characteristic of late modernity. The constraining and enabling features of 
contemporary prison management are considered in light of Giddens’s account of 
‘the duality of structure’. Relevant work on transformation of working lives by 
Sennett and others are also considered in order to situate this discussion within 
the world of work more generally.
         
The original research involved ethnographic field work in two medium security 
prisons in England over a twelve month period, with data generated from 
observations, interviews and documentary sources.  
Four aspects of prison management are used in order to address the central 
issues. The first is a consideration of performance monitoring mechanisms such 
as targets, audits and inspections; how these are understood, operated, and 
influenced by those using them and also how they reshape and direct the 
approach and thinking of managers. The second is a discussion of aspects of 
agency such as values, discretion, resistance and the use of power; in what ways 
these are idiosyncratic and individual and how far they are patterned across the 
organisation and shaped by wider factors. The third issue is a consideration of 
how people become prison managers and how they approach and understand key 
issues that face them in managing individual staff, teams and prisoners. The final 
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area considers the ‘hidden injuries’ of contemporary management practice, 
including how this is experienced by women, members of minority ethnic groups 
and others who experience themselves as having been marginalised. The study 
concludes by describing the confluence of global and local, and agency and 
structure that shape what is described as ‘prison managerialism’. It also describes 
some of the effects of this and discusses alternatives.
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This study concerns the contemporary working lives of prison managers in 
England and Wales. No individual or organisation sits in isolation and any study 
of prison managers has to be located in an understanding of the prison system in 
which they operate and the broader social context in which that is situated. 
The core of this research is a consideration, based in part on new empirical 
research, of the working lives of prison managers as these are experienced today.
Prison managers were selected as a research subject for a number of personal 
reasons, which are explored in chapter 3. They were, however, also chosen 
because they are a set of professionals who have a distinct, socially significant 
and historically under-examined role. It has been argued that studying prison 
staff is important for three reasons (Crewe, Bennett and Wahidin 2008). The first 
is that they carry out an essential state function that has a human impact on those 
who are imprisoned; it is important to understand their effects. The second is that 
they are a distinct occupational group who experience particular pressures, 
stresses and tensions; it is important to understand the effects upon them. The 
third is that studying the work of prison managers can illuminate wider social 
issues including power, order, inequality and resistance as they are manifested in 
the contemporary prison. From this perspective, the experiences of those working 
in prisons are grounded in wider social transformations and processes. It is 
intended that this study will address all three aspects and that this will draw out 
the relationship between the particular local circumstances and the broader 
macro-level changes of late modernity.  
Before returning to discuss and define the subject of this study more closely, it is 
necessary to introduce further the broad contours of late modernity as it has 
shaped prisons in particular and the world of work more generally.   
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The nature of the transformations in Western liberal society over the last half a 
century have been described in various ways, although the term preferred here is 
‘late modernity’1. There have been various attempts to encapsulate those 
changes, but their nature and form are difficult and problematic to define; 
“perhaps inevitably given the inexactitude of such large-scale generalization and 
periodization” (Garland and Sparks 2000 p.14). They are also changes that are 
uneven and incomplete so that their exact contours will vary from place to place 
and time to time (Kennedy 2010). However, in order to provide a broad 
introduction, ‘late modernity’ refers to:
“…the social, economic and cultural configuration brought into 
being by the confluence of a number of interlinked developments. 
These include (i) the transformative dynamic of capitalist 
production and exchange (the emergence of mass consumerism, 
globalization, the restructuring of the labour market, the new 
insecurity of employment); (ii) the secular changes in the 
structure of families and households (the movement of women 
into the paid labour force, the increased rates of divorce and 
family breakdown, the decreasing size of the average household; 
the coming of the teenager as a separate and often unsupervised 
age grade); (iii) changes in social ecology and demography (the 
stretching of time and space brought about by cars, suburbs, 
commuting, information technology; (iv) the social impact of the 
electronic mass media (the generalization of expectations and 
fears; the reduced importance of localized, corporatist cultures, 
changes in the conditions of political speech) and, (v) the 
democratization of social and cultural life (the ‘desubordination’ 
of lower classes and minority groups, shifts in power ratios 
between men and women; the questioning of authority, the rise of 
moral individualism.)” (Garland and Sparks 2000 p.15)
   
                                               
1 Several terms have been used to describe the contemporary world, including ‘high modernity’ 
(Giddens 1991), ‘new modernity’ (Beck 1992) and ‘late modernity’ (Garland 2001). The term 
‘late modernity’ will be used here because it implies that this is a phase in modernity, whereas 
Beck’s term implies that this marks a break with the past, and Giddens’s term implies that this is 
the end or pinnacle of modernity. These latter two terms therefore make greater claims than the 
more descriptive ‘late modernity’. However, it is not simply for reasons of modesty that ‘late 
modernity’ is preferred, it is also because, it will be argued, it is more empirically accurate. As 
will emerge in the remainder of this study, late modernity suggests a degree of continuity with the 
past; that this is the latest part of an ongoing process of modernity. As will be seen later, it is 
observed that the contemporary world is characterised not only by change and transformation, but 
also by continuity with the past.
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It has been argued that these social developments raise important questions for 
criminology that demand an intellectual response (ibid). This study attempts to 
respond to this by locating an exploration of prison managers within these social 
transformations, as will be explained more fully below. 
Prisons and late modernity
The late modern period has seen what David Garland (2001) has described as 
“underlying patterns of structural transformation” (p.7) in the practices of 
criminal justice in the UK and US. These transformations reflect and intersect 
with broader social changes. According to Garland, they include the decline of 
the rehabilitative ideal and its replacement with a more emotional and punitive
orientation, fuelled by images of dangerous offenders and vulnerable victims. 
Criminal justice has ceased to be an area dominated by elite or professional 
expertise but is instead colonised by popular media and political discourse. 
Managerialism has also expanded with the adoption of business practices in 
public organisations and direct competition for the provision of services in an 
ever-expanding web of security and control both through the formal criminal 
justice system and private services. These streams of punitiveness, populism and 
managerialism have fed an expanding ‘culture of control’ both in public policy 
and private lives. However, these changes have been uneven and have not 
obliterated what has gone before, but instead:
“It has been a process not of inventing new institutions or 
instituting new practices but of redefining those that already exist, 
giving them different force and significance, putting them to 
different use.” (Garland 2001 p.174)
There are therefore elements of the past and of local cultures that 
persist and exist in relationship to the wider changes.
It is worth briefly discussing how these themes have developed in 
English and Welsh prisons over the last two decades. This is a brief, 
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contextual overview that summarizes as concisely as possible some of 
the leading themes of recent discussions of this period. The key issue 
for this research concerns how these surrounding events, and the 
ideological and cultural currents that have accompanied them, have 
served to shape the working circumstances of, and demands upon, 
prison managers.
Populism and punitiveness
Crime and punishment became increasingly contentious issues in the 
early 1990s. Spurred on by a signal case, the murder of the two year old 
James Bulger by two young boys in Bootle, the then Prime Minister 
John Major called for society to ‘condemn a little more and understand 
a little less’ (see Bennett 2008a). The resurgent Labour Party attempted 
establish their governing credentials through the then Shadow Home 
Secretary, Tony Blair, calling for an approach that was ‘tough on 
crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (Downes and Morgan 1997), This 
strategy attempted to encapsulate an approach that bridged both 
credible punishment and progressive social reform. The Conservative 
government, whose popularity was in terminal decline, responded by 
adopting a more populist stance towards crime, with the then Home 
Secretary, Michael Howard making his much quoted speech to the 
Conservative Party Conference in 1993 in which he argued that:
“Prison works. It ensures that we are protected from murderers, 
muggers, and rapists – and it makes many who are tempted to 
commit crime to think twice” (Howard 1993)
This political language shaped and was also shaped by public and media 
discourse. It has been noted that public concern about crime has grown, people 
experience greater insecurity and they have looked for certainty in more rigorous 
responses to crime (Pratt 2007). This has been given voice through an expanded 
and increasingly accessible media, whilst the status of expert opinion has been 
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eroded through a general decline in deference and trust (ibid). These changes 
have reflected an acceleration of a longer-term trend away from welfare-
orientated approaches to more expressive and punitive ones (Garland 2001).  
Rather than being a reflection of a particular place or political campaign this is 
instead deeply implicated in the coming of late modernity. It has been argued 
that:
“It may no longer be the case that major actors in British or 
American politics can meaningfully be ranked as more or less 
‘populist’, or indeed as more or less ‘punitive’. Rather, populism 
can reasonably be regarded as one of the inevitable modes of 
late-modern politics; while ‘punitiveness’ is a stance that no 
serious politician can safely disavow” (Sparks 2003 p.170)
As in many countries including the US and Australia, these 
developments were put into operation through specific policies such as 
zero-tolerance policing, greater use of indeterminate sentencing for
incapacitating offenders considered dangerous, greater use of 
mandatory sentencing such as ‘three strikes’-style laws and minimum 
terms for particular offences (see Pratt et al 2005), and more onerous 
conditional release and more rapid recall to prison for violation
(Padfield and Maruna 2006). All of these changes accelerated the 
growth in the prison population.
There was a gradual but somewhat inexorable rise in the prison population in 
England and Wales from 1945 onwards, growing from 15,000 to 45,000 in the 
late 1980s (Morgan 1997). There was a brief reversal following the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 (ibid). However, the population again began to rise from 1992 
reflecting more punitive public and political attitudes (Downes and Morgan 
1997) and a number of adverse, if contingent, events. The prison population 
expanded to over 85,000, exceeding that mark during the 2010 general election. 
This made the UK one of the highest users of imprisonment in Western Europe 
(International Centre of Prison Studies nd).
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Within the prison, however, there was not a move towards the brutal internal 
conditions and treatment seen in some other countries (see Pratt et al 2005). 
Indeed, the first half of the 1990s saw a focus on the improvement of conditions 
and humane treatment. This was prompted by findings of the judicial inquiry 
established after the extensive riots of 1990 (Woolf and Tumim 1991). This 
called for and led to improvements including the installation of integral 
sanitation in cells, reduced overcrowding, improved levels of activity and 
procedural protections for prisoners such as formal complaint mechanisms 
(Morgan 1997).
In the later part of the decade, and following high profile escapes from two high 
security prisons, the Prison Service commissioned an external inquiry to review 
control, order and security (Learmont 1995). This was not a public, judicial 
inquiry but instead a report commissioned by the organisation and conducted by 
a senior military officer. Amongst other recommendations, the inquiry proposed 
a move away from prisoner rights and entitlements to a more conditional 
approach through incentives and earned privileges. This meant that prisoners 
would receive services such as access to visits, private cash, telephones, 
televisions and time unlocked based upon how well they behaved and complied 
with prison staff; a move towards the responsibilisation of prisoners and the use 
of ‘soft’ power, encouraging self-regulation (Crewe 2009). This was 
strengthened by the introduction in 1999 of home detention curfew, which 
allowed compliant and low risk prisoners to be released early providing they 
were electronically monitored (Dodgson et al 2001).  
The election of the New Labour government in 1997 saw increased investment in 
public services, including prisons. Material conditions improved with the 
extension of access to telephones, activities and in-cell televisions. There was 
also significant investment in services designed to reduce reoffending, including 
drug treatment, psychological interventions, education and work training 
(Bennett 2007a). Although these appeared to be more welfare orientated 
approaches, providing better conditions and opportunities for rehabilitation, their 
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purpose and application was subtly different. They were instrumentally directed, 
structuring the conduct of prisoners through ‘offender management’ (Crewe 
2009). They were also more actuarially designed, with services being based upon 
research as to specific activities that are evidentially linked to offending2 (see 
Feeley and Simon 1992). This reflects the observation of Garland (2001) that:
“The welfare mode, as well as becoming more muted, has become 
more conditional, more offence-centred, more risk conscious”
(p.175).
Whilst popular punitiveness is particularly evident in the political
rhetoric, media representation and the growth of imprisonment in the 
UK, it has been an uneven and incomplete transformation. In particular, 
the inner life of the prison has retained, albeit in an altered condition, a 
concern with the care and rehabilitation of those incarcerated. These 
shifting expectations and changing practices have both been filtered 
through and filtered into the values and actions of prison managers, 
altering their working lives.     
Managerialism
It has been widely observed that a hegemonic form of management now 
dominates contemporary organisations, particularly in the developed Western 
world (Parker 2002). This includes a movement towards larger organisations 
with hierarchical structures that attempt to monitor and control the behaviour of 
employees through target setting and the use of information technology. It also 
encompasses the use of Human Resource Management techniques such as 
recruitment, reward, appraisal, development, communication and consultation in 
order to shape the ways that employees think about their work, enlisting them as 
corporate citizens. This trend has sometimes been termed as ‘managerialism’.
                                               
2 At the time of writing, this was based on the seven ‘pathways to reducing reoffending’: 
accommodation; education, training and employment; health; drugs and alcohol; finance, benefit 
and debt; children and families; attitudes, thinking and behaviour.
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Prisons in England and Wales have seen the proliferation of the technologies and 
techniques of target setting and monitoring in a quite pronounced form over the 
last two decades. This has included the introduction of key performance targets
and indicators, audits, a star-rating system and league tables (known as the 
weighted scorecard) (see chapter 3). Historical forms of monitoring including 
Inspection3 and Independent Monitoring Boards4 (formerly known as Boards of 
Visitors) have also become more formalised (see Newcomen 2005 and AMIMB 
2005). 
These techniques were imported directly from the commercial sector by key 
personnel, including Derek Lewis, Director General of the Prison Service 
between 1992 and 1995, who was recruited directly from the Granada 
corporation without any previous prison or public sector experience (Lewis 
1997). This was the first time such an appointment had been made. Commercial 
approaches were also promoted in internal management reports written by 
businessmen, in particular, Lord Carter5 (Carter 2003, 2007). 
However, this was also a process that gained momentum within the public 
service as a means of improving efficiency and effectiveness. This broad trend 
within the public sector has been described as ‘New Public Management’ (Hood 
1991, Pollitt 1993, Ferlie et al 1996). Within prisons, the processes of 
management monitoring and control were seen as the solution to a range of 
problems experienced in prisons including improving security (Learmont 1995, 
                                               
3 HM Chief Inspector of Prisons is a statutory post under Section 5A of the Prison Act 1952 as 
inserted by section 57 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982. Their role is to inspect prisons in 
England and Wales and report to the government on the treatment of prisoners and conditions in 
prisons and to report on matters connected with prisons and prisoners.
4 These are comprised of volunteers from the local community who monitor the conditions in 
prisons and the treatment of prisoners and staff. This form of monitoring has a long history dating 
back to the Elizabethan era and has had a formal statutory basis that dates back to the 
nationalisation of prisons under the Prison Act 1877 (Haines 2008). Their contemporary authority 
derived from the Prison Act 1952.
5 Baron Carter of Coles founded Westminster Health Care in 1985, which he then sold in 1999. 
He has a wide range of private interests in insurance, health and information technology. He has 
acted as government advisor on a range of issues including offender management, sports, legal 
aid and health services.    
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Spurr and Bennett 2008) and increasing management control and direction, 
turning good intentions into reality (Wheatley 2005). 
A further technique has been the introduction of competition, with the first 
privately operated prison being opened in 1992 (Lewis 1997). This was 
controversial and contested but replicated changes in other parts of the public 
sector and reflected the dominant ideology regarding public services reform 
(Nathan 2003). Although opposed to private prisons whilst in opposition, the 
New Labour government continued to support competition whilst in power 
(Coyle 2005). Initially this was used as a means of gaining value for money with 
newly constructed prisons and providing leverage for improvement in poorly 
performing public sector prisons. The public sector was also able to compete 
successfully for prisons when contracts were renewed. This period marked a 
slowing and amelioration of commercial competition rather than its elimination 
(Bennett 2007b). However, as the population continued to increase, there were 
corresponding budget pressures that led to a refocus on how prisons could be 
reformed. In his internal reports, Lord Carter twice called for increased and 
routine competition for the delivery of prison services (Carter 2003, 2007). This 
he argued would attract more players into the criminal justice market and would 
achieve innovations and efficiency. The strategy of competition was not only an 
economic one but also had the effect of generating uncertainty and promoting the 
logic of the market, aligning individual and organisational interests (Turner and 
Morley 1995).
Some managers mourned what they perceived as the loss of independence and 
creativity arising from these changes (Wilson 1995, 2000), but this process 
marked deeper shifts rather than simply clipping the wings of maverick 
governors. This process has been marked by a movement from a social to an 
economic style of reasoning (Garland 2001). This can be detected throughout the 
criminal justice system including in the development of actuarial methods to 
identify and target the use of imprisonment towards socially problematic groups 
(Feeley and Simon 1992) and in the way that services for prisoners inside are 
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focussed on instrumentally-orientated approaches such as ‘offender 
management’ and ‘reducing reoffending’ (Crewe 2009). It can also be seen in the 
growing focus that managers place upon the meeting and achieving of targets and
performance measures (Bryans 2007). This economic rationale has therefore 
permeated into the fabric of the prison, its policies and practices.
There have been notable attempts to re-imagine the use of performance 
management, in particular, the New Labour focus on stakeholder and customer 
engagement (Blair 2010) was reflected in the development of a new measure of 
the quality of prison life (MQPL). This originated in research at the University of 
Cambridge (Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004) and was later incorporated into 
the performance management framework. Individual managers have also sought 
to resist, subvert and adapt managerial methods for moral ends (see Carlen 2001, 
Cheliotis 2006).
The processes of managerialization facilitate what has been described as 
‘management at a distance’ (O’Malley 2004). This is the process through which 
governmental control permeates social institutions and individuals giving rise to 
deeper and more intense forms of control. In prisons this is not only seen in the 
implementation of technologies of monitoring, but also in the ways that the 
thinking and actions of individuals and groups are re-orientated and brought into 
strategic alignment. Measurement and monitoring are means through which 
disciplinary power can be exercised but can also be legitimated through 
expertise, persuasion and authority. Through these processes, individuals and 
groups can be ‘responsibilized’ to act in appropriate ways (Garland 2001) and 
self-regulation and control can be developed (Foucault 1977, Rose 1999). 
The size and scale of prisons have altered during this time. The growth of the 
prison population has been accommodated partly through opening new prisons, 
but also through the expansion of existing prisons (Carter 2007). In 2007, an 
internal report written by a former businessman, Lord Carter, argued that 
economies of scale could be achieved by building large prisons, which became 
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known as ‘Titan’ prisons, housing 2500 prisoners (ibid). These plans encountered 
significant resistance and were subsequently mitigated (Liebling 2011). Again, 
these proposals were motivated by economic style rationales and market based 
solutions (ibid).
Over the last two decades there have been powerful and pervasive changes that 
have recast not only the policy and practice of prison management, but have also 
sought to change the thinking and rationale of actors. These changes have been 
contested and uneven but have nevertheless have had a critically important place 
in shaping the working lives of prison managers. 
The changing nature of work in late modernity
Work is a central aspect of social life and has been the subject of changes arising 
from the coming of late modernity. This has been widely discussed, in particular 
the way that the structures of work have changed including the mobility of 
capital; the replacement of the job for life with short-term, sub-contracted and 
part-time employment; rapidly changing technology and skills; and the 
replacement of the work place with decentred home and mobile working (Sennett 
2004). This has been described as ‘new capitalism’ (Sennett 1998, 2004) and has 
brought with it a more fluid and less secure employment experience (see also 
Giddens 1991, Beck 1992, Bauman 2000). These broad changes are important as 
they provide a useful benchmark for understanding how the experience of work 
in prisons has changes but also how it has resisted or avoided some of those 
changes. 
There are at least three ways in which a greater sense of fluidity, risk and 
insecurity has come to characterise the experience of work (Heery and Salamon 
1999). The first is that this may be a property of the job itself. In particular, it has 
been argued that the ‘job for life’ is no longer a realistic expectation for most 
people. Instead this has been replaced by less secure forms of employment 
including short-term contracts, sub-contracting and part-time employment in 
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rapidly changing organisations which shift their capital from one location to 
another. Jobs themselves may also feel insecure as constant retraining and skill 
acquisition is required (Sennett 1998). The second is that the environment in 
which the job exists may be insecure, with rapidly changing markets and 
competition for the provision of services. Organisations and workers are 
therefore subject to the volatility of the marketplace. The third way in which 
insecurity is maintained is through the subjective experience of workers in terms 
of cognitive and affective attitudes towards security, in other words, they feel 
insecure. This may manifest itself in the ways that people are concerned about 
working hard and performing well and therefore regulate themselves. This is also 
raised in ways in that employees may worry about what may happen to their job 
or that they will become unskilled due to changing technology or expectations; 
they are haunted by a “spectre of uselessness” (Sennett 2004 p.86). The changes 
that have been described were not purely technical but also represented a shift in 
values and organising logic. They raise issues regarding power, order and 
inequality. 
Has there really been such a dramatic transformation in employment or are these 
claims overstated? It has been argued that the case for ‘new capitalism’ has been 
exaggerated and instead traditional structures have persevered, for example long-
term employment has remained the norm, and capital is less mobile than has 
often been suggested (Doogan 2009). As well as questioning the extent the 
technical changes, there have also been arguments presented that the nature of 
the changes socially and in terms of individual identity, have been over 
emphasised. In particular, it has been argued that local and traditional practices 
are often deeply embedded and globalised trends have had to adapt in order to 
accommodate these (Parker 2002, Kennedy 2010). 
In prisons, long term, secure employment remains the norm, although some 
aspects of the work have been sub-contracted (see Bennett, Crewe and Wahidin 
2008). Competition is also limited, as has been described previously. As will be 
described later, there are also deeply embedded local practices that have 
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persisted. Nevertheless, the coming of late modernity has raised questions for 
prison managers about job security and it has promoted a sense of uncertainty as 
a result of close management and visible performance. The late modern prison is 
not a ‘new capitalist’ work place and the full sweep of change has not occurred.
However, a crucial feature of this study is to explore how these trends have
seeped into prison work, to what degree, and how this has intersected with 
traditional, localised practices.    
Local effects of global change
The central concern of this study is to understand the contemporary working 
lives of prison managers. In the context of late modernity, this requires an 
appreciation of the dynamic relationship between global change and local 
circumstances. This section, will attempt to place this in a theoretical setting, 
drawing together the issues of global and local, agency and structure.
The transformations of work and prisons are developments that reflect and are 
part of broader social change. As has been emphasised throughout this 
introduction, although there have been transformations that have had significant 
effects, the past has not been obliterated and the world has not been reinvented. 
This approach rejects the global-local binary, which:
“…encourages us to believe that the local and the global are 
pitted against each other in some sort of battle for survival or 
supremacy which the former will inevitably lose” (Kennedy 2010 
p.141-2)
Instead, there is continuity with the past in the shape of local peculiarities and 
practices. As has been argued, the local is:
“ubiquitous and commonplace…It absorbs, diverts and distracts 
us. It surrounds and envelops us, filling our lives with huge 
volumes of detail, information, attachments, pressures, 
expectations and demands, patterns, routines, responsibilities, 
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pleasures desires but also familiar routes and special-social 
niches…The ordinariness of the local and its powerful centripetal 
tendencies and attraction, pulling us inwards, affects everyone to 
a greater or lesser extent and usually the former.”  (Kennedy 
2010 p.7)
The nature of late modernity is instead to be found in a duality between local and 
global, what has been described as a “dialectical phenomenon” (Giddens 1991 
p.32) where they coexist and intersect.   
This has been noted in studies of prisons, where it has been argued that:
“Imprisonment’s local terrain is shaped but not fully determined 
by the forces of macro-social change. It is also influenced by 
organizational politics, professional values personal priorities, 
and historical contingencies.”  (Crewe 2009 p.20)  
This observation picks up that dialectical relationship. This was also neatly 
encapsulated in another observation, which captured the perseverance of the 
local character of prison life: 
“This tension between the forces of late modernity ‘out there’ and 
the micro processes of the prison, where staff and prisoners 
continue to exchange pleasantries, insults, disclosures, and deals 
is precisely ‘where the action is’…in prison. In most prisons still, 
the landing is the same landing; time and place matter; and the 
essential prison experience remains fully recognizable by those 
who have always been there. Meanwhile, the world around the 
prison landing has been transformed.” (Liebling assisted by 
Arnold 2004 p.4)
Understanding the late modern prison involves nuanced and complex questions
about how the traditional shape of prison life has persisted and provides 
continuity and how far this has been disturbed, altered or replaced by macro-
level changes. It is in the interplay that the character of the late modern prison 
and the working lives of prison managers will be found. As Garland (2001) 
argued, criminal justice institutions have not been reinvented but have instead 
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have been redefined, given “different force and significance” and put “to 
different use” (p.174). 
Making sense of late modernity: agency and structure
Having attempted to suggest some of the contours and dynamics of late 
modernity, why then does the title of this thesis give prominence to the concepts 
of agency and structure? According to Giddens (1984), agency refers to actors 
having the space to act differently at any stage during the sequence of action, 
whilst structure refers to the phenomenon of social practices taking on systematic 
forms across space and time. As with his approach to globalism and localism, 
Giddens argued that rather than being dualisms, these were two parts of a whole, 
they were a duality existing in a dialectical relationship. This was his theory of 
‘structuration’. This approach emphasises the relationship between the individual 
and wider society. With the development of globalised practices in the late 
modern world, Giddens argued that:
“the level of time-space distanciation introduced by high 
modernity is so extensive that, for the first time in human history, 
‘self’ and ‘society’ are interrelated in a global milieu” (Giddens 
1991 p.32)
Individuals are directly drawn into, implicated and affected by the circumstances 
of late modernity. Kennedy argues that understanding globality and social 
change is not solely a matter of tracing broad macro-developments, but is equally 
about understanding the role of individuals as ‘micro actors’:  
“It is ordinary people in their everyday lives who cope with and 
sometimes react to the global forces penetrating their particular 
life spaces – threats to jobs, the casualization of work, the effects 
of climate change or the stresses of living in a multicultural city –
even though they do not always understand or interpret them as 
global forces” (Kennedy 2010 p.13)
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As has been discussed in relation to issues such as the strategic alignment of 
organisational aims and individual actions, the development of self-regulation 
and feelings of insecurity in employment, global developments play out in the 
actions and practices of prison managers as individuals. In this way, Giddens 
argued that:
“…modernity radically alters the nature of day-to-day social life 
and affects the most personal aspects of our experience. 
Modernity must be understood on an institutional level; yet the 
transmutations introduced by modern institutions interlace in a 
direct way with individual life and therefore with the self”
(Giddens 1991 p.1)
The nature of late modernity and the changing structure of society shapes the 
broader context but also intersects with individual agency. Individuals are micro-
actors who interpret, adapt, implement, resist, ignore and facilitate the changes. 
These changes not only occur in the actions of individuals, but also in their sense 
of identity and self. It is therefore being argued that the way that the changes of 
late modernity have been both enabled and constrained can only be understood 
by exploring the ways in which individuals as agents have interacted with the 
local and global structures, making sense of the various pressures and tensions 
that are at play.
The central questions for this study explore these inter-relationships between 
global and local and between agency and structure. How has the role and 
function of prison managers changed? How have these macro-level changes 
penetrated into their working lives and reconstituted them? How have individual 
and traditional modes of practice persevered and been maintained? What have 
been the consequences for those people themselves and for those who live and 
work in prisons?       
This context is not unique to prisons. Indeed it is a central preoccupation in the 
contemporary worlds of work and public policy. This can be seen in myriad 
controversies about public sector work. For example, there have been frequent 
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debates about the role of testing pupils in schools, with the tensions between the 
development of consistent, measurable national standards and the fostering of 
greater creativity and individuality amongst teachers and pupils (see for example 
House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee 2008). In the 
police, there has been a debate about the exercise of discretion, particularly with 
practices such as stop and search, where the requirement to account for actions 
through bureaucratic records has be criticised as disproportionate and counter-
productive in that it may deter legitimate police action (See Flannigan 2008). 
Within the medical profession there has been considerable debate about the 
‘rationing’ of expensive drugs, as doctors and supervisory bodies such as the 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence have had to make judgements based not 
only on clinical criteria, but also consider cost-effectiveness and budgetary 
restraints (Society Guardian 25th September 2007). These debates set out 
ongoing tensions between increasing centralised control and individual or local 
discretion, between traditional ‘craft’ and managerial prescription. 
These tensions between the individual and the organisation, and concerns about 
security and identity have also been a feature of popular culture. Books such as 
Brave new world (Huxley 1932), Super-Cannes (Ballard 2000), The maintenance 
of headway (Mills 2009) and films such as The Insider (US Dir. Michael Mann 
1999) have depicted workers battling with the constraints of corporate life and 
their attempts to maintain their independence, identity and integrity. This has 
also been a long-standing theme of science fiction writing, where the corporate 
world has frequently been represented as assimilating with the wider world into 
an all-controlling dystopia. It has been claimed that:  
“Conformist utopias maintained by deliberate political effort are 
a cherished nightmare of contemporary science fiction…The 
machinery of oppression…is wielded…by businesslike 
managerial types well equipped with the latest technological and 
psychological techniques for the prevention and detection of 
heresy” (Amis 1961 p.84). 
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These are examples of the political, professional and cultural manifestations of 
the universal tensions in the contemporary world of work and expose the 
conflicts between old and new, local and global, individual and organisational 
that are a feature of late modernity.
Whilst this is a study of a specific group in a specific location, it is one that raises 
themes relevant to organisations around the world. This is a story of the 
intersections, tensions and dynamics of late modernity. In that sense it is a story 
about the world in which we now live.
The study   
The study that follows is set out in seven chapters. In chapter 2, the literature on 
prison managers will be reviewed. This chapter will describe the main theoretical 
tools that will inform the study. It will also explore the different ways in which 
prison managers and their working world have been understood and explained. 
This will go on to suggest a new approach to the study of prison managers that 
draws together the dynamic interconnections that shape the working lives of 
prison managers including between agency and structure, and between global 
and local forces. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology of the research and gives a sense not only 
of the strategies adopted but also why they were used and some discussion of the 
experience of conducting the research. 
What follows are the four empirical chapters that set out the research findings. 
The first of these, chapter 4, explores performance measurement and how prison 
managers use, understand and work with these tools. This is not discussed solely 
in a technical sense but also considers how these become a lived experience and 
affect individual identity and practice. This is concerned with how the 
importation of globalised practices has interacted with local culture. Chapter 5
looks at how prison managers bring individuality and subjectivity into their 
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work, using examples including their individual style, use of discretion, acts of 
resistance and use of power. This examines not only how such actions are a way 
of retaining and expressing individual identity but also how this can be a vehicle 
through which conformity is advanced, so that practice becomes patterned and 
structured. This is followed by chapter 6, which is concerned with the influence 
of traditional occupational culture and how this interacts with globalised ideas in 
key aspects of prison management including managing staff, teams and 
prisoners. These three chapters are used in order to discuss how managers 
understand and operate within their working world. Whilst they deal with issues 
of structure, agency and culture separately, the chapters do not present them as 
separate but instead use these as starting points to illustrate the ways in which 
they overlap and intersect in a series of dualities. The final empirical chapter, 
chapter 7, looks at the hidden injuries of prison management. This chapter 
attempts to describe how particular groups are negatively affected, even harmed, 
through contemporary management practice. This includes gender and racial 
groups but also looks at non-operational managers and those who experience sick 
absence. 
The study ends with chapter 8, a conclusion which attempts to summarise and 
describe the contours of contemporary prison management, the implications of 
this, and alternative approaches that could provide a different future.
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Chapter 2
A new approach to understanding prison managers
This chapter explores the main literature that is helpful in understanding prison 
managers. It will start by describing and discussing Giddens’ (1984) theory of 
structuration as that is such a core concept in this study.  The chapter will then 
explore the ways in which prison managers have been discussed in previous 
studies. One approach has been based on emphasising the local features of the 
organisation, including traditional prison officer culture, and the ways in which 
managers have acted with agency and in ways that are idiosyncratic and 
individualistic. The second approach has focussed on the restructuring of prison
management as a result of the coming of late modernity, in particular 
competition and new public management as a set of transformations that have 
homogenised and recast their work. The chapter will then close by suggesting a 
new approach based on Giddens’s theory of structuration. 
Giddens on ‘structuration’
In his seminal work elaborating the theory of structuration, Giddens (1984) set 
out that there was a long-standing conflict in sociology between those who 
adopted a functionalist or structuralist perspective and those that adopted a 
hermeneutic one. That is that functionalists and structuralists focus on social 
systems and the social whole, in other words structure, whereas hermeneutics 
emphasises the subjective experience of individual actors, in other words agency. 
Giddens attempted to move beyond these ideas in order to understand the 
complex interplay between agency and structure. This section will briefly 
describe and discuss the main elements of his theory of structuration that are 
relevant to this thesis. It should be noted, however, that Giddens was not alone in 
exploring this interconnection. In particular, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) theory of 
practice addressed a similar social problem to Giddens and shared some features 
but was distinct (Parker, J. 2000). This will also be drawn upon in this section.  
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The term ‘agency’ was used by Giddens (1984) in the sense that the actor may 
have acted differently at any stage during the sequence of action. They may not 
necessarily have foreseen, appreciated or intended all of the consequences of 
those actions, but they exercised some choice in taking them. He proposed what 














In this model, reflexive monitoring involves individuals monitoring themselves 
and others, and expecting others to also be doing the same. This involves 
conscious and considered actions. Rationalization of action refers to actors 
having a continuing reflexive understanding of their grounds for action that links 
throughout their experiences and provides some coherence to their lives. These 
may not always be fully conscious but are comprised of the values, beliefs, 
attitudes, practices and processes that they accept or take for granted and which 
shape their conduct. ‘Motives’ are more complex and often cannot be articulated 
by most actors. This could be broken down into the following triad of thought: 
 Discursive consciousness – these are motivations that can be rationalised 
and expressed, which the actor is aware of and able to articulate.
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 Practical consciousness – These may not be consciously expressed, but 
are comprised of the taken for granted assumptions that shape their 
actions.
 Unconscious motives/cognition – these include intimate and personal or 
deeply rooted social practices that are entrenched and not consciously 
questioned or articulated. 
From this perspective, there are three different aspects to individual action and 
agency, all of which are overlapping and interlinked. Firstly, this is characterised 
by what might be considered individual personality and character, through 
motives for action, which are deeply rooted in personal experiences and biology. 
The second aspect is the empowered, thinking and feeling agent who exercises a 
critical form of choice through reflexive monitoring and discursive 
consciousness. The third prioritises how the nature of agency is embroiled with 
that of structure as ‘practical consciousness’ and rationalisations for action. This 
reveals the many taken for granted acts that are part of the ongoing ‘flow’ of 
social life, including the use of language and gesture. For Giddens the vast bulk 
of social activity is characterised by this practical consciousness, which involves 
routinised, familiar and shared behaviours rather than heroic assertions of 
subjectivity (Parker, J. 2000). 
The second element important in the notion of structuration is that of structure. 
Giddens defines this as “the properties which make it possible for discernibly 
similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which 
lend them ‘systematic’ form” (Giddens 1984 p.17). He rejects the structuralist 
idea of structure or systems as external to human agency but instead sees them as 
having a virtual existence when enacted through instantaneous practices and in 
memory traces. 
Giddens argues that social rules are techniques or generalizable procedures that 
apply in the enactment and reproduction of social practices. These rules can be 
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described across a number of dimensions. In doing so, he illustrates that structure 
was not a single monolithic entity but instead structures can have discernibly 
different qualities. The dimensions he describes crossed four spectra:
Intensive (i.e. frequently used)                                    Shallow (i.e. infrequently 
                                                                                                 used)
Tacit (i.e. rarely discussed                                           Discursive (i.e. explicitly  
explicitly, generally accepted)                                     discussed and contested)                                                                                              
                       
Informal                                                                       Formalized
Weakly sanctioned                                                       Strongly sanctioned
Giddens therefore proposes that rules and resources vary in their qualities and 
intensity. 
Drawing these ideas together, Giddens argues that agency and structure should 
not be viewed as a dualism where they are mutually exclusive positions, instead 
they should be reconceptualised as a duality – characterised by a dynamic and 
mutually inescapable inter-relationship. Giddens terms this the ‘duality of 
structure’. According to this, the structural properties of social systems are both 
the outcome and the medium of the practices they organise (Giddens 1984 p.25). 
This essentially means that commonly understood and observed rules and 
resources are part of the continuity and reproduction of everyday social life but 
these rules and resources are also created and recreated as a result of individual 
choices and actions rather than having an independent existence of their own. In 
this way, Giddens illustrates how the duree of day to day routine is linked to the 
longee duree of institutionalised practice. In other words, everyday social 
practices become embedded, eroded or altered through their repetition and 
observance by actors.
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Bourdieu (1977) similarly draws a link between individual actions and the shared 
practices of the groups. As with Giddens, Bourdieu argues that people act with 
immediacy rather than with articulate consciousness and that their actions are 
shaped by dispositions, values, behaviours, attitudes and characteristics that are 
shared across members of a group. He argues that there are four elements to this. 
The first he calls ‘embodied experience’, or habitus, which has developed over 
generations and is comprised of dispositions and practices typical of the 
particular group. Second he identifies language and rationality, which includes 
both the specific words and phrases used but also the philosophy, morality and 
rationalisations commonly deployed. Third, he describes values, which means 
the moral imperatives and priorities held by that particular group. Fourth, he 
describes that the variety of practices are all implicated in the constitution of 
agency and structure, which means that the practices embody a complex 
relationship that crosses both groups and individuals. This work is particularly 
important for drawing out ways in which individual practices are patterned 
across groups and that shared practices and ways of thinking in groups become 
deeply embedded in individual identity.   
Giddens provides a series of tools which explain the ‘modalities’ of structuration; 
the dimensions of duality of structure drawn upon to give depth and weight to the 
practices. These dimensions take three forms; domination (power), signification 
(meaning), and legitimation (norm). Domination describes the resources that are 
held by some in order to control economic matters (allocative resources), such as 
deciding how financial rewards should be applied or financial wealth distributed, 
and also to control people’s lives (authoritative resources) through position, 
prestige and personality. Examples include the powers accrued by managers, 
professionals, the wealthy, or politicians. Signification refers to the use of 
persuasive power, for example because particular practices are considered more 
moral or more effective, and are therefore perceived as self-evidently good, 
similar to Bourdieu’s idea that values and moral imperatives shape practice. 
Examples include support for charitable works, or more general social rules such 
as politeness and civility. Legitimation describes the process of articulating, 
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disseminating and justifying through which rules become widely perceived as 
acceptable, become the norm and are subsequently reinforced through sanctions. 
This applies to the majority of law or written rules in work or other associations.  
Giddens also describes the directions in which the duality of structure can be 
utilised. For example, this can be an enabling force, in as much as it can provide 
a means through which intentions and needs can be realized. On the other hand, 
structures can be a constraining force in as much as they can set material 
constraints, sanctions to deter and punish certain actions, and structural 
constraints i.e. limits on the range of plausible options in any given circumstance. 
He again described this relationship as one that was dynamic through a ‘dialectic 
of control’ (Giddens 1984 p.16); a two-way relationship of influence and 
negotiation between the superior and subordinate. This dialectic is also 
particularly important to Bourdieu’s (1977) formulation, in which he argues that 
the social world is characterised by a perpetual power struggle between different 
groups, collectivities and interests. For Bourdieu, the agency of actors is 
particularly expressed when they take sides in these struggles. 
Finally in this section, it is worth reiterating how this links with the notion of late 
modernity, globalisation and localism, which was addressed in chapter 1. In 
particular this highlighted that local and global practices exist in a dialectical 
relationship. This can be seen as part of what Bourdieu (1977) might term a 
‘field of struggle’. However, this is not a dialectic that takes place independently 
of actors as some kind of abstract, theoretical, philosophical and political battle, 
but instead this is enacted between persons in everyday settings. As was 
described in chapter 1, individuals experience the pressures of globalisation 
through managerialism, diversity and technology, for example, and they have to 
interpret and make sense of this in their lives. The relationship between global 
and local is therefore given life through the duality of structure.    
Giddens’s crucial contribution, as well as that of Bourdieu, can be seen as his 
reframing of this fundamental sociological debate about agency and structure in 
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terms of a duality rather than a dualism. They highlight that individuals and 
groups interact in ways that are complex and mutually influencing. Rather than 
providing a comprehensive and scientific analysis of this, they provide a number 
of concepts that could be deployed to analyse and understand social life (Layder 
2006). 
Having briefly introduced the elements of structuration theory, it is necessary to 
turn to two different approaches that have been taken in discussing prison 
managers and how these reflect the dualisms that Giddens criticised. This chapter 
will then discuss how Giddens’s theory in particular can be used to inform a new 
approach to understanding prison managers.
Prison managers, localism and culture
Much of the previous work on prison staff emphasises the distinctiveness of 
prisons, prioritising local, cultural idiosyncrasies (e.g. Bryans & Wilson 2000, 
Liebling and Price 2001). This section will outline the ways in which prison staff 
have been discussed in these terms and how this has presented them in isolation 
from global, structural trends. 
Much of the previous research on occupational cultures within prisons has 
argued that there exist strong and distinct working identities. This has been 
applied to both prison officers (e.g. Liebling and Price 2001, Crawley 2004) and 
prison managers (e.g. Bryans 2007) but in contrasting and apparently mutually 
exclusive ways. For prison officers, research has generally described 
occupational culture as a homogenous set of practices, shaping and constraining 
the behaviour and attitudes of those concerned. For prison managers, 
occupational culture has been described as heterogeneous and as empowering 
them to act with agency. These two approaches will be described and discussed 
but at this stage it is worth noting that whilst it is accepted that localised tensions 
and dynamics exist and have an important place in working lives, the dualism 
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inherent in these studies, between officers and managers and between agency and 
structure, will later be questioned.       
Prison officer occupational culture
There have been several important works produced on prison officers in the US 
(for example Kauffman 1988 and Lombardo 1989) and in the UK (for example 
Liebling and Price 2001, Crawley 2004, see also Bennett, Crewe and Wahidin 
2008). These focus on officers as a distinct group, studied in their own right and 
distinguished from managers or other professions working in prisons. From this 
work, three major elements can be drawn that characterise the ‘traditional’ prison 
officer occupational culture, just as classic studies on police officers have 
identified an enduring culture (see Loftus 2011). The first element of this culture 
is insularity; that prison officers have an internal focus, strong bonds of solidarity 
with colleagues and are cut off professionally and socially from those outside of 
prisons. It has been argued that this is derived from a number of distinctive 
factors, including that prison staff work closely together physically and there is 
an intimacy and sense of shared reliance that comes from the need to keep each 
other safe (Crawley 2004, Crawley and Crawley 2008). As well as these factors 
that push prison staff together, it has also been argued that they are pushed away 
from those above and outside as they perceive that they are neglected and under-
valued by the public, politicians and the media, and they are suspicious of 
investigations and other forms of external scrutiny (ibid). Some of the internal 
effects of this include that uniformed staff regard themselves as being distinct 
from non-uniformed staff and ground-floor staff distinct from managers 
(Liebling 2007). This distance is not merely a reaction to perceived neglect but is 
also a means through which they can preserve their ‘discretion’ and avoid 
intrusive accountability (ibid). 
The second element is staff-prisoner relationships, where it has been argued that 
there is broad consensus about what constitutes the ‘right’ relationships with 
prisoners (or at least what are the ‘wrong’ sort); how interpersonal and 
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professional boundaries are drawn (Crawley 2004, Crawley and Crawley 2004, 
and Liebling and Price 2001). This consensus emphasises features that have 
important social and occupational effects. In particular, it is through these 
relationships that the antagonisms and conflicts of prison life are reflected and 
reproduced, but they are also the means through which power is exercised and 
order sustained. This consensus is grounded in perceptions that prisoners are 
unpredictable, potentially violent and therefore have to be contained, but also 
reflects a view that prisoners are socially inferior to officers (Liebling and Price 
2001, Liebling 2007). This relationship has often been characterised as ‘them and 
us’ (Crawley 2004, Liebling 2007). Sim (2009) has argued that this “social 
production of distance” (p.145) between officers and prisoners creates an amoral 
climate where indifference flourishes (see also Scott 2008). These values and 
perceptions underpin a hierarchical structure that facilitates domination and 
control of prisoners by staff.  
The third element is machismo; the “traditional male qualities of dominance, 
authoritativeness and aggressiveness” (Crawley and Crawley 2008 p.141) or 
what Sim (2009) describes as “untrammelled, corrosive masculinity” (p.145). 
This can be traced back to prisons being predominantly a male domain. It can
also be seen in the nature of the work, or at least those elements that are given 
high status. For example, the use of force is seen as attracting a particular kudos. 
It can also be seen in the nature of relationships between staff and prisoners and 
amongst staff themselves. The most respected officers are those who were able to 
mix ‘bottle’, including confidence and courage, and ‘banter’ a form of combative 
humour (Liebling 2007). These particular masculine qualities are used to define a 
‘good’ officer and to order the social relations amongst staff.    
These three features create the basis of an occupational culture or ‘working 
personality’ (Skolnick 1966, Crawley 2004, Liebling 2007). This emerges from a 
combination of circumstances that prison officers face and the milieu in which 
they operate, and it coalesces into a cognitive lens through which their working 
world is viewed, and a set of expectations and beliefs that shape their emotional 
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responses. In other words their social position shapes their habitus (Bourdieu 
1977), or how they conduct themselves in their working world, how they see 
themselves as a group, and how they find themselves positioned in relation to 
their superiors, to prisoners and to ‘outsiders’. Such cultures can be deeply 
embedded, for example it has been argued that police officer culture has largely 
endured despite social and political changes (Loftus 2011). 
Although earlier research has emphasised the coherence of this culture and the 
homogenous nature of the group, recent work has provided some corrective, 
suggesting that prison officer culture is not monolithic but can vary in its precise 
dimensions within and between prisons, and that individuals act with a degree of 
discretion and choice (Liebling and Price 2001, Crawley 2004). Nevertheless, the 
work described generally traces a distinct, local or ‘traditional’ occupational 
culture.   
Prison managers as moral guardians 
In contrast to the work on prison officers, the research on prison managers has 
emphasised diversity rather than homogeneity. These accounts suggest that 
prison managers shape the social climate of the institutions they command. It has 
even been suggested that prison management as an occupation is ‘sui generis’ or 
unique (Bryans and Wilson 2000) and that there is a distinct ‘prison management 
competence’ that is different from any other leadership or management 
competence (Bryans 2000a). This distinctive role was described by Wilson 
(2000) in the following terms:
“To work as a [prison manager], you had to understand 
prisoners, and be able to manipulate prison life to push it 
forward. This was not so much about management – or to further 
managerial ends – but to fashion and re-shape an essentially 
punitive structure into one that was positive and optimistic”
(p.12).
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It seems here to be implied that the occupational culture of prison officers forms 
part of the “punitive structure”. This depiction of prison managers suggests that 
they are distinct from – even perhaps in conflict with - other groups within the 
prison as well as from managers in other organisations. The idea being presented 
here is that it is prison managers who are the heroic guardians and agents of 
moral progression in prisons. 
This view is not uncommon and has found wide support from a range of 
commentators and academics coming from widely different perspectives. For 
example, it has been suggested that the approach of a prison manager can be 
positive, leading to a ‘remoralization’ of a prison, encouraging prison staff to act 
humanely and value prisoners (Carlen 2001). However, others have argued that 
leadership can be negative, for example failing to give sufficient attention to 
human values, but instead over emphasizing management targets, can sanction 
inhumanity (Coyle 2002). 
This appreciation of prison managers can be contextualised within wider 
organisational studies, particularly a body of research on human services, which 
are services where interactions and relationships between people are central. 
Prisons can be said to be a human service as it is widely recognised that prisoners 
rely upon staff in order to get their basic needs met but also rely upon 
interactions with staff as a normative experience, making the prison feel more or 
less legitimate (Liebling and Price 2001). Research on human services has 
suggested that the way staff are managed has a direct impact on the service they 
provide (Gronroos 1984, Berry 1989, Brody 2000). This has been replicated in 
prisons research, which has pointed to the impact that managers have upon the 
staff they manage. This can be direct and harmful. For example a study of 89 
prison officers in a UK prison found that managers could be a source of stress for 
them (Launey and Fielding 1989, see also Schaufeli and Peeters 2000). In a 
broader and more positive way, it has been argued that managers model 
relationships to officers and inform their use of discretion (Liebling and Price 
2001, Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004). 
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Some previous research has presented a view of prison managers as crusading, 
heroic moralists, battling against regressive prison officer cultures and an 
essentially punitive institution in order to craft a positive, reforming organisation
(e.g. Wilson 2000). Such a view holds strong sway, perhaps partly because so 
much of the work is produced by prison managers themselves (e.g. Bryans and 
Wilson 2000, Coyle 2002) and therefore identify strongly with their role and 
aspirations. This representation of prison managers may be best seen as a 
normative prescription.
Individuality and heterogeneity amongst prison managers 
Other research on the practice of prison managers has suggested that they do not 
act uniformly but instead there is a diversity of values and approaches. In his 
ethnographic study of American prison managers, DiIlulio (1991) concludes that; 
“there is no one theory of organizational leadership…and certainly no 
management formula that guarantees success” (p.54, see also DuIlulio 1987). 
Instead it has been suggested that there are a range of values, motivations and 
approaches. Two important studies of criminal justice managers in the UK reflect 
this idea, namely Rutherford (1993a and 1993b) and Bryans (2007). 
Rutherford (1993a) conducted his research at an early stage in the development
of New Public Management (NPM) in criminal justice. He suggests that criminal 
justice management is “an arena characterized by competing ideologies” (p.26). 
Based on interviews with 28 managers he argues that there are three clusters of 
values or ‘credos’ that shape individual practice (Rutherford 1993a). These are:
Credo one – “a powerfully held dislike and moral condemnation 
of offenders, and the beliefs that as few fetters as possible be 
placed upon the authorities on the pursuit of criminals who, when 
caught, should be dealt with in ways that are punitive and 
degrading” (p.11)
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Credo two – “to dispose of the tasks at hand as smoothly and 
efficiently as possible” (p.13). This is referred to as ‘expedient 
managerialism’.
Credo three – “empathy with suspects, offenders, and the victims 
of crime, optimism that constructive work can be done with 
offenders, adherence to the rule of law so as to restrict state 
powers, and an insistence on open and accountable procedures”
(p.18). This is referred to as the ‘humanity’ credo.
Rutherford argues that these views are often shaped by early experiences such as 
family, religion, influential people or experiences, education and training, and
professional development. These can alter or become concrete when entering the 
work arena as the result of using practice as an expression of personal values, 
watershed experiences or recognising the damage of criminal justice work. This 
research was conducted as the criminal justice field was in the early stages of 
NPM, however, Rutherford noted that expedient managerialism is becoming the 
dominant credo particularly in prisons and this is marginalizing moral concerns 
(Rutherford 1993b). 
More recently, Bryans’ (2007) conducted interviews with 42 governors in the 
late 1990s, taking a similar approach to research and analysis as a previous study 
of police chief constables (Reiner 1991). Bryans identifies four ideal types of 
prison governor. First, ‘general managers’ are those that have little concern for 
the morality of imprisonment, but instead focus on performance management and 
their own personal career. Second, ‘chief officers’ are those that work their way 
through the ranks and adopt an approach based upon their operational 
experience, providing high visibility, an appreciation of shop-floor work and 
often get involved in the minutiae of daily operations. ‘Liberal idealists’ are 
concerned with the morality of imprisonment, have an academic background 
often in the social sciences and are engaged in wider penal reform. Fourth, 
‘conforming mavericks’ are charismatic individualists who develop innovative 
practices whilst also achieving the majority of the conventional targets but do so 
in ways that are individualistic. Bryans accepted that most individuals are likely 
to be a mixture of the ideal types. This does raise the question of how valuable it 
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is to focus on such constructed types if they do not reflect the reality of practice 
but instead are abstractions. There is a risk that they obscure as much as they 
reveal by attempting to impose a neat typology of rather ‘fixed’ roles on a world 
comprised of tense and complex social relations.  
Together, these works represent prison managers as diverse individuals and 
emphasise the distinctiveness of prisons from other organisations and the 
distinctiveness of prison managers from prison officers. These works also 
suggest that they act with significant discretion and control over their working 
environments. In short, and in contrast to the prevailing depiction of prison 
officers, they are presented in ways that place agency in the foreground. 
Reconsidering localism and agency
These approaches to understanding prison officers and prison managers do raise 
a number of problems. The first is that in emphasising the distinctive, local 
features of prisons and prison management, this overlooks those aspects that 
show continuity and consistency with other organisations including global trends 
such as managerialism. The second is that emphasising the distinctiveness of 
prison managers from other staff, particularly prison officers and prison officer 
culture, this ignores the ways in which there may be intersections and links 
created through dialectical relationships and how prison managers may be shaped 
and constrained by this. In other words, both global and local structures retreat to 
the background in these studies. The emphasis on diversity is also exaggerated 
by the creation of ideal types, which neatly but artificially construct imaginary 
figures that may not exist so distinctly in reality. Instead, complexity is lost 
including the ways that different values, approaches and styles are mixed and 
intersect, and are brought to the fore or retreat to the background at different 
times and in different places.      
That is not to suggest that the local features of organisations and occupational 
cultures are not important but these limitations suggest that an alternative 
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approach is needed that situates prison managers within their professional and 
social context rather than lifting them out of it. It also suggests that an approach 
is needed that reconnects with the complex, lived experience rather than creating 
a simplified and imaginary one.
Prison managers, globalism and managerialism    
A second approach to understanding prison managers is a perspective that 
presents prison management as being fundamentally transformed by the rise of 
managerialism, a globalised approach to organisational management introduced 
in chapter 1. From this perspective, prison managers have become a 
homogenised group, moulded and reshaped to a new set of expectations and 
demands.   
In the prisons of England and Wales, the development of ‘new’ managerial 
practices were seen in changing practices such as the opening of a competitive 
commercial market for prison services, the use of techniques imported from the 
private sector including quantitative performance targets, and professionalisation 
of managers in fields including finance and human resources. The development 
of performance measurement has been the most extensive and important 
development in that process (Armstrong 2007). Many commentators have come 
to suggest that this new approach marginalises traditional forms of management 
and creates a more homogenised and tightly controlled institution with less space 
for localism and individuality. For example, Sparks et al (1996) argues that:
“…managerialism – with its reliance on abstract systems 
and categories – will typically not be too interested in the 
more ‘dense’ social relations, and the sensitivity to local 
historical traditions and past events, implied by the concept 
of ‘a sense of place’.” (p.78)    
This is not solely a change in management practice, but is located in wider 
changes in criminal justice. These changes include the greater use of actuarial 
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approaches, using quantitative research evidence in order to target the use of 
criminal justice resources towards socially problematic groups (Feeley and
Simon 1992). Examples of this include policing techniques and sentencing 
policies being changed by innovations such as zero-tolerance policing, minimum 
sentences and intelligence-led policing. As was described in chapter 1, there has 
emerged what has been described as a ‘culture of control’ in criminal justice 
(Garland 2001).  
The legitimation of managerialism
Initially, there was significant resistance to managerial developments. The 
introduction of commercial competition led to strike action (Bennett and
Wahidin 2008). Managers complained that the use of targets and audits changed 
the nature of their role undermining their moral aspirations and instead making 
them amoral general managers (Wilson 1995), or that it changed them from 
leaders to bureaucratic managers or administrators (Godfrey 1996). Such 
arguments suggest that the ‘craft’ of prison management is being undermined, an 
argument that has been made more broadly in relation to changes in the world of 
work (Sennett 1998, 2004). There have also been general criticisms of 
quantitative performance measurement including that they are technically flawed 
(Cave, Kogan and Smith 1990, Smith and Goddard 2002) and that the work of 
complex social institutions cannot be credibly reduced to performance measures 
(Hennessy 1990). 
Despite this initial resistance, these managerial approaches have taken hold and 
by the turn of the century, Bryans (2007) noted that:
“More recently, Governors have been required to adopt a more 
managerial ethos. Prisons have to be managed in a more 
passionless and bureaucratic manner. Efficiency and compliance 
have become the administratively defined goals. Governors are 
increasingly seen as general managers and held to account for 
the total operation of their prisons, through more comprehensive 
line management” (p.63)
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This description suggests that this has been a disciplinary process in which 
reluctant prison managers have been ‘required’ to change through tight 
accountability using transparent performance measurement. This form of control 
was described by Giddens (1984) as ‘domination’, and utilises power through 
allocating resources and the use of positional power.  
The idea that the growth of managerialism is exclusively a top-down, imposed 
change, forced upon unwilling professionals is not tenable. Such a system would 
not be sustainable. It is important to recognise the processes through which this 
has been legitimised so that managers see this not simply as something they have
to do, but something with which their own desires, interests and ambitions are
aligned. 
Some managers willingly embrace the managerial techniques, finding them to be 
an empowering force. For example, a former Director General of the National 
Offender Management Service described managerialism making it easier to get 
things done and turning the good intentions of liberal predecessors into reality 
(Wheatley 2005), whilst his successor (Spurr and Bennett 2008) has argued that 
performance measures are a means to achieve good works and that compliance is 
a means of managing risk, avoiding disasters such as the escapes that occurred in 
the 1990s (Woodcock 1994, Learmont 1995), or the racist murder of Zahid 
Mubarek (Keith 2006). Others argue that managerial practices such as 
enforceable standards can promote human rights (Livingstone et al 2003, Penal 
Reform International 1995, Whitty 2011) and enhance public accountability 
(Riveland 1999). Some academics also use managerialism as a means to engage 
with prisons and promote humanising practices (Liebling assisted by Arnold 
2004, Liebling 2005). From this perspective, managerial practices play a role in 
the legitimation of prisons.
Some managers have even become evangelical about the potential of 
management. For example, Wright (1994) produced a guru-style book for prison 
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managers based upon the once fashionable 1980’s corporate ‘excellence’ 
literature (Peters and Waterman 1982), which suggests that there is an optimal 
approach to management that can achieve success. This has been taken up in the 
UK where similar approaches have been advocated by serving prison managers
(e.g. Powls 1991). Even those who ostensibly resisted the changes, recognise the 
importance of general management competence and skills in prison management 
(Bryans and Wilson 2000, Bryans 2000a, 2007). From this perspective, this new
approach is not only enforced through what Giddens (1984) described as 
‘domination’ but also benefits from ‘signification’, where the practices are given 
meaning and moral force, enlisting willing support. 
‘Governing the souls’ of prison managers 
Whilst some managers were compelled to conform and others willingly did so, 
for the majority there are more subtle processes through which they have become 
embroiled in managerialism. Some of these changes relate to structures of prison 
management. In his study of managers’ use of discretion, Cheliotis (2006) 
describes that these changes have been reinforced by social processes or what he 
calls the:
“three basic managerial forces that, together, serve subtly to 
rigidify the nature and scope of criminal justice work, and to 
mould professionals into patterns of conformity to systematic 
goals, while also playing attention to the human consequences of 
these forces” (p.316). 
First, there is an increasingly hierarchical division of labour, particularly between 
headquarters and establishments, so that establishments are focused on service 
delivery rather than engaging in wider cultural, moral or strategic development. 
Second, there is intensive inter- and intra-agency competition, fuelled by 
commercial competition and publicly available performance information. Third 
is the breeding of a new, up-and-coming generation of blasé professionals who 
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are less concerned about moral aspects of imprisonment and see their work as a 
general management role.      
For many workers, these changes have brought about not only a shift in how they 
work but also how they think and feel about it. It has been argued that this is a 
feature of contemporary organisations, where “the personal and subjective 
capacities of citizens have been incorporated into the scope and aspirations of 
public powers” (Rose 1999 p.1), and that “the management of subjectivity has 
become a central task of the modern organization” (ibid p.2). This process of 
enlistment has been described as ‘governing the soul’ and suggests that the 
contemporary organisation attempts to engage with both what employees do but 
also with what they think and feel (Rose 1999).
The combination of surveillance through performance monitoring and 
measurement, and the enlistment of corporate citizens to align their thinking with 
that of the organisation and act with self-control, has been described as 
facilitating ‘management at a distance’ (O’Malley 2004). Such an approach 
reduces scope for individualism and instead promotes a homogenisation of 
practice. This routinisation and acceptance of practice is described by Giddens 
(1984) as utilising the approach of ‘legitimation’, where it is accepted as the 
norm and underpinned by widely accepted and understood system of rules and 
sanctions. 
It has been argued that this intensification of control and managerialism has 
distorted the nature of prison management. In particular it has been suggested 
that some prison managers focussed on measurement rather than the lived 
experience of imprisonment. This could mean that they construct a ‘virtual 
prison’ based on performance figures rather than seeing the reality of what is 
being provided to prisoners and what their experience is (Owers 2007), or such 
figures are used to present the idea that prisons are reformative and moral places 
whilst masking the pains of imprisonment and the deeper issues of power and 
inequality they reflect (Carlen 2008a). 
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Rethinking managerialism
These works collectively present a picture of a set of globalised practices
sweeping through and reconstructing the practice of prison management. 
Whether by domination, signification or legitimation, it is suggested that all 
managers have become enmeshed in the practices of managerialism, perhaps 
even to the extent that they have become detached from the realities of their 
work. From this perspective, prison management has become less distinct, with 
localism and idiosyncrasy excluded in favour of a more rigid, consistent and 
predictable form. However, this also raises a number of problems. Firstly, this 
presents a picture of a process that has attained a degree of domination and 
control that is virtually complete. Is it realistic to suggest that managerial 
practices cover every situation and circumstance that can be produced in a 
complex institution like a prison? Do responses not vary at different times and 
places? Is it realistic to suggest that individuals are so tightly controlled as to 
have such little choice and discretion in their actions?  Finally, is it realistic to 
suggest that ubiquitous, deeply held and long standing local features such as 
occupational cultures could be so completely eliminated in such a relatively short 
period of time? It is therefore argued that although there is a trend of growing 
managerialism as both a set of practices and a set of emotional and cognitive 
responses to the working environment, the works described above push this too 
far and give insufficient account of the complexities of individuals, cultures and 
variations of time and place.   
A new approach to understanding prison management
So far, two distinct perspectives have been presented. One set of perspectives
emphasise a localised occupational culture. This approach suggests that prison 
officers are a distinct and homogenous group, but that prison managers stand 
aside from this, acting with greater diversity and individuality, in many ways 
wrestling with the constraints of these localised cultures. In contrast, the second 
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perspective locates prison management within wider global developments, in 
particular the emergence of managerialism. From this perspective, prison 
managers are constrained by, or even promote the expansion of this hegemonic 
tendency within organisations. These two approaches set up a series of dualisms 
between agency and structure, and between local and global. The work of 
Giddens can be usefully drawn upon to question the assumptions that underpin 
this previous work, and to propose a new way ahead.
A new approach to understanding prison managers would involve moving away 
from the dualisms inherent in previous work and instead to explore these 
dynamic inter-relationships as dualities; globalism and localism, agency and 
structure. In common with Giddens, such an approach would be interested in 
how structures were both constraining and empowering; how individuals are not 
only subject to rules and structures but are also participants in their creation, 
maintenance and adaptation; the dialectics between the holders power of power 
and the subjects of it; and the dialectical relationship between the local and the 
global.  
This section will discuss the ways in which this new approach has started to 
emerge in recent discussions of prison managers. It will also examine how the 
issue of organisational culture is important in moving this new approach forward.  
Excavating dualities in prison management 
A new approach, which draws out duality, can be detected in some comments 
that have been made about prison managers in wider studies. For example, the 
dynamic nature of these inter-relationships is illustrated by Sparks et al (1996) in 
their study of order in prisons. In this, they argue that in prisons “power is not 
untrammelled” but instead there is a process of negotiation between different 
players (p.136) and that prison management involves “‘balancing’ or walking 
tightropes…reconciling competing priorities and concerns in the face of different 
kinds of constraint” (p.137). This starts to reveal some of the complex tensions 
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that prison managers have to negotiate both local and global. More recently, as 
part of a wider study of the moral performance of prisons, it was argued that 
good governors are not necessarily successful in any prison and instead there is a 
complex ‘establishment-leadership fit’, where different establishments require
different styles at different stages in their development (Liebling assisted by 
Arnold 2004). This again reveals the interplay between organisational culture, 
biography and individual style. From a temporal perspective, both Rutherford 
(1993b) and Bryans (2007) argue that managerialism is becoming more dominant 
in the practice of prison managers, illustrating that individuals and organisations 
change over time.  These studies suggest a more complex relationship between 
the agency and structure, over time and in different places, slowly revealing an 
intersection that can usefully be pursued further. 
Two particular writers, namely Pat Carlen and Leonidas Cheliotis, have 
developed research on prison managers that directly addressed issues of agency 
and structure. Carlen’s (2001, 2002a) research on prison managers was part of a 
wider study of women’s imprisonment. In the first of these papers, she analyses
the transformation of Cornton Vale prison under a new governor who was 
brought in to reduce suicides. Carlen describes how this governor encouraged a 
shared sense of responsibility, where prisoners and staff were empowered to 
provide support and improve quality of life. She describes that:
“this strategy did not involve a displacement of responsibility 
from more senior to less senior or even junior staff, but it did 
extend shares in the ownership and shaping of innovation to the 
staff who actually had to operationalize it” (Carlen 2001 p.465)
This is termed as ‘remoralisation’. Carlen criticises quantitative performance 
measures as inadequate within this context, arguing that it is not possible to 
reduce complex social issues to such measures. However, this is not an example 
of agency alone, but is a process that is led by a governor who deploys structures 
including the delegation of authority, the development of staff, communication 
and to some degree performance measures (i.e. suicides were reduced). This 
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research provides a living example of what Wilson (2000) described as 
‘fashioning and reshaping’ the prison. However, by 2009, the Inspectorate of 
Prisons in Scotland described that the prison was again in a state of crisis, with 
many aspects of the service unacceptable, and that there was a rapid turnover of 
managers meant that there was a lack of strategic direction (HMIP 2009). This 
highlights the need to constantly make, maintain and remake the reform process.
Carlen’s second work focuses on the relationship between women’s prisons and 
a newly established Women’s Policy Group in HM Prison Service headquarters 
(Carlen 2002a). She argues that prison managers are constrained by budget and 
security considerations which make it impossible to implement over-ambitious 
new policy initiatives, and that there are a plethora of unprioritised and 
sometimes opposed policy directives that are often unmindful of the realities of 
prison life. The consequences of this are that often there is non-compliance and 
there is a gap between performance measurement, which presents an image of 
effective and reformative prisons, and the reality of prison life. Her 
recommendations for addressing this focus on a rebalancing of professionalism 
and managerialism, so that prison managers can deploy their professional 
expertise more effectively, as the governor at Cornton Vale had the opportunity 
to do.  
These two articles draw a picture of managerialism as essentially dysfunctional 
due to overuse and its own inherent limitations. However, they also reveal a 
complex interaction between structure and agency, where managers are not 
automatons but instead resist, adapt, and engage with the structures they operate 
within. They do this for a variety of different ends including mitigating negative 
consequences, promoting morally progressive ambitions, but also presenting
complaint appearances.   
The most explicit attempt to explore the issues of agency and structure in the 
working lives of prison managers was conducted by Cheliotis (2006) in an 
ethnographic study of discretionary decision-making regarding temporary 
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release. In his accomplished analysis, he criticises work on managerialism such 
as Feeley and Simon’s (1992) on the basis that they assume that managers are 
docile bodies, trapped in an iron cage of bureaucracy. Whilst acknowledging a 
trend towards greater conformity, he argues that insufficient attention has been 
given to the role of agency. He suggests that individuals may engage in acts of 
resistance, charismatic people may inspire change and staff exercise discretion in 
their work. Rather than being simple automatons, he argues that individuals 
negotiate a position between revolutionary resistance and blind conformity, and 
that they are sophisticated consumers able to discern between competing 
messages and make choices about what they do. Cheliotis closes by making a 
statement that is both an observation and a normative prescription, that:
“…if properly limited by responsible agents, and thus, if used as 
a means to clearly predefined humanitarian goals, rather than as 
an end in itself, managerialism can facilitate the ‘delivery’ of 
justice” (p.354). 
This opened the door to using structuration theory as a means through which to 
understand prison managers, exploring the impact of managerialism but also 
recognising the interplay with agency. However, that door may have been pushed 
too far, and in reclaiming the role of agency, the effect has been to minimise the 
importance of structure as a form of constraint. In particular, discretion and 
choices are not free but are restricted and those that are willing to actively resist 
or have natural charisma are always limited. It also proposes a limited view of 
agency, giving particular prominence to resistance. Although this is clearly 
important, agency is not only expressed through resistance but can also be 
expressed in other forms including compliance. It can also be argued that 
Cheliotis’s conclusion suggests that it is the failure of managers to reshape and 
reinterpret managerialism that is responsible for any moral weaknesses in 
practice, rather than any inherent weaknesses in managerial practice itself. 
These writers have attempted to locate a new approach to understanding prison 
managers in a duality between agency and structure. From this perspective 
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managerialism is a constraining and enabling structure; managers do not simply 
have their freedom of choice restricted but can creatively engage in order to 
achieve desired ends. These works illustrate how managers do not robotically 
conform but they can enforce and ignore rules as well as having some choice 
about the degree and rigour to which they act. There is latitude for interpretation 
and adaptation, which in itself acts to shape and reshape the way rules and 
practices are realised. This suggests that prison managers are not overwhelmed 
and controlled by either the global hegemony of managerial practice or the local 
grip of traditional occupational cultures but instead there is space for individual 
choice.        
Rethinking organisational culture
The issue of organisational culture has been discussed in relation to various 
groups within the criminal justice system including the police (Skolnick, 1966, 
Waddington 1999, Loftus 2011), prison officers (Crawley 2004, Liebling 2007, 
Arnold, Liebling and Tait 2007) and youth offending teams (Souhami 2007). It is 
also a staple of management texts, both academic and popular (e.g. Peters and 
Waterman 1982, Schein 1988, Mullins 2002). However, the notion of ‘culture’ 
has significant ambiguity and what it means is contested (Parker, M. 2000). This 
section will briefly summarise the different ways in which culture can be 
understood and discuss why this is important in understanding the key issues 
being explored in this study of prison managers. 
It has been argued by Joanne Martin (1992) that there are three distinct but inter-
related perspectives from which organisations can be viewed: integration, 
differentiation and fragmentation. Each perspective will be discussed below.
The integration perspective has three defining characteristics: all cultural 
manifestations mentioned are interpreted as consistently reinforcing the same 
themes; all members of the organization are said to share in the organization-
wide consensus; and the culture is described as a realm where all is clear. This is 
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a world in which ambiguity is excluded and culture is seen in monolithic terms. 
An example of this is Watson (2003) who describes culture as a “set of meanings 
and values shared by members of an organisation that defines the appropriate 
ways for people to think and behave” (p.83). Such a formulation presents culture 
as clearly defined, understood and uncontested. Such ‘functionalist’ accounts 
(Parker 2000) do not account for conflict or multiple realities. This can 
particularly be seen in descriptions of traditional police or prison officer cultures, 
which have focussed on dominant features and constructed ideal types (e.g. 
Liebling and Price 2001), characteristics (e.g. Kauffman 1988) or ‘working 
personality’ (Skolnick 1966). 
The differentiation perspective describes cultural manifestations as something 
inconsistent (for example, when managers say one thing and do another). 
Consensus occurs only within the boundaries of subcultures, which often conflict 
with each other. In this model, culture is seen as a dispute between large sub-
cultures or a dominant and sub-culture. This reflects to some degree Bourdieu’s 
(1977) notion of ‘field struggles’ between contested ideologies. However, this 
reduces this to a dualism between opposing choices rather than emphasising 
diversity, inconsistency and dynamic inter-relationships. This approach can be 
particularly seen in the ways that criminal justice managers (Rutherford 1993a) 
or prison managers specifically (Bryans 2007) have been said to fall into discrete 
and competing categories. It can also be seen in the way that some writers such 
as David Wilson (2000) have suggested that prison managers heroically grapple 
with the leviathan of traditional prison officer culture. From this perspective, 
there is a competitive diversity of values, attitudes and priorities that characterise 
occupational cultures.  
The fragmentation perspective focuses on ambiguity as the essence of 
organizational culture. Consensus and discord are issue-specific and constantly 
fluctuating. No stable organization-wide or sub-cultural consensus exists. Clear 
consistencies and inconsistencies are rare. This is similar to the view of Martin 
Parker (2000), who sees organisations as in a state of perpetual tension, 
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competition and flux. From this perspective, organisational members have 
multiple identities for example, gender, location, profession, particular building, 
management/worker, and individuals may emphasise different aspects at 
different times. However, Parker does argue that consensus emerges around what 
the important issues are within an organisation, but not about how they should be 
approached, as a result, he suggests that culture can be characterised as a 
“contested local organization of generalities” (Ibid p.214). This is a view that has 
started to emerge from recent work on prison staff (e.g. Crawley 2004) and 
managers (e.g. Cheliotis 2006), which reveal a degree of individuality, discretion 
and diversity of approach.  
The particular contribution of Martin (1992) is to assert that in order to 
understand organisational culture it is necessary to deploy all three perspectives 
so as to reveal the dynamic interplay between them. Equally importantly, it is 
essential that culture is not constructed as an insular, hermetic phenomenon. 
Organisational culture is both influenced by and is an influence upon wider 
society. This includes the importation of ideas about issues such as gender and 
ethnicity but also the spill over of organisational, economic rationality into social 
life. By taking multiple perspectives, the idea of organisational culture starts to 
reflect the relationship between structure and agency. The different perspectives 
encompass actors deploying choice and individuality, but also the ways that 
dominant ideas shape behaviour and the ways in which individuals collectivise in 
order to co-operate or conflict over issues and ideas. These perspectives can 
provide a lens through which culture can be seen as both an outcome of the 
relationship between agency and structure, but also a medium through which it is 
expressed.
The issue of organisational culture raises a number of questions when viewed 
from multiple perspectives. What are the values, attitudes, interests and practices 
that shape the working lives of prison managers, including global practices such 
as managerialism and local occupational cultures and practices? What are the 
issues of conflict between managers or between managers and other 
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organisational groups? How do these forces influence managers in varying ways 
across hierarchy and role? How do managers make sense of these competing 
pressures and sustain a personal narrative or identity? These questions attempt to 
reveal the dualities that prison managers navigate between individuality and 
conformity, between global and local forces, and between agency and structure.  
A new approach
A new approach to the study of prison managers is being proposed which 
attempts to capture something of the duality that Giddens described in his theory 
of structuration. From this perspective, prison management is not a set of rigid 
prescriptions or untrammelled individualism, but is instead a complex set of 
negotiations. This new approach attempts to capture something of the 
kaleidoscopic variety of pressures and forces that play upon prison managers and 
emphasise how they individually and collectively respond to that. It also attempts 
to reveal the dialectical and interconnected relationship between global and local 
practices as interpreted and mediated through individuals as micro-agents
(Giddens 1991, Kennedy 2010). This approach offers a more nuanced and 
complex approach to understanding the everyday world of prison managers.
Conclusion
A new approach to understanding prison managers has been proposed that 
focuses on the dualities of agency and structure and global and local. This is used 
as a theoretical basis for exploring the working lives of prison managers in the 
era of managerialism, and is particularly concerned with how this is manifested 
in the way that managers engage with the local structures of traditional prison 
officer occupational cultures and global structures of managerialism. This final 
section outlines the key questions and area of inquiry that will be used in order to 
systematically reveal these inter-relationships that characterise the late modern 
prison and the practice of prison managers. Although aspects of structure, agency 
and culture are discussed separately below, they are not intended to be seen as 
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separate, instead it is intended that by examining in detail different aspects of 
prison management, the inter-relationships, overlap and dualities can be 
illustrated and explored.    
The first way in which prison management can be considered is through the 
technologies of managerialism, in particular performance management and 
monitoring. These are a prominent part of the globalised practices of 
managerialism and their introduction in prisons has been of particular importance 
(Armstrong 2007). In this sense they provide the example par excellence of the 
transformations that have been said to have taken place in prisons. The task is not 
simply to describe those tools or to discuss them in narrow instrumental terms, 
but instead to explore them in a social context. How do prison managers view 
these measures? How often do they use them and for what purposes? Are all 
management measures viewed equally or not, and if not, why are there 
differences? How far do they feel constrained, or stuck in what Weber (1914) 
famously described as an ‘iron cage’ and how far do they feel empowered by 
using these as a means to attain power and express themselves in creative ways 
reflecting their values and individuality? How has this affected their sense of 
personal and professional identity? This will also consider how different 
individuals or groups may have different or similar views about these measures 
and how these play out wider contested values about prisons. In asking these 
questions, the research attempts to better understand the operation of managerial 
structures as a human experience and to understand how these structures are 
mediated through local circumstances.          
The second area considers the individuality and subjectivity of prison managers,
as expressed through management style, the use of discretion, acts of resistance 
and uses of power. How are these acts of agency used? How far are they 
individualistic and idiosyncratic and how far are they informed by other factors, 
both local and global? For what purposes is individuality exercised? In what 
ways are prison managers given free rein over these areas and in what ways are 
they constrained or directed to act? Is their discretion patterned through formal or 
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informal expectations and practices? This will attempt to probe into the ways in 
which acts of agency reflect both individual choices and are shaped by structures 
such as rules, processes and culture, taking on discernable characteristics.
The third area to be examined is the role of traditional culture on prison 
managers. What are the elements of occupational practice that are replicated 
across groups? How do different elements of occupational cultures come into 
conflict? How do individuals make sense of those conflicts and tensions? This is 
intended to reveal the dualities of agency and structure and global and local as 
played out across critical aspects of management practice including the approach 
to staff, teams and prisoners.        
The final area that will be explored relates to the relationship between prison 
management and wider social power and inequality. This will examine some 
long-standing and embedded issues such as race and gender. This will also 
involve looking at non-operational managers who in traditional approaches 
towards prison management are marginalised and excluded by the dominant 
occupational group, but have been given greater prominence as part of the global 
managerial agenda. This section will also look at those who suffer from ill-health 
whilst at work and are therefore vulnerable. In examining these areas an attempt 
is being made to consider the effects of contemporary prison management as 
situated in a wider social context.    
The aims of these questions are to explore the world of prison managers from a 
sociological perspective, to understand this as a lived and living experience, 
located within the broader social transformations of late modernity. This will 
provide a novel and more nuanced exploration of contemporary prison managers 




The origins of this research lie in my own personal experiences. With the 
intention of extending my interest in social justice into a career, I joined the 
Prison Service on a fast track management programme in 1996 and in 1999 
became a governor grade. During my time managing prisons I have wrestled 
with complex and unresolved moral dilemmas. How far can I progress issues of 
social justice within prisons and how far does that have a broader impact on 
society? Does the structure of society mean that imprisonment merely 
entrenches, legitimates and enforces power and inequality? What is my role as a 
public ‘expert’ on criminal justice issues – to advocate on behalf of an optimistic 
approach to prisons or to problematize it and argue for its abolition? The origin 
of this research was therefore internal rather than external and was driven by a 
desire to explore and understand in a more systematic way my own working 
world and indeed myself. From the outset the research and my role as a working 
prison manager have been inextricably linked.
This chapter sets out the research methodology and the problems of carrying out 
‘insider’ research. The style differs from the rest of this thesis as it provides a 
reflexive account and therefore necessarily involves the use of the first person. I
will attempt to explore the technical aspects of conducting the research as well as 
systematically examining the tensions, problems and challenges that I 
experienced. 
As has been noted previously in relation to prison research, it is essential to 
understand “the precise position from which it is written” (Sparks et al 1996 
p.344) in order that the power relations between researcher, subject and sponsors 
can be appreciated. This is particularly important where the researcher is, like 
me, a prison employee (ibid). This dual position of being both an insider and a 
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researcher is a constant thread running through this methodological account and 
is essential to understanding this research. 
This chapter will start by setting out the background to the research including 
how the topic was identified and what the main questions were. It then goes on to 
describe the main research strategies deployed. There then follows an account of 
the field work, starting with gaining access and entering the research sites. The 
account of the field work continues with a discussion of the problems and 
challenges including discussions of identities, power and confidentiality. The 
chapter concludes with the process of leaving the field.
Starting the research             
In order to explore the working lives of prison managers, I decided that an 
ethnographic approach was required, one that was “grounded in a commitment to 
the first-hand experience and exploration of a particular social or cultural setting 
on the basis of (though not exclusively by) participant observation” (Atkinson et 
al 2001 p.4). There were some specific features of both the subject that had been 
identified and the setting in which it was taking place that made this approach 
relevant. In relation to the subject, ethnography has been identified as being 
particularly relevant to exploratory or ‘pathbreaking’ research (Fielding 2001) 
and this project fitted that in as much as it involved a relatively unexplored area 
with a broad agenda. The nature of the research was to address the lived 
experiences of work, including how rules and routines were understood and 
enacted. Ethnography of work has been able to explore this whilst also linking 
this with broader sociological questions such as the relationship between agency 
and structure (Smith 2001), organisational and occupational culture (Frow and
Morris 2000, Parker, M. 2000) and issues of power and inequality (Smith 2001). 
Ethnography also has an established track record in prisons (e.g. Sparks et al 
1996, Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004 and Crewe 2009), and specifically in 
researching prison staff (Liebling and Price 2001, Crawley 2004). This work has 
revealed the complex social interactions that shape the prison world, shed light 
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upon what are often obscured and hidden aspects of the institution, and has 
connected this with wider sociological problems (Wacquant 2002).        
I considered who the subjects of the research should be, in particular whether it 
should be restricted as it has been in other studies to those in charge of prisons, 
the governing governors (e.g. Bryans 2007). However, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, this focus has led to an over-emphasis on these individuals and 
a representation of them as heroic shapers of prison life. Such a view, I have 
argued obscures the deeper social processes taking place in the organisation. I
therefore concluded that what was required was a broader perspective 
encompassing other managers including governor grades, uniformed managers 
(senior officers and principal officers) and non-uniformed managers (such as 
those working in finance, human resources, learning & skills and psychology). 
This approach reflected changes in prison management generally where there has 
been an expansion in the importance and role of non-uniformed managers as 
greater managerial and specialist expertise has emerged (e.g. see Crewe, Bennett
and Wahidin 2008) and there have been attempts to develop first-line and middle 
managers so as to deepen managerial control and influence (e.g. see Brookes, 
Smith and Bennett 2008). This resonates with observations from the world of 
work more generally, in particular how strategies have emerged designed to 
control the actions and subjectivities of managers deep into organisations (e.g. 
Rose 1999, O’Malley 2004). Whilst uniformed managers such as senior officers 
have previously been situated within studies of prison officers (e.g. Crawley 
2004), they do undertake line management responsibilities, have increasingly had 
to take on responsibilities for the delivery of key performance targets and audits, 
and have been subjected to increasing management scrutiny. It therefore seemed 
appropriate to also consider them as managers. By focussing on a wider and 
deeper range of managers than previous studies of prison management, the 
intention was to open up a vista onto the penetration of new ways of working 
into prison life and illuminate wider social processes.    
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The data was generated in two category C men’s prisons of broadly similar size 
and age. These types of prisons were selected as they represent the bulk of the 
prison estate and could therefore be considered broadly typical of imprisonment 
in the UK (Crewe 2009). Part of the reason for choosing two sites was pragmatic, 
it was about the time that was available and striking a balance between 
examining more than one site in order to strengthen the case for generalisation, 
whilst not diluting the experience in individual sites to the point where it lacked 
depth. I was also interested in the idea of local cultures and how these intersected 
with global developments, immersion in a locality was therefore necessary in 
order to access this. This design also had a theoretical explanation as it was 
intended to provide intrinsic case studies, using them in order to draw wider 
generalizations (Stake 2000). 
Having set out how the broad research agenda was established, it is now 
necessary to turn to the specific research strategies that were deployed.
Research strategies
This section will provide a largely descriptive account of the research strategies 
deployed and the process of ethical consideration. A more analytical account of 
the research process will be delayed whilst this necessary foundation is laid. 
The central approach taken in ethnography is the use of participant observation
(Fielding 2001). However, approaches to observation vary along a spectrum from
participant to non-participant and even within one study, such as this one, the 
role and identity of the researcher will be unstable and vary according to 
circumstances at different moments. A range of other strategies are also deployed 
in ethnographic research such as formal and informal interviewing, systematic 
counting, and examining documents. Such a wide range of strategies are now 
being used that it has been suggested that there is “a carnivalesque profusion of 
methods, perspectives and theoretical justifications for ethnographic work” 
(Atkinson et al 2001 p.3). 
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In this particular study there were three sources of data generated in the two sites; 
observations of managers in their day to day roles, formal interviews with them 
and documentary evidence. Each of these will be discussed below.   
Observations require the researcher to attempt to engage in and understand the 
everyday world of the people being studied, including the symbolic meaning they 
apply to experiences and patterns of behaviour (Fielding 2001). As Goffman 
(1961) stated:
“any group of persons – prisoners, primitives, pilots or patients –
develop a life of their own that becomes meaningful, reasonable 
and normal once you get close to it, and…a good way to learn 
about any of these worlds is to submit oneself in the company of 
the members to the daily round of petty contingencies to which 
they are subject.” (p.ix-x)
The observation stage lasted for approximately three months in each site, 
comprising 31 days in each. Most days lasted from around eight in the morning 
until half past three in the afternoon. The days would usually start with 
attendance at the ‘morning meeting’ where each day the managers on duty would 
meet to review the previous day including any incidents, plan for the day ahead 
and account for any staff absenteeism. This was useful for finding out what the 
important events in the prison were, generating issues for discussion and 
maintaining visibility and relationships with managers across the sites. From that 
meeting I would usually have pre-arranged to shadow an individual for the day, 
watching them carry out their duties such as attending or chairing meetings, 
completing paperwork, meeting with staff and prisoners, and carrying out 
‘rounds’ where they toured their areas of responsibility and completed 
management checks. In these roles I was able to observe and discuss their 
interactions with others, decision making processes, styles, and the constraints 
placed upon them. Given that most of these observations were with people I had 
not met before, it was only natural that I asked background questions and 
informally interviewed them about themselves and their role (Fielding and
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Thomas 2001). Occasionally where managers were together in groups I was able 
to ask them questions collectively, which could be described as spontaneous 
focus groups or group interviews (Fontana and Frey 2000). During these 
observations I was also able to integrate observations of particular processes 
including adjudications on prisoners who had committed offences against prison 
discipline, early release and recategorisation decisions about prisoners. I was also 
able to observe audits being carried out. On a number of occasions in both sites I 
attended not to shadow individuals but instead to attend specific meetings 
including the senior management team meetings, and meetings with the local 
branch of the Prison Officers Association. I would take notes throughout the day 
in an exercise book that I carried with me and at the end of each day I would 
write these up in the form of field notes (Van Maanen 1988).
This was followed by interviews with 30 people in each site. These interviews 
focussed on managers, but also incorporated a random sample of five officers in 
each prison in order to consider their perspective and the impact of management. 
Due to the smaller numbers, the governing governor (in overall charge of the 
establishment), all governor grades (senior operational managers), and principal 
officers (uniformed middle managers) were interviewed. Most non-operational 
senior management team members were also interviewed (such as heads of 
learning and skills, finance, psychology, regimes, or human resources), although 
some such as the finance managers were only interviewed informally in the 
observation phase. With senior officers (uniformed first line managers), there 
were too many to interview them all and therefore a sample was interviewed.
These were selected opportunistically based upon who was available at the time, 
although in each prison this did include all senior officers that were members of 
minority ethnic groups and at least one female. The interviews were semi-
structured and the questions were informed both by the literature review and the 
observation phase. The questions included the backgrounds and motivations of 
prison managers as well as aspects of their work including the role of 
performance management, the use of discretion, models of good management, 
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and how they were influenced by the internal dynamics of the organisation 
including prison staff culture and external factors such as politics and society. I 
also explored issues of power and inequality by looking at gender, race and ill-
health. These interviews therefore followed up in detail the main areas of interest 
and focused interviewees on the critical areas (Cohen and Taylor 1980). The 
interview schedule was not formally piloted but was designed and checked 
through supervision, then redundancy eliminated during early interviews. The 
interviews were tape recorded and no one had any objections to this or expressed 
any concerns. This may have been because the process of talking to people 
frequently and about a range of different subjects in the observation phase built 
trust (Sparks 2002) but is more likely to be that many people in prisons are 
familiar with research, issues of confidentiality and have been tape recorded at 
some stage during their career. Following the interviews, I made a verbatim 
transcript of the interview. 
The third source was documentary data. At each site, documentary evidence was 
generated including publicly available performance information such as KPTs, 
audits, staff surveys, measuring the quality of prison life results, independent 
monitoring board reports, inspection reports. Internal information was also 
collected where this was relevant including the minutes of meetings, local 
information notices and personnel data.  With such information providing an 
‘official’ portrait, there were clearly issues regarding authenticity, credibility, 
representativeness and meaning (MacDonald 2001) and therefore the documents 
were not in themselves considered conclusive. However, they were useful for 
providing that ‘official’ perspective, which could be contrasted with the full 
account of what happened in meetings. This could also be used in order to 
triangulate some data (Denzin 1978) and clarify issues.  
Ethics
There are a number of formal ethical frameworks available in order to assist with 
the design, planning, undertaking and reviewing of research (e.g. Murphy and
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Dingwall 2001, Christians 2000). One of the most widely recognised is that 
produced by the Economic and Social Research Council (2006). This covers six 
key principles, which are:
 Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity 
and quality.
 Research staff and subjects must be informed fully about the purpose, 
methods and intended possible uses of the research, what their 
participation in the research entails and what risks, if any, are involved. 
 The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the 
anonymity of respondents must be respected.
 Research participants must participate in a voluntary way, free from any 
coercion.
 Harm to research participants must be avoided.
 The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of interest 
or partiality must be explicit.
Ethical issues cannot be simply ticked off but instead are organic, complex and
ongoing issues, as will be discussed later in this chapter. However, it is necessary 
to account for some of these formal issues in the planning and design of research. 
In this case, the project was subject to approval and supervision by the School of 
Law at Edinburgh University. An information sheet was produced describing the 
researcher, the research, how confidentiality applied and the uses of the research. 
This specifically highlighted my position as a serving prison manager. This form 
was given to any individuals who were shadowed during the observation stage 
and to all participants in interviews. In other situations during the observation 
stage, such as when I encountered people interacting with those I was shadowing 
or when I attended meetings, I would verbally introduce myself as a researcher 
undertaking a project on prison managers. Those who were observed during 
shadowing or who participated in interviews also signed a consent form. This 
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explained that they could withhold consent, or withdraw it at a later point should 
they wish to do so.
The contributions of participants to this study were stored securely physically 
and electronically and where used are anonymised. They are coded by 
establishment, by grade and then assigned a number within that group. The two 
establishments were assigned letters, one W and the other S. Each participant is 
then identified by role as officer, senior officer, principal officer, governor grade, 
or non-operational manager. There were sufficient numbers of staff in the officer, 
senior officer and principal groups in order that contributions would be 
anonymous. The governor grades including the governing governor and deputy 
governor were grouped together in order to reduce the risk of their being 
identifiable. Similarly, non-operational managers were grouped together rather 
than being identified as ‘finance manager’, ‘HR manager’ and so on, for the 
same reason. As a result, each contribution is identified by an establishment 
letter, grade and then an allocated number, so for example ‘S5 senior officer’
indicates the fifth senior officer at one of the prisons. Field notes are also 
indicated with an establishment letter, the letters ‘FN’ to indicate that they are 
derived from field notes and a number to indicate the day. For example ‘WFN 
30’ indicates field notes from the 30th day at one of the sites.       
There were three occasions when individuals may have been identifiable, all of 
these are in chapter 7. The first was in the discussion of ethnicity as in each 
prison there was only one manager from a minority ethnic group, the second was 
in the discussion of Heads of Learning and Skills as there was only one in each 
prison, and the third was the discussion of female managers as there were low 
numbers of female managers at each grade. In relation to the managers from 
minority ethnic groups and the Heads of Learning and Skills, further consent was 
sought from the individuals and the details were obscured to reduce the risk of 
identification. With the female managers there was less risk and therefore it was 
considered sufficient that the details were obscured.
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So far, there has been a descriptive account of the research strategies and the 
ethical framework applied. However, as was noted earlier this is a more dynamic, 
organic and complex issue that has so far been presented. It is now necessary to 
embark upon a more analytical and reflexive account of undertaking the research.  
Entering the field
Gaining access to prisons can be “a time consuming and problematic process” 
(Smith and Wincup p.335) and certainly there have been many examples of 
researchers being denied access or having their ambitions curtailed in the process 
of negotiating access. However, as an insider negotiating access was less time 
consuming and was not problematic in the same way. 
Indeed, gaining entry to the prisons was straightforward. Personal contact was 
made with the senior managers in the two prisons, the research explained and 
they immediately consented. Neither of the Governors made any requests other 
than asking for sensitivity as to the time and resources that would be required to 
support the research. I was not asked by either of the Governors for a formal 
Prison Service research application, although this was completed and forwarded 
to them. Although not directly articulated or explored, this ease of access 
arguably reflected a range of assumptions that could have been made about me 
and the work. This included that I may have been seen as being a recipient of 
benevolent comradely support but equally that could be accompanied by an 
unspoken assumption that would be repaid through a benign set of findings. I 
may also have appeared less threatening, more predictable and controllable than 
an outsider, in other words seen as less of a risk.      
One of the sites selected was a late replacement; originally another prison had 
been identified as a research site but after the untimely death of the Governor I
decided that it would not be appropriate to conduct the research there, although it 
had been made clear that the offer was still open to me. Another prison was then 
approached as an alternative but the Governor there had only recently taken up 
68
post and felt that he did not want to have such research conducted until he was 
more established. This did expose that ‘insider’ research was not necessarily 
viewed as entirely benign, particularly by those who felt vulnerable or insecure 
due to circumstances. 
On entering the research sites, I attended a weekly senior management team 
meeting and briefly introduced myself and the research. Both Governors made an 
effort to send a message regarding co-operation and openness. One did this
directly by stating that everyone could be honest, whereas the other made a 
risqué joke and when challenged by a member of the team about making such 
comments in front of a “guest”, he responded by saying that anything could be 
said in front of me. This senior level sponsorship came from my being an 
‘insider’. 
Entry into the field contrasted with other accounts of gaining research access; 
official barriers were easier to navigate and there was some instant and senior 
sponsorship. However, as shall be explored, gaining this initial support with the 
absence of overt constraint did not describe the whole picture and indeed the 
process of undertaking the research raised complex issues about identity and 
power.
Conducting the fieldwork: Problems and challenges
This section will explore some of the problems and challenges of carrying out the 
research. In particular it will draw out the ways in which my position as an 
‘insider’ shaped the research process. Whilst some other research studies by 
insiders have simply stated their personal experience and affiliations and treated 
it as a declaration of interests (e.g. Bryans 2007), I will attempt to provide a more 
reflexive account of conducting ‘insider’ research. This section broadly covers 
three issues: identities; power; and confidentiality and interventions.
Identities
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Identity is the idea that individuals have a concept of the self, a sense of who 
they are and their place in the world, what has been described as the “sustaining 
of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives” (Giddens 1991 
p.5). In the process of carrying out this research there were shifts in my own 
sense of identity, but there were also responses from subjects regarding who they 
thought I was and how they understood my identity. These two aspects will be 
discussed below.
My own sense of identity was intimately bound up in the research methodology. 
In classical anthropology, the detached observer coming into the particular field 
for the first time was seen as the purest expression of this method, whilst those 
who were ‘insiders’ were seen as having insufficient distance and detachment 
(Angrosino and Mays de Perez 2000). However, this view has been eroded with 
the development of what is called ‘anthropology at home’ where researchers 
enter more familiar fields (Jackson 1987, Okely 1987) and indeed the use of 
insiders has even been deliberately used as a form of empowerment for those 
being studied (Sarsby 1984). For an ethnographer studying a field they are 
familiar with, the challenge is identified as achieving sufficient critical distance, 
a process of “getting out, of distancing themselves from their far-too-familiar 
surroundings” (Lofgren 1987). In that way a position is sought which is intimate 
enough to gain access, empathise and understand but at the same time 
sufficiently detached in order to reflect and analyse, what has been described as 
walking a tight rope between “empathy and repulsion, home and strangeness, 
seeing and not seeing” (Sarsby 1984). It is this position between distance and 
intimacy that has been described as the essence of ethnographic fieldwork; “it is 
out of this experience of being simultaneously an insider and an outsider that 
creative insight is generated” (Fielding 2001 p.151).
There were some ways in which I tried to create distance through the research 
design itself. In particular, I selected prisons that I was not familiar with and 
therefore they and the people who worked there were largely unknown to me. By 
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having sites that are separate from my direct personal experience, this helped me 
to see things anew and to feel some unfamiliarity in a familiar environment 
(Strathern 1987). The planning of the research and background reading gave 
some shape and structure to the observations, shifting me from my work identity 
or at least providing me with a reflexive appreciation of it, and helping me to 
view the environment from a sociological rather than a managerial perspective. 
The use of field notes, the constant carrying of a notebook and frequently writing 
observations and entries also anchored me in the purpose for which I was there. 
In these ways I was trying to manufacture a sense of disciplined subjectivity 
(Wolcott 2005).
There was also a more intimate, intense and personal experience that I went 
through in order to achieve a sense of detachment. I can now: “reflect on the self 
that [I] had to become in order to pass in the setting, and how that temporary, 
setting-specific self differs from the person that [I] normally [am]” (Fielding 
2001 p.151). The most visible and outward manifestation of the changes in my 
identity were in my personal appearance. Before entering the first research site I 
had to decide what I was going to wear. This was a more challenging and 
complex issue than simple vanity. This struck at the heart of my identity and the 
change that I was undertaking. Clothes are not merely for discretion or warmth 
but are also related to identity: “Essentially people use clothes to make two basic 
statements: first, this is the sort of person I am; and secondly, this is what I am 
doing” (Ross 2008 p.6-7). In prisons, clothing has a particular meaning and is 
used in order to communicate distinctions of rank and purpose. There is a long 
history of prisoner clothing being used as a reflection of changing penal 
philosophies from the uniformity of arrowed and striped clothing to the 
liberalism of prisoners wearing their own clothes, and on to new punitive 
practices using high visibility clothes (Ash 2010). For staff also, the use of prison 
uniform and military style insignias of rank are used in order to convey a sense 
of order, status and discipline, with governor grades distinguished by the fact that 
they wear suits, sometimes even being referred to as ‘suits’ and promotion into 
their ranks being described as ‘getting your suit’. My decision about what clothes 
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to wear therefore took on a particularly potent texture and felt that it went to the 
essence of both who I had been and who I was attempting to become.   
I decided to wear casual but reasonably smart clothing but avoid suits and ties. 
This decision was intended to convey a difference from my previous identity as a 
prison manager and to mark myself out as someone who was not in the prison as 
an employee. This change in status and role did not go unnoticed by others. One 
officer directly asked me what it was like going from a “high powered job” to 
coming in speaking to staff wearing a t-shirt and jeans (I was wearing a polo shirt 
and chinos, but the question was still a good one). Other staff, including senior 
managers did occasionally comment on my casual attire, usually in a light-
hearted way, but also in sufficient numbers to indicate how important this was in 
defining my change in role and perceived status.
I also found myself going through changes that indicated a personal journey I 
was undertaking. I became increasingly comfortable in casual clothing and 
increasingly uncomfortable in a suit, so that those occasions outside of the 
research when I had to wear a tie, I found it strangulating and almost impossible 
to wear. I grew my hair longer, and even at one stage sported a beard. The way 
that research can have an impact on the researcher and is manifested in personal 
appearance was graphically illustrated on the cover of Malcolm Young’s An 
Inside Job (1991), where two photographs of the author contrasted the clean cut 
police officer with the hippyish researcher. These changes are not superficial, but 
reflect a deeper questioning taking place as a result of the temporary role in the 
field. Young observed that there is an intense, intimate and personal experience, 
a “radical reflexivity” (ibid p.25), that is required in order to create the distance 
required: 
“It requires a conscious act of experiencing a reflection of 
yourself and of how you have become what you are. It can be 
quite painful, for the insider is studying his own social navel, with 
the potential always present that he will recognize this to be only 
one of a number of arbitrary possibilities and perhaps also find 
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that many practices are built on the flimsiest of moral precepts”
(ibid p.9). 
In my experience, the research led me to question my profession and my own 
role, reflect on the morality of practices I engaged in, choices I made and 
accommodations I accepted. These are not always comfortable considerations. I 
particularly questioned the role of prison in society; its role in maintaining and 
reinforcing power and inequality (for example see Bennett 2008b). This also led 
me to question my role as a prison manager, as well as those of other prison 
managers, whether I and they reinforce, resist or ameliorate these conditions. 
This questioning is difficult but is also creative and rewarding as part of the 
process of exploring the field from a space that is both intimate but also 
sufficiently detached in order to facilitate meaningful observation.
Whilst these changes in my own identity mark the journey I was undertaking, no 
researcher acts in isolation. Those who are the subject of the research also have a 
sense or perception of my identity. This is often intertwined with organisational 
culture and structures as it is related to any personal identity I projected. There 
are seven predominant ways in which I felt that I was perceived by those in the 
field.
The first is as a colleague. As has been described earlier, the fact that I was an 
insider meant that access was easier and also meant that I understood the 
language, acronyms and technicalities of processes in prisons. This is useful in 
enabling staff to speak to me with some degree of confidence that their 
perceptions would be understood and empathised with. I did not face any 
resistance as an ‘outsider’ or have to undertake any rites of passage in order to be 
accepted. In fact, that acceptance was often instant, for example one senior 
officer went as far to describe me in a team briefing as “one of us”. This sense of 
shared experiences and belonging did create some challenges in focussing on the 
research issues. Some outside researchers can adopt a position of naivety which 
would allow them to explore what were taken for granted assumptions and 
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practices. I had to manufacture this sense by explaining to people that although I 
was familiar with the technicalities or mechanics of prison management, my role 
as a researcher meant that I was looking at it from a different perspective. 
Generously, everyone was willing to do this, although it did illustrate that the 
first perception that many people had of me was as a fellow member of prison 
staff rather than a researcher.   
The second identity is that of superior. As those I was interacting with knew my 
background and previous roles, some were conscious that I held a formal rank 
and status within the organisation. For example, occasionally I would be called 
“Sir” or “Governor” and one interviewee asked “is it okay to call you ‘Jamie’ 
since you’re an ex-Dep6?”. Such forms of address convey a sense of the 
importance of status and hierarchy within the organisation. However, such forms 
of address also perform a function for those who are using them, acting as signals 
that they should be cautious about what they say and do. A third, and related, 
identity is that of expert. I was sometimes asked by individuals or in meetings to 
comment on policies, practices or provide feedback. I studiously avoided doing 
this, always explaining that I was there in a particular role of researcher. This 
was never pushed by the questioners and was accepted on the face of it. 
However, this did disclose a degree to which participants were aware that I was 
not a naive observer but instead carried a professional history and knowledge.   
The fourth identity is that of mentee. Some managers, notably some who were 
older, more experienced and particularly those that were more senior than me in 
the organisational hierarchy, adopted a mentoring role towards me. They were 
willing to spend additional time with me, ensuring that I had support and access, 
willing to share their thoughts and experiences and also offer unsolicited advice 
on my future career. This benevolent interest was helpful and appreciated but 
was also an assertion of hierarchy and control.  
                                               
6 i.e. Deputy Governor
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These first four identities are linked in as much as they all relate to hierarchical 
position, rank or status within the organisation. They reveal that whilst I was not 
in a formal position, I was perceived by many to carry residual status and identity 
as a prison manager.  
The fifth identity is auditor. Some managers asked about how the outcomes of 
my research will be used within the organisation. Although I explained that this
is not the purpose of nature of the work, some managers found this difficult to 
comprehend. For example, many people asked about or referred to the ‘report’ I 
was writing, a term that implied that it has some official purpose. Another 
example is where one governor grade approached me anxiously saying that he 
had been told I was completing “a cost-benefit comparison” between the two 
prisons. Although I had previously explained the nature of the research and 
reiterated this, there remained a residual anxiety from that individual, reflecting a 
concern about the purpose and uses to which the research may be put by the 
organisation. Some managers also responded to the research by putting on a 
performance as if they were being tested and were anxious to pass. These 
individuals would often use management phrases and clichés in order to respond 
to questions and would constantly seek to give positive examples of what they 
had done, claim credit for innovations and provide ‘spin’. Given that I had spent 
some considerable time in the field by the time I carried out the interviews, these 
distortions were relatively easy to detect and were themselves telling about the 
individuals and sometimes about wider prison management. Nevertheless they 
also reveal one of the ways in which I and my research were understood and 
approached by the participants.    
The sixth identity is as a curiosity. For some people, I was difficult to understand 
and to pigeon hole and they appeared bemused as to what I was doing and why I 
was doing it. This was revealed in some of the comments that were made about 
my personal appearance as described above. Indeed, one senior manager, during 
the stage that I had longer hair and a beard, described me in a joking way as “Che 
Guevara”. Whilst this may just have been a reference to my appearance, it may 
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also have indicated that beyond curiosity, there may have been suspicion or 
discomfort about my motives or that I deviated from and subverted cultural 
expectations by undertaking this research role. 
The final way in which I was understood was as a researcher. However, this was 
not discrete from my organisational identity and in many ways was a 
manufactured identity. There were some managers who had themselves 
undertaken research and were able to discuss meaningfully the research process 
and my role. They particularly understood what I was doing, how I was doing it 
and some of the complexities. As the research progressed, other managers also 
seemed to accept that I was there in a particular role and started to become 
protective of that. For example, when I was asked in meetings to comment on 
issues, other managers would step in on my behalf explaining that I was there as 
a researcher. Whilst this may have also been about protecting their own status 
and position, the fact that this appeared to happen more as time went on, 
indicated that this at least in part reflected that they accepted my role as 
researcher. However, for some there was an inherent problem with being a 
manager and a researcher. On more than one occasion I was asked penetrating 
questions about my motives and any personal or career advantage that I may 
accrue from conducting the research. One manager took a different angle and 
asked candidly whether it was possible for me to be unbiased given my 
background and describing how they felt judged by my observing them. My 
identity as a researcher appeared manufactured, incomplete and inextricably 
bound up with my organisational position, although it did form part of how I was 
understood and viewed by others.
The preceding discussion has attempted to unravel some of the complex issues of 
identity in conducting ethnographic research. Every researcher imports aspects of 
their existing identity and it is not possible to be a pure, detached observer. 
However, it is essential that there is reflexivity and sensitivity to the ways in 
which ones own identity shapes observations and understanding and how it 
affects those participating in the research.     
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Power
Power in its most general terms refers to the production of causal effects (Scott 
2001). This is not only a subject of this research, but is an ethical and practical 
problem in its conduct. As an ‘insider’ I am someone who potentially holds
power, but I am also the subject of power, and potentially the medium for it. 
There is therefore a particular issue about the potential effects of the research for 
myself and for others.
I will start by discussing the ways in which I may have been the subject of 
power. This has been described as the “special problem” of prison research 
where access and funding are restricted and therefore there are risks regarding 
the control and shaping of research (Sparks et al 1996 p.339). There are both 
formal and informal ways in which organisations can attempt to shape and 
control research outcomes (Whyte 2000, King 2000). However, the argument 
that organisations will overtly control research can be overplayed and it should 
be recognised that the process of gaining access and conducting research is 
negotiated, meaning that the researcher themselves exercise significant power 
(Hammersley 1995, King 2000). In my specific case, the research was funded 
initially by the Leadership and Development team of the Prison Service as an 
individually negotiated personal development opportunity. The head of that 
particular team was keen to promote innovative development opportunities and 
was willing to make funds available to support this. Although that individual 
asked me to include in the research some analysis of data that had already been 
generated on prison managers using Myers-Briggs personality assessments, this 
was quickly forgotten as that individual moved on from that role and it has not 
been part of the research project. Each year I have had to resubmit an application 
for funding which has asked for little more than an update on progress. As has 
already been described, access to the prisons was straightforward without any 
attempt to alter or shape the research agenda. There was not therefore the 
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intimate scrutiny and collaboration in establishing the research agenda that have 
been discussed elsewhere (Sparks et al 1996, Smith and Wincup 2000). 
During the conduct of the research there were not any overt attempts to control or 
shape what was happening. There were rare comments made including an offer 
to keep a senior manager “informed” about a prison being researched, occasional 
requests to ignore or overlook comments that may have been seen as 
inappropriate or unprofessional (‘don’t write that down’, ‘you’re not making a 
note of that?’), and a prodding desire that the outcome of the research would be 
‘favourable’ to a particular prison. However, these comments were never made 
with a sense of any meaningful pressure and were never taken seriously by me or 
followed up by those who made them. Later questions about the research by 
those people were satisfied (or deterred) by general feedback about which stage 
the research was at or sociological concepts that may be relevant, no information 
was directly asked for or disclosed that would have breached confidentiality. 
Similar comments frequently crop up in methodological accounts, and should not 
be considered indicative of any serious attempt to corrupt or distort the research 
findings, but were instead a reflection of the natural uncertainty and nervousness 
of research subjects who surrendered considerable power to a researcher. 
However, overt power is not the only way in which control can be exercised and 
there are often soft forms of power that achieve the same outcomes. There are
more subtle ways in which the values of funders and researchers can become 
inexorably interlinked through their relationship (Cheek 2000) and this can be a 
particular issue where, like me, they are an employee (Sparks et al 1996). I have 
acquired a certain amount of organisational trust and have accepted the 
obligations and responsibilities that come with that, having occupied senior posts 
and represented the Prison Service externally and in the media (see Warren 2006 
for a particularly insipid puff piece). However, I have also cultivated an 
alternative identity as a commentator on prison issues, being editor of the Prison 
Service Journal since 2004, a member of the editorial board of the Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Matters, the author of a number of 
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articles and the editor of three books. Some of these articles have been critical of 
prisons generally or Prison Service policy in particular. As such, I have a 
developed and practiced critical appreciation of the work that I do and the field in 
which I operate. This detachment was reinforced through supervision and whilst 
the final thesis is not polemic, it does include observations that are critical of or 
are at odds with official accounts. 
At the time the initial funding was agreed and the research initiated, a prison 
governor having this kind of hinterland did not appear to cause any 
organisational concern, perhaps because these articles were not widely read and 
perceived as being safely contained in academic journals. However, in 2008 the 
attitude towards publications changed following publicity given to a pamphlet 
published by a prison governor grade which criticised government policy on 
knife crime (Marfleet 2008). This resulted in rigorous enforcement of the rule 
that prison staff had to have publications authorised by the organisation prior to 
publication. At the time this happened I had a number of articles in press and was 
the subject of a formal investigation and disciplinary proceedings as a result of 
the publication of one of the articles, which was critical of Conservative Party 
crime policy (Bennett 2008a). This shift in attitudes towards research and 
publications did not result in any direct interference in this project but, it does 
mean that any subsequent publications will be produced in an environment that is 
potentially more controlling and punitive.    
As an insider, my experience as the subject of power was different from that of 
external researchers. In the design, funding, approval and fieldwork stage, there 
was an absence of formal control and I was able to proceed with minimal 
scrutiny. Indeed, the most striking feature has been the absence of control rather 
than the exercise of it. However, at the other end of the process, the publication 
stage, there is more significant power available and the potential for the exercise 
of control by the organisation is more pronounced.
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I will now turn to the ways in which I may have been the facilitator of power. My 
intention was to carry out research on prison managers, who are people who 
themselves hold significant power over others. In his work, Bryans (2007 p.6) 
described prison governors as a powerful “criminal justice elite”. Pahl (1980) has 
argued that sociology has largely ignored the powerful in favour of the powerless 
and addressing this deficit could have significant value:   
“If the everyday worlds with which we are most familiar are 
mainly those of the underdogs or, at best, the middle dogs, we are 
forced to fall back on the accounts of non-sociologists for an 
understanding of the top dogs…If one argues that our 
understanding of the powerless has been greatly improved 
through sociological analysis, surely our understanding of the 
powerful could also be improved” (p.130-1).    
However, are prison managers really a powerful elite? Gouldner (1973) also 
argued in favour of undertaking sociology of the powerful but argued that prison 
managers, school head teachers and hospital administrators were not the 
powerful but were also underdogs. He described that these ‘local caretaking 
officials’ were generally depicted in sociology as ignorant and poor managers. 
He went on to say that these depictions carried: “a political payload. For it is this 
discrediting of local officials that legitimates the claims of the higher 
administrative classes…and gives them an entering wedge on the local level” 
(ibid p.50). 
A study of prison managers therefore has to be conscious of the risks of being 
used in unintended ways and for reasons that are not approved or supported by 
the researcher (for a poignant example see Sparks 2002). As a result, this study 
attempted to avoid appearing as a formal evaluation of effectiveness and instead 
was an attempt to provide a sociological exploration. By the very nature of the 
subject of agency and structure, prison managers were explored not only as the 
holders of power but also as the subjects of it. It was therefore not attempting to 
place prison managers in the position of being elite or the sole holders of power. 
It is as much about their powerlessness as much as it is about their power.  
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Finally, I will address the ways in which I was the holder of power and others 
were the subjects of it. I have already touched upon some of these but they are 
worth reiterating. The first was that any researcher holds some power in as much 
as people exposed themselves and their work to the scrutiny of someone who 
would analyse and write about it without them having control. This was a 
significant act of trust by the participants and an accumulation of power and 
responsibility by the researcher. As has been previously mentioned, my role as an 
insider may have carried with it expectations about comradeship and may have 
facilitated access, it was therefore important for me to structure expectations by 
being clear about the nature of the research, the areas being considered and to  
provide commitments about confidentiality. The second aspect of my power 
related back to my role as a serving prison manager. This was brought sharply 
into focus on the one occasion when a member of staff declined to be 
interviewed. I had intended to go back to the manager in charge of the prison on 
that particular day and arrange an alternative interview, as they assisted me by 
making staff available. The interviewee expressed concern about this and stated 
that they may be challenged or criticised for refusing to take part, not by me but 
by the manager I would be speaking to. As a result I decided not to arrange an 
alternative interview and went home for the day. Although on this occasion the 
risk was managed and avoided, it nevertheless highlighted that I was perceived 
by some as having power through the support of senior people within the 
establishment. Although I did not sense that others were concerned about this, it 
was an issue that I became increasingly conscious of as a result.         
As an insider, the complexities, challenges and risks of research display both 
similarities and differences compared with external researchers. In some ways 
the process of the research was eased and the logistics were more 
straightforward. There were the same risks of control and misuse of findings. 
However, there were more subtle challenges both in the ways that organisational
power flowed in shaping the researcher and the response of the participants. As 
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an insider researcher it is essential that one is alert to this and open to ways in 
which this can be manifested and managed.   
Confidentiality and intervention
Many researchers report ethical dilemmas presented where they have to ask 
themselves whether they should maintain the mask of the neutral and passive 
researcher or whether they should intervene (for particularly vivid examples see 
Crewe 2009). This was a dilemma that I faced on several occasions throughout 
the research, again my insider status made these challenges at least feel different 
to those situations presented in other research. 
As was mentioned previously, the only time in which there appeared to be a 
request to breach confidentiality was when a senior manager asked me to keep 
him “informed” of the research. This appeared to be an implied invitation to do 
more than simply discuss the sociological findings but instead to pass judgement 
and nuggets of information about the organisation and individuals. As I have said 
previously this was not followed up and subsequent conversations and feedback 
were in the most general terms regarding the progress of the research and I was 
not directly asked to breach any confidentiality.
There were a number of occasions during the research where people made 
comments that I felt were distasteful and were sometimes racist or sexist. One in 
particular had a strong impact. On that occasion, a manager shared an anecdote 
about a conversation he had with a more senior, female colleague at a previous 
prison. In this he said that he had described overweight women as “pigs in 
knickers”. This left me feeling sickened at the degrading language and attitude 
displayed. Many researchers have reported having ‘well bitten tongues’ from 
remaining silent when comments are made (Crewe 2009). However, this left me 
sharing Crewe’s feelings of shame at the “collusive silences” (ibid p.475) that 
were maintained. In my circumstances, I was particularly concerned as my 
organisational status may have conferred a greater degree of tacit approval to 
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what was said, but I had to balance that with the potential benefits of gaining a 
rounded picture of the world I was examining.        
During the research, people appeared to become increasingly relaxed, testing me 
with disclosures about their views about managers, and once established that I 
would listen and hold confidences, opened up to disclosures about a range of 
issues. As ever, it was the disclosures of breaches of formal rules that provide a 
barometer of the honesty and openness of participants. Some revealed 
experiences of witnessing the abuse of prisoners in the distant past, many 
disclosed practices such as manipulating performance information, and others 
disclosed more individual, but deeply held personal beliefs about issues such as 
religion or politics. As with the comments described above, the balance seemed 
to lie in maintaining openness rather than shutting this down and breaching 
confidentiality.
On one occasion I felt that the balance lay differently. In this situation, I was 
shadowing a manager who had to carry out a series of checks in the reception 
area of the prison. A prisoner had arrived who claimed to have been assaulted by 
prison staff at the prison he had just left. Initially it was not clear that there was 
going to be any follow up on this. I decided that the risk was serious and 
immediate and therefore wanted to be assured that the prisoner was receiving 
medical attention and that the matter was properly recorded. In the event, the 
manager I was shadowing did ensure that these things happened without the need 
for me to intervene. I am sure that the questions I was asking betrayed more than 
a research interest at the time and that my concern was clear, but I was satisfied 
that was necessary in the circumstances. 
There were other occasions where my presence appeared to have a potential 
effect on those around me. For example, in one of the prisons I will later describe 
how they received a request from a nearby prison to hold a disruptive prisoner 
for the duration of an inspection. Before the management team decided to decline 
this request there were a number of glances thrown in my direction and whilst the 
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same decision may have been made whether or not I had been there, my presence 
was certainly something that they became conscious of at that moment.   
One issue that is often raised in research is about loyalties and taking sides, again 
a particular issue in prisons where the divisions between groups are sometimes 
marked. In one of the sites, I was present during a one day strike by the Prison 
Officers Association. Some managers were members of the union and therefore 
joined the strike (most senior and principal officers) whilst others were not and 
therefore operated the prison during the day. I decided that I would cross the 
picket line and enter the prison. I did not feel compromised by this as a result 
both of the fact that I was researching managers and was therefore interested in 
how they would deal the situation, and also that as a governor grade I would not 
be expected by those on the picket line to join a strike and instead would be 
expected to go in. My dual identity acted as a protection on this occasion. During 
the day I was able to talk to managers on both sides and afterwards was able to 
discuss the strike openly with those who took part without any adverse reaction. 
Whilst in the prison, I also made it clear that should the need arise I would be 
willing to assist with the operation of the prison. This assessment was based on 
the immediacy of the risk as in a strike situation with small number of people on 
duty the safety of staff and prisoners can be compromised. However, in the event 
I was only asked to cover a unit during a meal break.       
These dilemmas about when to stand back, when to intervene, when to keep 
confidentiality and when to break it are always presented in the field. However, 
there were occasions when my dual role had an influence, in shaping these 
dilemmas. 
Leaving the field
In each prison there was a fixed period in which I was due to be there (six 
months) and a set programme of work that I intended to carry out. It was 
therefore a straightforward logistical task to end the research. I offered to return 
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in due course to present back some of the findings but that would be some years 
later.
Leaving the field was not, however, simply a technical task but was instead part 
of a personal journey or “rite de passage” (Young 1991 p.63) which had seen me 
change in many ways.  As I prepared to leave the second research site, my casual 
clothing started to become smarter, my hair shorter and ties felt less constricting. 
Within two months of completing the fieldwork I had taken up a post as 
Governor of a prison. Although I outwardly returned to my previous occupation, 
I did not feel like the same person who had gone into the research. I felt more 
questioning, less attached to the organisation for its own sake, more conscious of 
the social web that imprisonment formed part of, and more conscious of the 
strengths and limitations of managerial practices. This made me a different 
prison manager, although I make no claims to be a more effective one, but that 
after all was never the purpose. 
On taking up my new post, I became immediate colleagues with the Governors 
of the two prisons I had conducted the research in. We had to re-establish our 
relationships in new roles and were able to move on. However, the need for me 
to maintain confidentiality was apparent and they both respected that my 
research would develop at its own pace and in its own way. Apart from the 
occasional polite question about when it would be completed, neither has ever 
wanted to know more about it or asked to intervene in any way.    
Having undertaken this research, it also meant that I would now be marked not 
only in how I saw the world, but also how I would be perceived. Although there 
may not be the open and intense hostility towards inside researchers as there has 
been in the past (Young 1991 see also Mascarenhas-Keyes 1987), there is a 
degree of antagonism that could arise from being so publicly identified as a 
prison manager with an interest in research, intellectual inquiry or academic 
study. This is an antagonism that was, in itself, revealing about the culture of 
prison management. There is a cultural tension within prison management in 
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which some prison managers define the world of prison management as being 
made up of two mutually exclusive groups, the first was described using terms 
such a ‘academic’ or ‘process-orientated’ or ‘strategy’, in contrast to the second 
group that were described using terms such as ‘practical’, ‘people-orientated’ and 
‘operational’. Whilst such distinctions were false and incomplete, the language 
and tensions are important in understanding culture (Parker, M. 2000), but were 
also part of my own personal story. 
On leaving the field I completed a phase in the research, but I also entered into a 
new phase of my personal and professional life. In this phase I certainly didn’t 
claim to have the answers but I did have a better understanding of the questions, 
issues, complexities, tensions and problems of the world in which I worked and 
researched.       
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Chapter 4
“Our core business”: Prison managers, performance 
monitoring and managerialism
This chapter is the first of four that present and analyse the empirical research. 
These chapters explore different aspects of the working lives of prison managers
in the conditions of what has been described as ‘late modernity’. Together these 
chapters attempt to realise the aim of the study to understand how individuals 
make sense of and interact with the various competing forces that play upon 
them including local traditions and practices such as occupational cultures, as 
well as global changes such as the growth of managerial practices. This study is 
particularly interested in the negotiation of the dualities of global and local, 
agency and structure, and the ways in which they enable and constrain prison 
managers.       
This chapter focuses on the use of performance management measures in the 
Prison Service and their place in the contemporary lives of prison managers. 
These measures have a central and emblematic position in the managerialist or 
New Public Management (NPM) approach and are particularly revealing about 
the ways in which this has become situated within the prison and the practice of 
managers. A brief summary of the development of managerialism was provided 
in the introduction (chapter 1). This attempted to illustrate how the contemporary 
performance management framework has emerged as a response to a series of 
problems, in particular about how to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
prisons. The solutions were partly sought in greater use of monitoring as a means 
of exercising management direction and control. This was not an isolated 
initiative but instead reflected changes within the public sector as well as wider 
social and political developments. 
This chapter will provide a detailed exploration of each of the performance 
measures, and will endeavour to understand them not as a technical resource but 
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as a social phenomenon. The model for the performance management system at 
the time of the research, was set out in the report Modernising the Management 
of the Prison Service (Laming 2000). This describes the inter-relationship of 
different methods:
(adapted from Laming 2000)
This model identifies six methods for monitoring performance: key performance 
targets (KPT), audits, area manager visits, HM inspectorate of prisons (HMIP), 
Measuring the quality of prison life (MQPL) and Independent Monitoring Boards 
(IMB). Each of these will be described and analysed, focussing primarily on how 
they are used and experienced by managers as part of their working lives. The 
structural qualities of each measure will also be discussed using analytical tools 
produced by Giddens (1984)7, as these qualities are important in examining how 
they are understood and interpreted. This chapter will particularly consider how 
managers experience performance measures as both a form of enablement and 
constraint, and how they themselves facilitate, resist, adapt or interpret the 
requirements placed upon them. The way that prison managers interact with 
these measures and make sense of them through their working lives is critical in 
                                               











illuminating the intersections of agency and structure, and local and global 
forces.
Key Performance Targets
Quantitative measures were the most visible form of performance management 
and as such they had a particular resonance in discussions regarding 
managerialism; they were the performance measurement par excellence. 
Although touted in the mid-1980s (Dunbar 1985), they were introduced to 
prisons in the early 1990s, imported from the commercial sector by Director 
General Derek Lewis (Lewis 1997). They were at the vanguard of the 
introduction of NPM techniques and whilst they were contentious they also had a 
powerful influence in changing prison management.  
During the period of the study, there were approximately 45 KPTs although not 
all of these would apply to each prison; approximately 40 would be relevant to 
each prison. These covered five categories: ‘Decency & Health’ (such as suicide 
and self harm audit score, time unlocked); ‘Organisational Efficiency & 
Effectiveness’ (such as completion of staff appraisals, timely responses to 
prisoner complaints and public correspondence); ‘Regimes’ (such as purposeful 
activity and the attainment of qualifications by prisoners); ‘Safety’ (such as 
assaults and accidents); and ‘Security’ (such as escapes, breach of temporary 
release and completion of searches). Producing this range of measures created 
difficulties in creating an overall picture of performance, making comparisons 
over time or between prisons difficult, and obscuring differentiation between 
more or less important targets. In order to address these issues, an analytical tool 
was developed known as the ‘Weighted Scorecard’, based on similar principals 
to the ‘Balanced Scorecard’ (Kaplan and Norton 1996, 1998). This gave each 
prison a numeric score calculated by taking account of performance against 
target and the relative importance of the various targets. The Scorecard generated
a report which combined scores relative to the target set for the current financial 
year and performance against ‘standard’, an expected performance for similar 
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types of prisons. The Scorecard was available in an IT package, which allowed 
analysis of strengths and weaknesses. Prisons were also listed in rank order, 
which led to it being compared to a ‘league table’ (Wagstaffe 2002).              
These measures had a high visibility, being discussed at all levels. They were 
formally monitored at least monthly at senior management team meetings, and 
informally every week at performance meetings attended by senior and middle 
managers. They were a visible assessment of individual, team and prison 
performance and were constantly in the consciousness of managers. They also 
provided a means of inter-prison comparison, particularly through the Weighted 
Scorecard. Many managers therefore viewed them as the performance measure 
par excellence and that appeared to be reinforced in the way they were produced 
and disseminated. 
This section explores how prison managers viewed and understood KPTs: how 
important were they in their working lives? What values did they ascribe to these 
measures? Why did they comply with or resist their implementation? Through 
these questions, it is intended to explore the role of these practices in shaping 
managers’ working lives and the role of prison managers’ in shaping practice. 
This section will also consider the practice of prison managers and how they felt
about themselves and their work, how these measures influenced the way that 
prisoners and staff were treated, and how they shaped the organisation. In other 
words, there is a question here of the effects on the organisation and the people 
within it. Finally, this section will attempt to analyse the structural qualities of 
KPTs, in order to question whether this provides some explanation for the way 
they were used.        
Practices, perceptions and effects
In the two fieldwork sites, managers talked about how KPTs exercised a 
powerful role within their working lives. The phrases they used to express this 
included: “The whole day is affected by key performance indicators”, “KPTs rule 
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my life”, “they dominate my life”, “they rule my working life”, “we are governed 
by them”, “I’m very aware of them all of the time”. Such terms conveyed both 
the pervasive role that these measures were perceived to have in shaping the 
workplace and the depth to which they penetrated, becoming an all embracing, 
continuous and conscious presence. They often described these measures as 
fundamental to the practice of prison management: “they underpin everything we 
do”, “they’re my bread and butter”, and “they are our core business”.  In general, 
managers saw these measures as having a dominating presence.      
The reach and power of KPTs, however, was not uniform but instead varied. One 
reason for this was differing levels of competence. Whilst some managers were 
clear on how to analyse figures and translate them into action, others were less 
confident and competent. In some meetings, performance information was read 
without any analysis or follow up. At one meeting, a manager directly challenged 
other attendees by saying: “We look at this every month but we don’t do 
anything about it, we just say it’s a bit up or it’s a bit down”. In other meetings, 
performance information was produced that was badly designed and of limited 
use, for example in one prison figures on the number of prisoners involved in 
violent incidents did not distinguish those involved as victims from those 
involved as perpetrators. This issue of competence should not be underestimated 
in shaping the effects of performance measurement. Where competence was 
limited, the measures had less value or credibility and had a more superficial 
impact. 
Their impact also varied depending upon the number of targets that groups or 
individuals held and the difficulty of achieving them. For example, some 
managers had few targets and they were easily achieved as there was sufficient 
staff resources allocated and the practice was routinised. Examples of this 
included the conduct of voluntary drug testing, mandatory drug testing and cell 
searching. These were seen as largely managing themselves, requiring 
management checks during each month but limited intervention. However, other 
targets such as classroom efficiency (the % of available classroom activity places 
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that were utilised), delivering offending behaviour programmes and purposeful 
activity were often more difficult to sustain as they required cross-department co-
operation. As a result, these were more prominent in the working lives of those 
responsible, requiring them to expend more time and energy ensuring that they 
were met. 
The role of KPTs in the manager’s working life also varied with a person’s place 
within the hierarchy, so more senior staff including governor grades generally 
saw them as having a dominating role. Officers and senior officers generally saw 
their role as managing day-to-day interactions and events rather than directly 
achieving targets. Many were conscious that what they did on a daily basis fed 
into the achievement of targets over a longer period of time, but this was not seen 
as the core purpose of their work. The only time they would be more conscious 
of targets, would be when more senior managers intervened if a target was not 
being met, or towards the end of each month when there was pressure to ensure 
that targets were achieved. These issues were summed up in the words of one 
officer: 
“I always feel that they’re dealt with one step back from me. I go 
out and do my tasks, I go out and deal with the guys, talk to the 
guys, handle what’s going on, do my duties for the day. I 
understand that that fits into that system of KPTs but I don’t 
always truly feel responsible for them. I go and do what I’ve got 
to do for the day. If I’m not meeting the target a manager would 
have a word with me. I don’t go around with that in my head, 
whereas I imagine at management level you’re always thinking 
about it.” (W3 officer)
Whilst in general terms managers saw KPTs as having a powerful and pervasive 
role in their working lives, this was not uniform but varied both vertically along 
the hierarchy, and also varied according to the structural characteristics of the 
measures and the competence of individuals.     
Some managers ascribed a range of values to KPTs, seeing them not only as 
something they had to comply with unwillingly, but instead a system that was 
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appreciated. The most prominent values were instrumental. From this 
perspective, targets were tools that improved managerial effectiveness and that of 
individuals, teams and the organisation as a whole. At its most primary level this 
was seen as a means through which work priorities could be established and 
management could be objectified and quantified so providing a rational basis for 
action such as praise, punishment and the allocation of resources. This was a 
source of empowerment for managers; a means through which their skills could 
be applied. They described that this had beneficial results including increasing 
productivity and accountability. This came about as it was believed that workers 
would push themselves in order to meet targets as this provided a positive sense 
of achievement or a negative desire to avoid failure. There were wider social 
benefits reported, in particular improved team working. Within teams people 
would collaborate in order to achieve goals and there were also cases where 
goals such as purposeful activity or classroom attendance required cross-
departmental co-operation and the fact that these were KPTs enabled this to take 
place. The proponents of quantitative performance measures have long argued 
that they provide benefits in terms of organisational effectiveness (for example 
HM Treasury et al 2001), but it should be recognised that this sense of 
effectiveness means increased hierarchical control and visible accountability for 
managers, it is therefore a partial view of what constitutes an effective 
organisation. 
These measures were also seen as having some normative value or moral benefit 
by enabling progressive change. In areas outside of the traditional custody duties 
such as education or rehabilitation, targets provided a source of leverage, 
enlisting wider organisational support. They were also seen as moving prisons 
away from idiosyncratic management towards rational decisions based on needs 
assessment. For example, one manager described:
“Prisoners would come in who could not read and write it was 
almost a bee in my bonnet I became incensed by it because the 
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education team at that time only wanted to know about lifers8 that 
would be taking on their open university or long term prisoners 
that wanted to take A level. That’s all they were bothered about. 
There were no key performance targets and the like. They would 
not bother with these poor people who could not read and write. 
To me these were the people that needed it most. The arguments I 
used to have with them; “oh we haven’t got the time” “yes you 
have got the time, you can have twenty lifers in a classroom, but 
you can’t have a classroom with twenty teaching them the 
basics?” That’s the way it always has been, but you need to look 
at the needs. That’s something that I have always steadfastly and 
been a firm believer in”. (W7 governor grade)
Therefore it was being asserted by this manager that KPTs have enabled the 
process of addressing the needs of the most socially excluded and given the 
powerless an importance that they have not previously enjoyed. The argument 
that there has been a moral dividend from quantitative performance measures has 
been made by several senior prison managers (for example see Wheatley 2005, 
Spurr and Bennett 2008). One former Director General of the Prison Service, 
Martin Narey, went as far to say:
“…show me a prison achieving all its KPIs and I will show you a 
prison which is also treating prisoners with dignity” (Narey 2001 
quoted in Liebling assisted by Arnold 2005 p.68) 
This view presented that not only have performance measures improved 
effectiveness but they have also had a humanising and moral effect. On this 
view, measurement has been a civilising process through which a morally 
sensitized service has emerged. This is a highly contestable view, as will be 
discussed below, but nevertheless it was one that was held by many.         
Attachment to these output measures was reinforced through a network of 
rewards and sanctions. Many perceived that KPTs were backed up by a punitive 
mechanism that would ensnare them should they fail to achieve. This was 
summed up in phrases such as: “KPTs are the word in this jail, you’ve got to 
                                               
8 Life sentence prisoners
94
meet them every month and God help you if you don’t”,  “ [if] we don’t deliver 
the right numbers, I personally get a kicking”, “[If they are not met] you get 
absolutely hammered”, “if we don’t meet them, we get our arses kicked if it’s our 
fault”, “[If they are not met managers will] throw a few fucks into them”, “[I will 
have to] face the wrath of my boss”, “[they are] used as a stick”, and “my focus 
is on KPTs because if I don’t it comes back to me”. There was a belief that harsh 
sanctions would arise from non-attainment. In reality, managers who did not 
succeed in meeting targets were not dismissed, managed as poor performers or 
treated in harsh ways, and indeed many would have their reasons for non-
attainment which would usually be accepted as legitimate. However, managers 
were concerned about this and felt that the experience of accounting for non-
compliance was uncomfortable and that this caused them anxiety about the 
security of their position, reputation and future career. It was considered that 
failure would undermine their credibility with their managers, peers and their 
own staff and that it could result in transfer to less desirable posts or result in the 
denial of promotion opportunities. It was also an outcome that would play 
negatively with their sense of worth and self-identity.  In contrast, success 
brought with it a sense of personal attainment and the prospect of extrinsic 
rewards. Formal mechanisms such as the award of ‘high performing prison’ 
status did entail small financial payments that could be used to reward the staff 
group, but this was limited and only available to a small number of prisons. 
Nevertheless, managers in the prisons that did achieve this status expressed pride 
in the achievement. There were other indirect and informal rewards available. 
Informally, discretionary resources could be allocated to establishment from 
headquarters departments or area offices and this was sometimes linked to how 
well an establishment was perceived to be performing. There were also informal 
rewards available such as praise, developmental opportunities for individuals, 
and the hosting of prestigious visitors.  
Most managers were not slavishly uncritical of output measurement and indeed 
many were conscious of their limitations. First, they recognised that they did not 
always reflect what was important. Some managers described that the critical 
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work of their departments did not feature in performance measurement and that 
the measures in place did not reflect their priorities. They were therefore seen as 
being incomplete and opportunistic (see Smith and Goddard 2002). Second, they 
were described as inflexible, examples of this included that in the field sites, 
measures were not altered to reflect changed resources such as reductions in 
budgets or even increased prisoner population through the opening of new 
accommodation. As a result these were seen as uncontrollable, unrealistic and 
they placed great pressure upon staff to achieve them. Third, it was claimed that 
these measures did not take account of quality. This was cited for example in 
relation to staff appraisals where it was suggested that the measure was to 
complete these in a timely manner but this did not address their quality, and also 
in relation to searching where it was described that these were carried out in a 
less thorough manner in order to fit them into the limited time available. It was 
also suggested that this had an impact on quality in militating against more in-
depth work, for example it was suggested that because targets were set, certain 
courses such as drug treatment had to be filled and this was done even if for the 
prisoners allocated to these were not the highest priority. This reflected the 
arguments made by Anne Owers (2007), former Chief Inspector of Prisons, who 
stated that in some establishments there existed ‘virtual prison’ where managers 
had a view based on performance measures that was out of kilter with the reality 
of the lived experience.   
Although many managers were conscious of these limitations, their criticisms
were largely reserved for the backroom or for the occasional comment in open 
forum. Revolutionary rejection or ignoring of output measures did not take place
and instead managers accepted compliance as a necessity, albeit a sometimes 
unwelcome one. There was a sense that resistance was futile. For example, one 
manager described that in relation to KPTs, some people “don’t believe they are 
necessary”, but that they are “here to stay”, and another suggested that whilst he 
might not agree with some KPTs, “that’s neither here nor there”. This indicated a 
form of dull compulsion where managers felt powerless to do anything other than 
conform.
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Having considered the place of KPTs in the working lives of prison managers it 
is now necessary to turn to consider the effects of these measures on prison 
managers and the wider organisation. The first observation relates to self-worth 
and wellbeing. How managers performed in attaining KPTs was important in 
how they felt about themselves. Whilst some managers expressed a positive 
desire to achieve, many more expressed a negative desire to avoid failure. For 
most managers, they were unswerving, using phrases such as: “you don’t miss a 
KPT, you just don’t do it”; “I don’t like to fail things”; and “I guard them with 
my life”. However, sometimes this was expressed in ways that appeared extreme.
For example, one manager described how he found it “devastating” that he had 
failed to meet a target despite the fact that this was caused by a large increase in 
the prisoner population. Another manager described that the thought of not 
meeting a target “makes me feel ill thinking about it”, whilst a third described 
that they had been burned out and had become “fraggled” as a result of chasing a 
target in difficult circumstances. These intense, physiological feelings were 
elicited by the drive that these individuals had regarding targets. It was clear 
from these comments that these measures played a powerful and dominating role 
in how managers viewed themselves, their self worth and it potentially affected 
their well being.    
There was also an impact on relationships both internally and externally. As was
described above, these measures had the ability to encourage collaboration 
between departments in order to achieve targets. However, there was also a 
negative side to this in as much as many managers described that these targets 
had the effect of making them more individualistic and more competitive (see 
also Cheliotis 2006). For example, some managers focussed on only those targets 
that they were assessed upon or that they could be made to account for. This was 
summed up by one manager who said:
“I will pursue the ones that I have an interest in because it will 
reflect on me, but I’m not too bothered about things like C[ontrol] 
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and R[estraint] because I don’t manage [that]…As long as I send 
back my correspondence when I get it, I’m not bothered whether 
we reach 100% or 90% in actual fact. I’ve done my bit. If it was 
only 75%, I’d say how many letters did I get, how many have you 
had from me on time, 100% well that’s all I’m bothered about. 
I’ve got enough on my plate without worrying about everyone 
else’s beefs” (W12 governor grade).
  
This contrasted with the collaborative ideal often presented regarding prison 
culture and managerialism (see further chapter 6).
Many managers saw themselves as participating in a competitive environment 
both internally and externally. Within prisons, individuals and departments 
wanted to be perceived as performing well, and there was also a rivalry between 
prisons particularly those that were geographically close. The prison’s position 
on the Weighted Scorecard was presented at full staff meetings and other 
meetings as the primary measure of prisons performance and the current position 
was usually prominently displayed at the entrance to the prison and widely 
known around the establishments. Although officially, the Scorecard was not 
used as a league table, instead it was used as one part of the performance 
management toolkit, to many people this was a facade and it was frequently 
described in terms such as: “it’s a league table, well it’s not a league table”; “they 
say it’s not league tables, but they are”; “it’s not a league table but it is”, and 
“you can look at it however you like, but they are league tables and they show 
you in a better or worse light”. Many managers elevated this to a prominent 
sporting competition.  
It was described above that there was a perceived positive effect of KPTs that 
they improved effectiveness. However, it was also the case that they caused 
distortion. The first way in which this happened was that they caused myopia 
where managers focussed on the attainment of targets without considering the 
longer term impact. They also focussed on these measures to the exclusion of 
other factors and this could mean both that important issues of quality were 
ignored, for example drug treatment places being filled by prisoners who were 
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not the highest priority, as described above. In addition, good performance on 
these measures could mask the wider performance of prisons or departments. For 
example, one prison was performing well on its KPTs for race equality9, but was 
criticised in this area by external inspectors (see also Carlen 2008a). 
    
Another significant example of the distorting effects of these measures was in the 
instances of falsification. There were clearly examples in both sites where 
performance information was submitted that was not accurate. For example, 
purposeful activity figures were submitted on a standardised form without 
reflecting the real time spent working; official start and finish times would be 
recorded rather than actual times and interruptions would not be captured. Other 
examples included offending behaviour programme completions being carried 
between accounting years in order to meet targets; there were criticisms of 
inaccurate recording of accidents and serious assaults in some prisons; it was 
stated that prisoners were moved around the prison at the end of each month in 
order to meet overcrowding targets (i.e. they were moved out of doubled cells); 
staff who had left one prison were still counted as part of the control and restraint 
team; and the dates on late complaint forms were amended so that they appeared 
to have been submitted on time. These practices were widely carried out and 
accepted. It was generally viewed that such practices were necessary in order to 
ensure that the official performance of the prison as expressed in KPTs was 
maintained. Managers were also conscious of the mechanics of measures such as 
the Weighted Scorecard, so for example gave particular attention to the most 
highly weighted targets, “a ten-scorer”, and worked out ways in which the 
Scorecard could be manipulated, such as overachieving on certain targets or 
completing work earlier in the year that officially planned. In all of these ways, 
performance information was managed and massaged in order to create a 
positive appearance rather than to make real changes to the lives of prisoners, 
                                               
9 There were two race equality KPTs: one relating to staff and one relating to prisoners. Both 
were composite measures. The staff measure included audit results and the percentage of 
minority ethnic staff employed. The prisoner measure included audit results, outcomes from 
visitor surveys and monitoring of whether key areas such activities, use of force and disciplinary 
measures reflect the ethnic mix of the population.   
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staff and visitors. This distortion and falsification has been noted on a 
widespread scale in relation to time unlocked figures (HMCIP 2008) and has
been described as a chronic feature of managerial practices in prisons (Carlen 
2002a). Whilst these could be seen as subversive acts that resisted the official 
purpose of output measures, in practice they acted to legitimise these by 
presenting an appearance of attainment and reinforcing the requirement to 
comply above normative values such as honesty and integrity.           
Structural qualities
These measures exercised a powerful social control over managers and had 
significant effects upon them and the organisation. It is now worth addressing the 
question of why that was the case. Some of this could be ascribed to the 
structural properties of these measures. Whilst it is recognised that they were 
uneven and varied in practice, using Giddens’ (1984) analytical tools it could be 
said that output measures in prisons were generally intensive, tacit, formalized 
and strongly sanctioned. They were intensive in as much as they were frequently 
used with managers checking these at least weekly. They were tacit in as much 
as they were accepted and are not subject to any significant challenge. They were 
formalized in their definition, operation and monitoring. They were strongly 
sanctioned both within the internalised self-control exercised by individuals and
through the external actions of more senior managers. Their source of power 
could be said to involve domination (power), signification (meaning) and 
legitimation (norm), with the most prominent source being legitimation; that 
these measures were widely accepted and absorbed by managers in their practice, 
identity and values. In terms of structures they had the qualities of strength, 
solidity and rigidity. However, what was also apparent was that it was not solely 
the structural qualities that gave these measures their prominence, it was also the 
social context and the way that they were understood, internalised and practiced 
by the group and individuals, in other words their position within the habitus 
(Bordieu 1977). They were seen as a means through which individual attainment 
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could be achieved, they were a measure par excellence and they were the 
measure that individuals invested greater commitment in.      
Audits
Process audits were a prominent element of the managerialist project. They were 
intended to provide an “independent evaluative practice” (Clarke et al 2000). In 
prisons they were focussed on ensuring that policies were being implemented as 
specified in Prison Service orders and instructions. During the fieldwork there 
were 65 auditable performance standards applicable to the research sites, 
covering a diverse range of issues including violence reduction, security, 
catering, health and safety, industrial relations, race equality and suicide 
prevention. Each standard contained a number of ‘baselines’ that specified the
processes that should be in place. Each prison had its own in-house audit team, 
which conducted audits of all standards over a three-year period, although some 
high priority standards, such as security, would be audited annually. There was 
also a national Standards Audit Unit, which visited annually to check the quality 
of in-house auditing, every two years to cover security and every four years to 
cover other standards. Every audit conducted by both in-house and external 
auditors resulted in a percentage score being awarded and an action plan being 
developed to address non-compliant areas.
The growth of audit in prisons followed the escapes of category A prisoners from 
Whitemoor and Parkhurst in 1994 and 1995, where the cause was linked to basic 
security procedures not being followed (Woodcock 1994, Learmont 1995). It has 
been claimed internally that the ‘success’ of audits has been integral to the 
transformation from non-compliance to compliance, from insecurity to security 
and from failure to success (for example see Clarke 1996, Wheatley 2005, Spurr 
and Bennett 2008). Due to the consequences of these escapes for the public, 
officials and politicians (see Lewis 1997) this new technology of compliance was 
seen as an important weapon in the risk management armoury. Audit has played 
a crucial role in the recent history of prisons and was a powerful barometer of the 
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changes that have taken place and their social consequences. In this section, these 
claims will be explored. This section seeks to explore the role of audits in the 
working lives of prison managers, considering issues of enablement and 
constraint, and professional identity. This section will also seek to explore their 
effects on the organisation and the people within it, including managers 
themselves. Finally, this section will also attempt to analyse the structural 
qualities of audits.        
Practices, perceptions and effects
Audit standards provided in-depth prescriptions of the processes and procedures 
that should be in place and were a means by which they could be tested in 
practice over a period of time. This was a more in depth scrutiny of processes 
than provided by KPTs, which focussed on outputs. However, these were not 
measured constantly but instead were measured on anything from an annual to a 
three-yearly cycle; there was not the constant reporting and monitoring there was 
with KPTs. Management meetings would include updates on the most recent 
audits and the action required to address deficiencies. Those that were 
undergoing audits were therefore the subject of intense, visible scrutiny. 
However, as audits would check processes over a long period of time there was a 
constant, low level awareness by managers that their work would be subjected to 
auditing. They constantly conducted checks for audit purposes such as 
scrutinising the frequency of entries in ACCT10 documents, violence reduction 
documents, observation books and there were written logs in each area structured 
in order to capture information required by audit standards. Whilst less 
constantly intense than KPTs, this provided a method of surveillance that was 
pervasive. Managers were conscious of their weight and control: 
“standards are a way of policing us. Someone comes in and says 
here are the standards are you adhering to them? It can be used 
                                               
10 i.e. Assessment, Care in Custody and Teamwork. These were the formal documents used to 
record the management of those who were identified as being at risk of self-harm.  
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as a tool for challenging staff on how they go about their 
work…it’s like someone looking over my shoulder about how we 
operate”. (S8 governor grade)
Some described this as “overbearing” or even “audit madness” or “action-
planitis”, illustrating the extent to which they felt controlled and constrained.  
Some managers considered that audits provided benefits, in particular they 
enabled them to improve compliance (for example see Clarke 1996, McDonnell 
2000). Some talked about audits as a way of ensuring that work was being done 
correctly and preventing drift where over time processes stopped being operated 
properly or at all. Comments of managers included: “[it] give[s] me good 
assurance”, “keeps us focussed”, “It’s an excellent way of ensuring you’re doing 
things correctly and by the book”, “it lets managers know that what they are 
managing is being done properly”, “ensures you are doing the job”, “Audit is a 
safeguard in case you are merrily going along thinking everything is being done 
correctly but it shows perhaps we’re not doing everything correctly”, and “the 
only way that we can ensure that we are delivering what we are supposed to be 
delivering”. It was also described that they provided consistency between 
departments and prisons, what was often described as a “uniform” approach. 
Audit was seen as a process that maintained management control through 
transparency, accountability and uniformity.
There was a widely held view that the system of audits was backed by sanctions. 
For example managers commented that they felt “jumpy about audits”, that it 
was underpinned by “a blame culture” where failure would mean “their name 
would be next on the list”, or it would “come back and bite you”. One manager 
after an audit result that did not live up to their expectations joked, but with some 
serious intent, about whether he would be removed from his job. Managers were 
also sometimes concerned about embarrassment and criticism in the eyes of 
peers that could result from the visibility of poor audit results. Sanctions were not 
solely internal; there were also concerns that non-compliance would leave the 
prison vulnerable to litigation. Comments were frequently made about solicitors, 
103
coroners’ courts and a “blame and claim” culture as providing a justification for 
audit. They were seen as a means through which risk was intensified and 
managers themselves became vulnerable and subject to domination, but they 
were also a means through which they could control risks such as personal 
reputation, employment security, control of their workforce, and litigation. 
In general, managers were not necessarily unwelcoming of audits and indeed 
many legitimised the process. They argued that this was good organisational 
practice and even that there were moral benefits as audits protected individual 
rights and humane treatment. Historically, the use of defined minimum standards 
has been supported by prison reformers (for example Casale 1984) and these 
have provided the basis for international conventions on prisons (Penal Reform 
International 1995). However, the critical difference was that reformers have 
generally called for standards not as an internal managerial measure but as a 
means of securing public accountability, being set and reviewed in the 
legislature, enforced through the courts and widely used by non-governmental 
organisations in order to inform their scrutiny of prisons (Gostin and Staunton 
1985). Others claimed that local innovation was disseminated through audits. For 
example, methods of recording cleaning used on one wing were promoted by 
auditors in one of the prisons as an exemplar of how to do this. They were also 
seen as providing a means through which managers could encourage teamwork 
between departments. The conduct of routine checks also led managers to 
interact with staff and prisoners at key times, such as servery checks being 
carried out at meal times. The process of audits was therefore described by some 
as encouraging both vertical integration, between people in hierarchical 
relationships, and horizontal integration, between departments or individuals who 
work alongside each other. 
At the same time, many managers were not uncritical of audits and would 
question and challenge them, although this was usually restricted to backroom 
discussions and only occasionally emerged in public discussion such as 
meetings. Criticism often focussed on audit as a form of petty bureaucracy. They 
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were frequently described “tick boxing” or “dotting the I’s and crossing the t’s”. 
Such phrases indicated that they were seen as bureaucratic and detached from the 
reality of what people were doing. Their pettiness was often illustrated through 
the myriad of stories about pedantry, for example in one instance it was claimed 
that a search was conducted by two members of staff where one person did the 
searching and the other talked to the prisoners, but this was criticised because 
only one person should do it, not because any element of the search was missing. 
Other examples included a criticism that a baseline stating that prisoners should 
be offered a shower on reception was not met because prisoners received this on 
the wing even though this meant that they were settled into their new 
accommodation quicker and could bathe in greater privacy. In these stories, the 
criticism was that there was a technical approach rather than a substantive one. 
This argument has been made more broadly in relation to audits: 
“audits are ‘rationalised rituals of inspection’ which produce 
comfort, and hence organizational legitimacy, by attending to 
formal control structures and auditable performance measures. 
Even though audit files are created, checklists get completed and 
performance is measured and monitored in ever more elaborate 
detail, audit concerns itself with auditable form rather than 
substance.” (Power 1997 p.96)
From this perspective, audits can become myopic and self-serving exercises and 
managers were conscious of this. 
The second area of criticism was that audits drew managers away focussing on 
people. This was not simply that their time was taken up by paperwork, but also 
that managers became alienated from the human aspects of their work. One 
officer described:
“It’s not a true reality for me…I like to be with the guys on the 
wing, the prisoners, dealing with their issues, sorting things out 
for them, but I keep getting dragged off into a paper trail but it’s 
taking me away from the humane task…I want my work to be 
prisoner-based, not paperwork-based”. (W3 officer)
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Again, this reflected broader criticisms of audits where they have been described 
as becoming a dominant practice in the working lives of managers. It has been 
suggested that this reduced professional discretion and instead replaced this with 
compliance (Power 1997, Clarke et al 2000, Ryan 1993), but also shaped broader 
attitudes and values. It has been described that:
“…the values and practices which make auditing possible 
penetrate deep into the core of organizational operations, not just 
in terms of requiring energy and resources to conform to new 
reporting demands but in the creation over time of new 
mentalities, new incentives and perceptions of significance.”
(Power 1997 p.97).  
Some managers sensed that audits had a subtle psychological effect of shifting 
their focus from a concern with the individual human experience of 
imprisonment towards a managerial outlook. This could be seen in the 
management of areas such as race equality, which was discussed by some 
managers not in terms of the human experience, but in terms of being “politically 
heavyweight” audits. Cell sharing risk assessments were introduced following 
the racist murder of Zahib Mubarek by his cell mate (Keith 2006), and were 
described in one management meeting in purely managerial terms:
“this is auditable through three or four different baselines…I’ve 
got it up to a three [on audit] but I want to get it up to a four”.
(SFN 31)
Audit was therefore a managerial practice that could shift focus from the 
normative values of prison management and redirect them towards instrumental 
ones (Power 1997, Clarke et al 2000). Auditing was not a purely technical tool 
but instead had broader social effects (for example see Bennett and Hartley 
2006). This created a sense of alienation where some individuals felt a 
dissonance between their own values and experiences of prisons and those 
promoted by audit. This feeling was starkly described by one manager who said: 
“I always have two things in my mind: the audit point of view and the real 
prison” (see also Owers 2007).
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Beyond verbal forms of resistance, many managers attempted to manage the 
process of audits with sometimes distorting effects. There were many ways in 
which this was claimed to happen such as in-house auditors marking generously, 
selecting samples with an eye to those that performed better, being selective 
about the evidence that was generated, those being audited putting on a 
‘performance’ that was different from their usual practice, and managers 
applying pressure to auditors to revise their marking. The manipulation of audits 
was a chronic feature of this system of management and has been observed 
across sites (Clarke et al 2000).
The actual conduct of audits was observed, and it confirmed some of the 
comments by managers. Audits did provide a means of checking whether certain 
work was being completed in a manner that reflected the standards. Auditors 
would use a number of methods including checking paperwork, asking questions, 
and making observations. However, this was often dominated by paper-based 
assessment rather than being a qualitative and experiential means of assessing 
outcomes. For example, in a hygiene audit posters and records were checked but 
there was no observation of actual cleanliness. This meant that there may have 
been a gap between what was audited and the reality of the lived experience (see 
also Bryans 2000b). Auditors acted with a degree of discretion, for example one 
auditor described that assessment of searching, although prescribed in a national 
policy, would vary according to the category of prison. 
Those being audited were not passive recipients, but interacted with the process 
in a number of ways. First, there was a great deal of preparations made, including 
conducting pre-audit checks and taking remedial action, such as getting missing 
signatures and documents completed. Managers described how before an audit 
they would be running around like “headless chickens” or “blue-arsed flies” and 
that auditors would find that “everything smells of paint” or “the ink’s still wet 
on the paper”. Second, during the audit there were negotiations and interactions 
with auditors in an attempt to influence their findings. When the results of an 
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audit did not match their expectations, managers would often ask for further 
areas to be checked, would produce counter-evidence or would provide 
rationalisations for the failures. These were all attempts to manage up the results. 
Managers would also use relationships in order to try to manage auditors, 
spending time visiting and talking to them, providing good accommodation and 
refreshments and playing to their egos by asking advice and paying deference. It 
has been suggested that this process of negotiation is common in audit structures 
(Power 1997). Finally, where the results were not positive, there were attempts to 
delegitimise the process in order to minimise the damage. This could be done 
through highlighting individual findings that indicated that audits were petty, or 
claiming that audits were narrow and instead appealing to less precise 
benchmarks such as “a safe and secure prison”. Claims were also made regarding 
having lower expectations than the final marking, and stating that changes in 
results were due to auditing becoming more stringent rather than performance 
deteriorating. These were attempts to reframe the success criteria (Clarke et al 
2000).
Structural qualities
Audits share many structural characteristics with output measures but also had
several differences. As with output measures they could be described as 
‘intensive’ in as much as they were frequently used with sometimes annual audits 
taking place and some baselines requiring daily checks, however, this was not 
always the case as some audits only took place every three years. Overall though, 
the process of audits had a place in the consciousness of managers that gave them 
this intensive quality. Whilst audits were generally accepted as a fact of life and 
could therefore be described as ‘tacit’, their effectiveness and meaning was more 
contested and managers were generally more critical of audits than they were of 
output measures, although forms of resistance were generally contained. In terms 
of their form, as with output measures, audits were heavily formalized through 
detailed published standards, baselines and guidance on evidence. The operation 
of audits was underpinned by a strong set of perceived internal and external 
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sanctions without the balance of more positive commitment through a sense of 
attainment or potential rewards. Audits, in comparison to output measures, were 
less strongly legitimised by managers and more strongly supported by 
domination or power.       
Overall, the practice of auditing in prisons reflected that of auditing in other 
organisations. It has provided a pervasive form of control which has not simply 
provided a technical management tool but has acted in ways that have reshaped 
the values of the organisation, in particular by facilitating managerial control. 
However, this has not been uncontested or enjoyed uncritical acceptance.    
Area Manager’s Visits
At the time of the research, prisons in England and Wales were divided into ten 
geographical areas that were coterminous with the police. In each of these there 
was an Area Manager, usually an experienced former governor. They acted as 
the line manager of the prison governors and also had a support team who 
managed areas such as performance management, developed links with other 
organisations such as probation and the police and they had policy leads for 
prisoner regime areas such as drugs and resettlement. The origin of this role can 
be traced back to the 1970s, when four regional managers were appointed in 
order to improve the management and control of prisons. However, with their 
wide span of control they were largely ineffective and were therefore replaced 
with Area Managers in 1991 (Bryans and Wilson 2000). Their role was 
contested: Area Managers themselves were often confused as to whether their 
role was advisory or whether they had directive management control (Lewis 
1997, Laming 2000) and governors resisted the imposition of control (Bryans 
2007, see also Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004). Over time the arrangements 
became more accepted as the roles became clearer and new personnel had more 
sympathetic views. It has been described that these changes “…resulted in a 
redistribution of power and resources from Governors to area managers” (Bryans 
2007 p. 86). 
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This section particularly focuses on the regular, documented visits made to 
prisons by Area Managers. These formed an important part of the way prisons 
were assessed. The reports from these visits attempted to look beyond the 
performance information, to get a sense of what was often described as the ‘feel’ 
of the prison (Wagstaffe 2002, Wheatley 2005). This section will explore the role 
of the Area Manager’s visits, including how prison managers’ discussed, 
understood and interacted with these. This section will also seek to explore the 
effects on the organisation and the people within it. Finally, this section will 
attempt to analyse the structural qualities of these visits.        
Practices, perceptions and effects
In the two prisons, the Area Manager visited approximately every two months 
and followed up with a written report. The character and approach of the Area 
Manager was important in shaping how they carried out their role and how they 
were perceived. Managers were able to differentiate between individual Area 
Managers and were aware of their strengths and weaknesses, priorities and 
expectations. There was intense preparation prior to visits and the subsequent 
reports would be widely distributed in an edited form so that staff were aware of 
their contents. They would also be discussed at senior management meetings and 
full staff briefings in order to motivate action. The Area Manager was regularly 
cited in meetings in order to provide weight to particular points and to act as a 
driver for actions. In one prison, a manager so frequently cited the wishes and 
observations of the Area Manager in meetings that it appeared to replace local 
strategic planning. The Area Manager was a continual presence through these 
actions.
During the field work at one of the prisons, a new Area Manager was appointed 
and this had a noticeable impact. The senior management team were immediately 
aware that the individual focussed on performance management and wanted to 
see improved Weighted Scorecard positions. This was widely discussed and as a 
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result performance was more intensively monitored; a weekly senior 
management meeting was introduced focussing on KPTs, using powerpoint 
presentations, charts and lists of data. Managers also carried out covert 
preparation and research, for example they contacted managers in other prisons 
to ask what the Area Manager had focussed on. They identified preparatory steps 
and communicated these priorities around the prison. There was intense 
preparation put into the build up to his first visit with extensive cleaning and 
repainting taking place. As a result, many mockingly compared this to a “royal 
visit”. This preparation was a feature of the build up to all Area Manager visits, 
where managers perceived, in a similar way to audits and in identical language,
that they would “run around like headless chickens”, or “blue arsed flies” or 
would be “flapping like a good ‘un’”. Preparation would focus on issues that the 
Area Manager was known to examine and issues highlighted in previous reports. 
These visits focussed on performance management and compliance. This was 
seen in four ways. The first was that part of the visit would be dedicated to 
reviewing performance measures with the Governor of the prison. The Area 
Manager would draw upon a variety of information provided by their support 
team and they would use this to focus discussions. This was particularly 
important for the Governor as this was an arena where their reputation with the 
Area Manager would be forged and this would form part of their own 
performance appraisal. As the Area Manager visited other parts of the prison, 
they would discuss performance measures with others and would therefore act to 
promote their importance. 
The second way in which performance and compliance would be promoted was 
through the communication of key strategic messages. They would do this partly 
by talking to people about wider issues. For example, they would often attend the 
daily morning meeting, which most prison managers attended, and would 
provide a briefing of major national and area wide issues such as population 
pressures, building programmes and performance results. They would also 
promote strategic issues by focussing on particular matters such as resettlement 
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or education by visiting those areas and examining them in more detail. In this 
way, visits would be used in order to provide visibility to areas that were 
sometimes marginalised in traditional prison culture but were managerially 
important. This was appreciated by some managers, for example one 
commented:
“What is really nice is when he walks around the prison and he 
comes and spends half an hour and chats through programmes…
how is this working and what isn’t working. That is really, really 
healthy...particularly with the group I manage, which is non-
[uniformed] on the whole…the Area Manager is not just 
interested in [mandatory drug testing] finds or all the regime type 
stuff, he is genuinely interested in how things are working in this 
part of the business as well. I see that as very important.” (W21 
non-operational manager)
These elements appeared to be aimed at orientating managers towards central 
priorities and concerns. 
Third, the Area Manager would disseminate good practice. They had an intimate 
knowledge of the prisons in an area and had extensive personal experience. They 
could therefore refer managers to practices that would assist them in dealing with 
problems.   
The fourth area, and perhaps the one that generated the highest profile and the 
most controversy, was personal inspections conducted by the Area Manager. 
This involved visiting areas of the prison and checking compliance with 
procedures including security, health and safety and cleanliness. This was 
compared by many managers to a military inspection. Examples of issues 
highlighted included colour coded cleaning equipment being used in the wrong 
areas, wedges being used under office doors, posters in cells on outside walls, 
servery doors being left unlocked, lights or televisions being left on, drawing 
pins being used on prisoner notice boards, and small graffiti marks on notices. 
Some people saw this as petty, whilst others dismissed this as an individual 
idiosyncrasy that reflected their “pet hates”. It was the case that the Area 
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Manager considered the same limited range of issues in every prison. Others also 
criticised that this distracted from more important areas and that in focussing on 
the detail, the bigger picture was often missed about the experience of prisoners 
in the prison. However, for some managers, this reflected a deeper purpose: “It’s 
a kick up the backside where you get rid of complacency”, “it does keep you on 
your toes”, and it provides “managerial grip”. Some managers were impressed by 
the perceived attention to detail and many felt that this created a façade of 
panoptic observation, where the Area Manager was seen as being able to spot 
any blemishes of flaws in the prison or department. This may have stimulated the 
intensive preparation that preceded these visits and therefore promoted a form of 
Foucauldian self-control (Foucault 1977). As well as this managerial aspect, 
these inspections also reinforced traditional culture. In particular they 
emphasised a hierarchical and heroic view of management with the most senior 
person being presented as being imbued with exceptional powers of observation 
and judgement. The issues that were focussed upon also emphasised security and 
appearances, so reinforcing ideas of institutional control and orderliness, rather 
than examining other issues such as human and interactional experiences.  This 
element of the visits was idiosynchratic in style, but in substance it took both 
managerial and traditional cultural concerns, combining them in a craftsman-like 
way into a mode of practice.    
A frequent justification for the role of the visits, presented in both official 
accounts (Laming 2000) and the views of many managers, was the opportunity to 
gain a subjective professional judgement, often referred to as a “feel” for the 
prison. In practice, this was not an assessment of the moral climate and 
relationships, but was essentially an assessment of managerial control. As has 
been described, the focus was largely on performance monitoring and 
compliance rather than qualitative, emotional and relational aspects of the 
prisoner experience. On their initial visit to a prison, one Area Manager said to 
the senior management team: “I know the dry facts…I haven’t seen you or what 
you do” (SFN 9). This suggested that the focus was on understanding managers: 
who was contributing and who was not, who was having an impact and who was 
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not, and understanding the actions, styles and characters of those working in the 
prisons. The ‘feel’ of the prison assessed by the Area Manager was therefore 
largely an assessment of managerial performance. 
These visits legitimised the process of monitoring and control as the Area 
Manager provided a personal embodiment of managerial practices. Managers 
acknowledged this, for example one said:
“[T]hey’re good in as much as you do see someone, they’re not 
just a person at a desk somewhere out of the way. They are 
around and about and that’s good for staff morale…” (W29 
senior officer)
The Area Manager could have an impact through their control of rewards and 
punishments. As rewards, they could allocate discretionary funds to those prisons 
that were performing well:
“…if there is any money flying around at the end of the year, as 
there usually is, you’re more likely to get it if the Area Manager is 
reasonably satisfied that the establishment will use it wisely and 
is performing to a good standard.” (S4 governor grade)
They could exercise considerable power over the careers of senior managers. 
They were able to transfer those who were seen as not performing sufficiently or 
had outlived their useful tour of duty. Conversely, those that performed well 
could attract patronage and make career progress.   
The Area Manager visits had a strategic purpose in aligning the prison with 
organisational priorities and encouraging a culture of compliance and 
managerialism. These visits also inter-twinned aspects of traditional practice in 
the ways that they were internally focussed and hierarchical. They acted to 
strengthen, intensify and legitimise these practices, focussing on KPTs, audits 
and the minutiae of rule compliance. This acted to reinforce and entrench the 
responsibilisation of managers and Foucauldian self-control, where people felt 
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that they could be observed at any time. It also used softer forms of power 
through influence, status and charisma to bond managers in to a dominant mode 
of governance. 
Structural qualities
As a form of structure, the Area Manager’s visits were relatively intensive as 
they took place every two to three months. They were also discursive in as much 
as they were widely discussed by people either positively or negatively and they 
were prominent. They were less formalized than audits or KPT but were not 
entirely informal, but instead were loosely structured around broad themes and 
issues. They were strongly sanctioned as the Area Manager was the line manager 
of the Governor and could exercise influence over resources and career 
prospects. This form of structure was therefore looser but nevertheless powerful 
in the lives of prison managers. The main forms it took were a mixture of 
domination and legitimation, combining elements as it did in order to create an 
intimate, personified form of intensive control and compliance. They were 
important events for managers and provided a means to close the gaps and 
enhance other structures of performance management.   
HM Inspectorate of Prisons
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons is a statutory post under Section 5A of the Prison 
Act 1952 as inserted by section 57 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982. The role of 
HM Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) is to inspect prisons in England and Wales 
and report to the government on the treatment of prisoners and conditions in 
prisons and to report on matters connected with prisons and prisoners. There is a 
specific responsibility to submit an annual report to be laid before Parliament. 
Their programme is based on a mixture of routine and risk assessed inspections. 
Full inspections run on a five year cycle and all unannounced follow-up 
inspections run on a risk-assessed basis. They also publish thematic reviews on 
specific aspects of imprisonment. The Chief Inspector is appointed from outside 
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the Prison Service and is assisted by an inspection team made up of people with 
a range of experiences including prison managers on secondment.    
The published aim of HMIP is: 
“To provide independent scrutiny of the conditions for and 
treatment of prisoners and other detainees, promoting the concept 
of 'healthy prisons' in which staff work effectively to support 
prisoners and detainees to reduce re-offending or achieve other 
agreed outcomes” (HMCIP nd) 
Reports are informed by published standards, called Expectations, derived from 
the United Nations ‘healthy-prison’ criteria (HMCIP 2006). This criteria covers:
 Safety – that prisoners, even the most vulnerable, are held safely.
 Respect – that prisoners are treated with respect for their human dignity
 Purposeful Activity – that prisoners are able, and expected, to engage in 
activity that is likely to benefit them.
 Resettlement – that prisoners are prepared for release into the 
community, and helped to reduce the likelihood of reoffending.    
There are three stages to each inspection. The first is the pre-inspection visit 
which includes the collection of preliminary information and the conduct of a 
confidential survey of a representative proportion of the prisoner population. The 
second stage is the inspection itself, assessed against the published Expectations. 
Sources of evidence include prisoner survey groups, individual interviews 
carried out with staff and prisoners, the prisoner survey results, documentation 
and observation by inspectors. At the end of this the prison is awarded a numeric 
score for each of the four healthy prison tests, from one (“The prison is 
performing poorly against this healthy prison test”) up to four (“The prison is 
performing well against this healthy prison test”) (Newcomen 2005). The third 
stage is the post-inspection action, including the production of an action plan, 
based on the recommendations made in the report and subsequent progress 
reports. It has been reported that 97% of recommendations are accepted with 
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83% being accepted fully and 70% were found to have been implemented fully 
or partially on follow-up inspections (Owers 2009).
There has been significant debate about the role of inspection. In particular, there 
has been a question about whether this should be independent in its purpose and 
methodology or whether this should be tied to organisational objectives. There 
has been a general trend in public sector inspection to emphasise organisational 
objectives and to enlist inspection as part of the managerialist framework (see 
Davis and Martin 2008). There have been attempts to take prison inspection 
down this route, for example a report commissioned by the Prison Service 
recommended this (Laming 2000) and in 2005, the government announced plans 
to create a merged Inspectorate for Justice, Community Safety and Custody, 
which would include prisons. It was intended that this be more ‘joined up’ but 
also more focussed on managerial accountability. In opposition to this approach, 
it was argued that the success of HMIP is due to its independence and its 
distinctiveness from organisational and managerial accountability (Owers 2007). 
These arguments eventually prevailed when it was decided in 2006 that the 
proposal for a unified inspectorate would not be taken forward. The inspection 
process has therefore maintained its distinction from the managerial agenda and 
instead has provided a form of assessment based upon human rights standards.  
This section will explore managers understanding and response to the process of 
inspection. This will consider the ways in which it was viewed and used by 
prison managers and the effects that this had on individuals and the prison. As 
well as exploring these social perspectives, this section will also analyse the 
structural properties of inspection.    
Practices, perceptions and effects
In the two research sites, prison managers appreciated that inspection provided a 
more qualitative evaluation.  This was described in terms such as “they look at 
the overall stuff”, “it’s more of an overview”, “the whole package”, and “the big 
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picture”. They described that HMIP were able to provide an assessment that 
excavated a fuller understanding of qualitative issues such relationships between 
staff and prisoners, the treatment of prisoners, the basic conditions, ‘decency’ 
and rehabilitative opportunities. It was seen as wider and more in-depth that 
KPTs and audits, something more than compliance with organisational 
objectives. In other words it was not a process of ‘managerial accountability’ 
focussed on internal measures and audiences but was instead a form of ‘public 
accountability’ based on an externally defined human rights standard and 
communicated to an external as well as internal audience (Davis and Martin 
2008). 
Some managers appreciated that inspection had this Janus-faced quality looking 
both inside and outside. The value of this was summed up by one former Chief 
Inspector of Prisons:
“…[prisons] are also places that can and do easily become self-
referential, lacking the external checks and balances that make 
institutions ask difficult questions, rather than revert to a default 
setting of institutional convenience…there is the ‘virtual prison’ –
the one that exists in the governor’s office, at headquarters or in 
the minister’s red boxes – as compared with the ‘actual prison’ 
being operated on the ground. The Prisons Inspectorate picks up 
that ‘inspection gap’ between what ought to be and what is.”
(Owers 2007 p.16-17)
   
Managers appreciated that inspectors provided “a fresh pair of eyes” that could 
identify areas that those working in the prison on a day-to-day basis simply 
accepted or ignored. Inspection could be seen as a form of consultancy useful to 
managers (Ramsbotham 2003, Raine 2008). The externally focussed role 
included improving public accountability; having a preventative and protective 
role in relation to human rights, preventing abuse and maintaining standards; and 
progressing standards by providing a means for professionals and others to 
evidence the need for improvements and through thematic reviews giving 
guidance and direction (Owers 2007, Raine 2008). 
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Most managers described that they were not continuously conscious of HMIP, 
but instead became more conscious of this in the build up towards planned 
inspections when they would undertake preparations such as increasing staff 
awareness and checking policy and practices for compliance with Expectations. 
This focus would also be maintained through the aftermath where follow up 
actions were planned and implemented. Some of the preparations made by 
managers were distorting and misleading, for example in 2009 a public scandal 
erupted as a result of prisons transferring difficult prisoners prior to inspection 
visits (HMCIP 2009a, 2009b). During the fieldwork, one of the sites was asked 
by a nearby prison to temporarily locate a difficult prisoner for the duration of an 
inspection. Although in the circumstances they refused to do so, this did indicate 
that the practices revealed in 2009 were perhaps not isolated. However, for many 
the inspection was a process that defied preparation and instead the prison could 
only demonstrate its usual practices. 
Inspection was described as a more uncertain measurement than other 
approaches such as KPT and audit and less amendable to management control. 
Although there were attempts to cultivate relationships with inspectors or 
manage impressions by providing favourable information and building positive 
relationships. The way in which the assessment took place was described by 
many managers as subjective, based on “perception”, “opinion” and “feelings” 
rather than hard facts, and based on individual inspector’s personal views. As a 
result inspection was sometimes criticised as not being “methodologically 
trustworthy” (Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004 p.142). Many managers 
preferred forms of assessment such as KPTs and audits and they would use 
outcomes on those measures to challenge and contradict specific inspection 
findings. This showed an organisational bias towards more quantitative and 
malleable measures. The process as a whole was also described as being 
‘political’. This was seen in the nature of the recommendations, which it was 
claimed were patterned across different reports so as to reflect concerns that the 
inspectorate had about prisons nationally, such as the size of the prison 
population or race equality, rather than reflecting genuine local findings. The 
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reports were also seen as political because they were high profile both within the 
prison system and in the wider public through the media. Such observations 
revealed a discomfort with the difference between managerial and public 
accountability. Together these perspectives revealed a lack of appreciation and 
understanding of the inspection methodology, which was structured professional 
judgement taking place within a broader ethical framework (Evans and Morgan 
1998). They also revealed the dissonance between the interests of internal 
management and an external human rights process.
There was another aspect to managers’ critical perspectives on inspection. This 
did not focus on managerial issues and interests, but instead had its root in 
traditional prison occupational culture. From this perspective, the inspection 
process was criticised for having a focus on prisoners. The perceptions of 
prisoners were sometimes painted by managers as being illegitimate, for 
example it was suggested that prisoners would be critical of security, drug 
supply reduction and tackling bullying, or that their views would be fickle and 
unreasonable, simply responding to whether they had been recently challenged 
for their own poor behaviour. These views acted to undermine the legitimacy of 
prisoners’ role in evaluation and the inspection process. This also reflected and 
perpetuated a particular cultural view of prisoners as the ‘other’ (Sim 2009) and 
as a result, the process was seen as tainted by association. The inspectors 
themselves also came in for criticism for their perceived elitism, idealism and 
naivety. For example, one manager complained that he would not get a job with 
the inspectorate because he was a “beer drinker” while inspectors were “wine 
drinkers”, suggesting cultural and class elitism. 
In terms of effects, the inspection process had an impact at certain points in the 
inspection cycle. In some cases the public nature of inspection reports meant that 
they could make and break careers. A poor inspection report was described as 
having brought to an end the career of some governing governors, whilst for 
others it could provide an important benchmark demonstrating the progress they 
had made. For most managers, the positive outcomes would be communicated 
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and the negative effects mitigated by either criticising the inspection process or 
reframing the success criteria in the ways described previously in relation to 
audit. There were some managers who tried to use inspection more positively as 
a means of pushing forward change and deriving power. Some managers argued 
that as a result of inspection reports, additional resources could be attracted by 
increasing the profile of certain areas and creating a pressure to remedy 
deficiencies. For example, in one prison a report highlighted the length of the
waiting list for the enhanced thinking skills course and this prompted the conduct 
of a needs assessment that could potentially have led to an increase in the 
number of courses resourced. These were issues that would not be identified in 
an audit or through KPTs. For some, criticisms in inspections were an 
opportunity to seek additional support and resources. As one manager described:
“I feel we have slipped back since the last HMCIP in lots of ways 
so I’m expecting a rough ride from them. I feel positive about that 
because I feel that is a way I can move forward because there are 
things that need doing but I can’t do, I’ve failed in because either 
people don’t take it seriously enough or are not supporting that 
area. It will be driven by them and things will get done”. (S8 
governor grade)
Overall, inspection was an important measure due to its independent and public 
nature. However, it was contested by managers and its effects were limited to 
those times and places where inspections were taking place. 
Structural qualities
Inspections differed from the measures described so far in relation to their 
structural qualities. Inspections were less intensive and more shallow as they 
were conducted in full once every five years. However, when they did take place
they were felt intensively. As a measure it was rarely discussed largely because 
of this infrequency but when it did take place it was discussed extensively 
including in the critical ways described. It therefore was discursive rather than 
tacit in as much as the nature of inspection was not routinely accepted but was 
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constantly questioned and challenged by prison managers. It was widely seen as 
being less formalized than audit or KPT but as this was based upon structured 
professional judgement, it was not informal. The sanctions attached to inspection 
could be dramatic for senior managers, but for most there would be few direct 
consequences. The main forms that that this structure took were signification or 
meaning, and legitimation as inspection was perceived as having a moral 
foundation, albeit one that was contested.
Inspection was a more uncertain and complex assessment. It stood aside from the 
general forms of managerial accountability and instead provided an externally-
based and independent form of public accountability. This did not sit easily with 
prison managers and although some individuals appreciated it, many felt a sense 
of dissonance that derived from both managerial and traditional cultural interests.  
         
Measuring the Quality of Prison Life
At the Prison Service Conference 2002, Phil Wheatley, subsequently Director 
General of the National Offender Management Service, set out the importance of 
‘decency’ in prisons. As well as some specific measures, he also set a general test 
as; “whether or not staff would be happy with their relatives being held there” 
(HM Prison Service 2001 p.27). This was a deliberate, strategic attempt to 
reinvigorate a moral dimension of prison performance. This followed revelations 
of abuse and poor conditions in a number of prisons including HMP 
Wandsworth, HMP Wormwood Scrubs and HMP Holloway (Ramsbotham 
2003). This also conformed to a New Labour agenda that sought to re-moralise 
imprisonment through investment in improving conditions and providing more 
rehabilitative opportunities (Bennett 2007a).    
At the time this was emerging, Professor Alison Liebling from the University of 
Cambridge was researching a quality measure for prisons. Her work led to the 
development of a tool to assess the moral performance of prisons, which she 
described as ‘measuring the quality of prison life’ (MQPL) (Liebling assisted by 
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Arnold 2004). The tool utilises survey data using over 100 questions scored on a 
five point Likert scale covering relationship dimensions including respect, 
humanity, relationships, trust, and support as well as regime dimensions 
including fairness, order, safety, well-being, personal development, family 
contact, and decency. The authors describe the ‘moral performance’ of prisons 
as:
“those aspects of a prisoner’s mainly interpersonal and material 
treatment that render a term of imprisonment more or less 
dehumanising and/or painful” (ibid p.473 original emphasis). 
Although broader, this is linked to notions of legitimacy and decency, and has 
been described as ‘legitimacy-plus’ (Liebling 2005).    
The research was developed using a methodology known as appreciative inquiry, 
which is based upon providing “a way of looking at an organisation, which 
concentrates on strengths, accomplishments, best practices, and peak moments” 
(ibid p.133). Through understanding these positive aspects of individuals, and 
organisations, it seeks to uncover the ‘truth’ which is overlooked in problem-
centred research methodologies. It is also intended that this approach provides a 
corrective to critical accounts of prisons and prison staff. This approach is 
generally deployed as an organisational change management tool rather than an 
academic research methodology (Elliott 1999). 
On a practical level, this tool has now been adapted and developed as a means of 
assessing prison performance. A national Standards Audit team carries out a 
MQPL assessment at each prison every two years. This involves surveys being 
completed by a random representative sample of 10-15% of the prisoner 
population. They meet in groups of approximately ten prisoners in order to 
complete the survey and discuss issues that are important to them.  Following the 
assessment a report of the results is provided to the Governor, including 
comparative data about the results and details of the main concerns of prisoners. 
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It is for prison managers to then decide how to respond as there is no formal 
requirement to do so.
Theoretically, critics of MQPL argue that the appreciative perspective is partial 
and privileges the values of staff and managers, painting a more positive picture 
than others would see (Carlen 2005, Wilson 2005). These critics also argue that 
rather than revealing a deeper truth, MQPL provides a means of legitimising and 
defending the interests of insiders. In a converse and narrower sense, the authors
reveal that the MQPL approach may be unbalanced. Specifically, they state that
in one prison where the score on MQPL was high, revealing a positive culture of 
relationships and humane treatment, there was subsequently a series of security 
breaches. This indicates that ‘trust’ may have been given and abused or cordial 
relationships maintained at the cost of not maintaining appropriate security.  The 
authors acknowledge that the measure is not able to provide an appropriate 
balance of quality of life and security. This is, of course, a major limitation of the 
tool and concedes any claim to comprehensiveness.
The development of MQPL has been marked by polarised responses from 
academic commentators. This section will seek to explore these issues through 
the eyes of prison managers. In particular, how managers discussed and 
understood MQPL and what effects it has on them, on prisoners and the prison 
generally. This section will also consider the structural qualities of this measure.             
Practices, perceptions and effects
The most striking feature of managers’ views of MQPL was how little they knew 
about it. Many had not heard of it or had only a vague understanding of what it 
was or how it was conducted. It was the least visible and least understood of all 
the performance measures. Those that were aware of it generally described it as a 
measure of “prisoners’ perceptions” and considered that it related to issues of 
“respect”, “decency” and “staff-prisoner relationships”. Some saw this as having 
value as a measure of “the feel of the place”, as a tool to assess and manage 
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prisons, and a means by which the views of prisoners could be elicited and 
considered. Some also valued the independence of the measure. The normative 
value that this had was summed up by one manager who said:
“…it puts it in another perspective, because sometimes we are too 
focused on how we manage staff, how we manage as a prison, but 
forget how we manage prisoners, and it puts in a flavour of how 
prisoners feel they are being managed in the prison. I think we 
should take it very seriously” (S8 governor grade).
Although a perspective held by only a small number of managers, those 
individuals reflected the view of academic commentators who argue that MQPL 
is more sophisticated than the blunt instrument of KPTs (van Zyl Smit 2005), can
reduce the distorting effects of hard managerialism (Liebling 2008), can promote 
a similar human rights agenda to inspection (Harding 2005) and can provide a 
means to humanise prisons (Bennett 2005, Newell 2005). The author of MQPL 
herself admits to “mixed feelings” about the adoption of this methodology within 
a managerialist framework, but supports this pragmatically (Liebling 2005) as it 
introduces an “explicitly moral element” into performance management 
(Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004). 
On a more instrumental level, some senior managers stated that they had to pay 
attention to MQPL because it was a measure that senior echelons in the Prison 
Service, in particular the Director General, took account of in forming a view 
about individual prisons. 
Managers had significant scepticism about MQPL, based on a mixture of 
concerns about the nature of the measure as a managerial tool and a cultural 
response to the direct involvement of prisoners. The first question raised by 
managers was whether this could be a valid measure. They felt that the very 
nature of imprisonment militated against honest appraisal. For example, one 
manager said:
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“…prisoners will say things that are not really the way they are, 
it will be their perception and maybe they’re getting a lot better 
conditions, things are maybe a lot better than they are 
portraying…That worries me sometimes, you never get a true 
picture from them. Prisoners will be prisoners and they will 
complain to complain.” (S13 senior officer)
These comments indicated a concern that the measure served the 
interests of prisoners, painting a partial and untruthful picture. They 
also described that prisoners will inevitably be critical due to some 
ingrained identity or pathology, described as “prisoners will be 
prisoners” or as another manager commented: “You ask any prisoner, 
he’s going to moan because he’s in prison” (W9 non-operational 
manager).
Many managers also described that the methodology was unreliable because of 
its inclusion of critical prisoner voices:
“…they select 100 prisoners to gain their views on various parts 
of the establishment on how they feel. Those views are then fed 
into a report, but they are perceptions of the prisoners, so the 
perception of the 100 prisoners they speak to may not be the 
perception of the other 500 prisoners. There are certain 
perceptions in this year’s MQPL that were only the perceptions of 
three prisoners in their report, but they’ve put it down…a group 
of prisoners, ten I think, [said] that the staff were rude and 
arrogant and negative. I don’t see that. That’s a perception of a 
small minority of prisoners. I don’t see that as I go around.” (S24 
governor grade)
This manager therefore suggested that critical voices were given 
disproportionate prominence. Other managers saw the outcome as being 
unreliable as they believed it was simply the luck of the draw as to who was 
selected to take part. As one manager described:
“It can be extremely subjective because they will come in and 
pick up a percentage of the jail…they could come in this week and 
find one set of results and come in next week and find a 
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completely different set…It’s good luck or bad luck as to which 
prisoners they select randomly from a computer. It’s just how it 
goes.” (S6 principal officer)
Some managers went further to describe prisoner contributions as unreliable due 
to bias or dishonesty. One manager described their view:
“MQPL I find that frustrating because that’s a prisoners’
perspective of what’s going on but there’s nothing in there, as far 
as I can see, that addresses any vindictive actions that a prisoner 
might take, some prisoners might say something and half a dozen 
prisoners say something completely different and radical, perhaps 
because they’ve got an axe to grind.” (W6 governor grade)
Other phrases used to sum up this perceived bias by prisoners included that they 
may have responded to being “rubbed…up the wrong way” or that it simply 
provided “a good place for them to have a go”. Some went further to suggest that 
prisoners were dishonest. For example some managers described that:
“Unfortunately prisoners, they do tell lies…” and that “…you have to take them 
with a pinch of salt”.
These views about MQPL revealed that it was a controversial measure. This was 
partly due to a lack of understanding about research methodologies such as 
sampling.  What also underpinned the scepticism was a cultural response to the 
foregrounding of the interests of prisoners. This was represented by managers as 
an unreliable source of information. Of course, such views revealed more deep
seated perceptions of prisoners and their appropriate position. This pathologised
prisoners as untrustworthy and delegitimised them as a focus of concern and 
instead suggested that they should be the silent, passive and powerless subjects.  
As described above, some senior managers saw MQPL having an instrumental 
importance as it was taken into account in organisational assessments. As a 
result, some attempted to prepare for MQPL as they prepared for other external 
assessments. For example, one manager described:
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“We did a lot of work here before they arrived in August, making 
sure that the prisoner was in the right temperament and you can 
do that by generating the right atmosphere in the prison, we had 
competitions in the gym and things like that, little things that 
created a good atmosphere in the prison. When MQPL came in 
we got an exceptional report. I think a lot of it was the work we 
did beforehand and that was generating a good atmosphere so 
when prisoner groups went to see the psychologists they were in 
the right mind to talk about the benefits of being [here]” (S9 
governor grade).
However, for most managers, the measure was beyond preparation.
In terms of how MQPL was followed up and its effects, it was seen by many as 
having a limited impact. Managers described that the report would be read, 
discussed and published, but there would not be rigorous analysis and follow up:
“It seemed more like another paper exercise…You send them 
back, you get some feedback sent out or published on the intranet 
and its end of story.” (W22 senior officer)
The only exception was that one manager suggested that as with other reports, if 
there was a particularly good or bad assessment, it would have an impact but 
beyond these polar outcomes it was often seen as marginal. There were four 
reasons given for this. The first was that the MQPL report was complicated and 
difficult to interpret and turn into clear action (Bennett 2007b). Managers 
described how they were presented with “all these graphs and charts” which they 
struggled to understand. The reports were composed of a myriad of statistical 
information using means and standard deviations. This has been applauded by 
academics who have described that:
“In contrast to her subtle analytical instruments, the performance 
indicators used by the Prison Service seem extraordinarily 
crude” (van Zyl Smit 2005 p.766)
However, for many prison managers, in comparison to the simplicity of KPTs, 
MQPL appeared to be extraordinarily complex. The reports also did not 
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immediately lend themselves to practical action. The report would say what 
prisoners had said, what their perspectives were and how they rated aspects of 
the prison, but it did not identify any specific issues that shaped this perception 
or any changes that could be made in order to improve. This meant that they 
were of limited practical value without significant further analysis and action 
planning.
The second blockage to effectiveness flowed from the scepticism managers 
reported regarding prisoners’ involvement. As a result of this, the perceptions 
and assessments reported were often dismissed. For example at one of the 
research sites, nine of the twenty critical areas from the MQPL report were 
rejected because they were considered to be factually inaccurate. However, for 
some managers this represented a misunderstanding of the value of the report:
“The other thing is they’ll say…the prisoners’ perception is this. 
We say ‘no it fucking well isn’t - rubbish!’ In fact I heard [X] say, 
which I thought was brilliant…”yes its prisoners’ perception, so 
what action are we taking to change their perception?” That’s the 
whole point of the exercise, why have they got that perception and 
what are you going to do to change it, rather than they’ve got the 
facts wrong – yes they have but that’s not the point, why have they 
got that perception?” (S15 governor grade)
However, such a view was in the minority and instead many managers simply 
saw the outcome of the reports as being as unreliable as the prisoners themselves. 
The third reason that the reports were limited in their effects was related to the 
issue highlighted in the original research that developed MQPL; the inability of 
MQPL to incorporate the appropriate role of security. For example one manager 
stated:
“I think you can interpret it in 300 different ways. I’ll give you an 
example of that, it was put over that the lifer manager is more 
interested in security than he is in progressing life sentence 
prisoners. I could take that, because all they do is put that 
statement in, they don’t quantify how it’s been given or what 
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inflections on it, so I don’t know whether that’s meant to be a 
negative thing said by prisoners or a positive thing. If they are 
looking from a staff point of view then security is important and 
that’s the key thing, we are protecting the public. Or do I look at 
it as being negative that prisoners think we are coming down to 
hard on them but if that is the case I have to decide whether I 
loosen the reins a bit or am I being manipulated to loosen the 
reins, or do I keep them as they are? So it’s very hard to define 
what they are saying.” (S26 principal officer).
This comment contested the normative value of MQPL and prisoner 
observations. It explored how the legitimate role of security, which may 
sometimes conflict with quality of life, was not incorporated in the assessment.   
The fourth issue that limited follow up was that criticisms were often about 
issues that were not within the control of the prison. For example, problems with 
foreign national prisoners being detained pending deportation, or prisoners being 
held at considerable distances from their home were presented as issues that had 
an effect upon quality of life but the prison was powerless to influence.
Overall, MQPL had a limited effect on the prison. This was partly a function of 
its complexity but it was also as a result of the cultural response to it being based 
on prisoners’ views.    
Structural qualities
As a structure, MQPL was infrequently conducted and used, being conducted 
once every two years and being weakly followed up. It could therefore be 
described as shallow. It was also discursive in that managers contested its value 
and effectiveness and this translated into how they followed up and managed it. 
It was formalized in as much as it used survey and focus group techniques, which 
were carefully designed. Sanctions following up from this were generally seen as 
limited and the results were marginalized, as a result it could be described as 
being weakly sanctioned. MQPL was designed in order to be based upon 
meaning and legitimation, but instead it was highly contested and really it was 
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conducted because it had to be rather than managers feeling any commitment to 
it.
The aim of MQPL to engage prisoners in the performance management of 
prisons exposed wider cultural issues. In a more obvious way than inspection, it 
highlighted the preferences of prison managers for measures that were simple 
and malleable, but also located within a traditional culture, including how 
prisoners were perceived. The response of managers to MQPL has to be 
understood within this context of prison and managerial cultures.
Independent Monitoring Board
Each prison has an Independent Monitoring Board. They are volunteers from the 
local community appointed in order to monitor the conditions and the treatment 
of prisoners and staff. They produce regular, weekly visit reports and also an 
annual report which is sent to the Secretary of State responsible for prisons. Their 
purpose is defined as “providing a voice for the community in setting out what 
we expect to be done in our name” (AMIMB 2005). Board members are selected 
and trained for their role and their appointment is approved by the Secretary of 
State. 
This form of monitoring has a long history, dating back to the Elizabethan era 
and has had a formal statutory basis that dates back to the nationalisation of 
prisons under the Prison Act 1877 (Haines 2008). Their contemporary authority 
derives from the Prison Act 1952. Over time, the role of the Board has changed 
and this has continued to evolve over recent years. Until 1991, Board members 
heard disciplinary charges against prisoners and until 2003 were responsible for 
authorising the use of segregation. Recent changes have seen the Board become 
purely a monitoring body. This shift in emphasis was recognised by the change 
of their name in 2003 from the historical ‘Board of Visitors’ to the more explicit 
and modern ‘Independent Monitoring Board’ (Lloyd 2001). This change in role 
and focus has also brought with it the development of more structured 
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techniques, such as the publication of detailed guidance on questioning areas as 
part of the monitoring role (AMIMB 2005). 
It has been argued that these Boards have an important role in highlighting and 
preventing abuse (see for example Lewis 1997, Ramsbotham 2003). It is also 
part of their role that they act as a form of public accountability by recruiting 
from the local community, publishing their reports publicly and having 
independence from local management. This is a form of monitoring that has a 
long and varied history and although recent years have seen a more managerial 
agenda, they have retained an independent and loosely defined monitoring role.           
In this section, managers’ understanding and appreciation of the role of the IMB 
will be explored. This will include how they are perceived, how they interact 
with prison managers and the effects on staff, prisoners and the wider 
organisation. The section will go on to examine the structural qualities of the 
IMB as a form of monitoring and management.     
Practices, perceptions and effects
The formal role of the IMB was widely understood and appreciated by managers. 
Their role was often described in terms such as being “the eyes and ears of the 
[Secretary of State]”. Their role was described as having internal and external 
dimensions. Internally they were seen as a route through which prisoner concerns
could be addressed. Their independence was seen as important in enabling them 
to resolve problems with prisoners. Within the prison, they could also ask 
questions and follow up queries so that staff and managers had to spend time 
explaining issues to them and responding to their concerns.  They also had the 
right to report issues to the Governor, which would lead to follow up actions 
being taken. A number of individuals were singled out for their knowledge and 
expertise, often from their professional background in specialist areas such as 
healthcare. They were seen as having a protective and preventative role in 
respect of performance and human rights. Externally, their annual report would 
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be submitted to the Minister and formal questions would be responded to. They 
also had external power as their reports could attract local media attention and 
shape community perceptions. They were seen as holding power through public 
accountability that could have consequences for the prison and managers.
There were positive effects that could arise from their role. Their scrutiny and 
advocacy on behalf of prisoners acted as a means through which moral 
conscience was maintained and reinforced, for example, managers expressed 
concern about the IMB becoming aware of cases were individual prisoners were 
receiving what they considered to be poor health care or other services. It was 
also suggested that scrutiny by the IMB led to improvements in quality. As one 
manager commented:
“In some respects that’s pretty useful because it’s certainly fine 
tuned what we will write in certain reports because it’s got to 
stand scrutiny. We’ve upped our game considerably to reflect the 
changing pace of the IMB.” (W6 governor grade)
  
The IMB were seen by some as having moral authority which could have wider 
benefits in protecting and promoting human rights.
However, they were not uncritically accepted by managers. The first example of 
this was the backroom representation of the IMB as socially distanced from the 
people who lived and worked in prison. Boards are largely comprised of middle 
aged, middle class white people (Lloyd 2001). Many managers were conscious 
of the distance that this created between the IMB and prisoners or staff. As one 
manager described:
“IMBs aren’t actually a fair representation of the population are 
they?...if someone said what are the prisoner population and who 
is looking after them, if you look at [this prison]’s IMB, they’re 
either retired or coming to retirement, white middle or upper 
class, that does not reflect the prisoner population. Sometimes 
there could be that issue of – how can you understand? How can 
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you understand what its like to be a heroin abuser from [a city], 
and the culture they have?” (W10 governor grade)
This view led some managers to see IMB members as ill-suited to their role and 
with a limited appreciation of the world they had entered. Some managers dealt 
with IMB members at arms length or treated them with scepticism. This could be 
detected in stories about IMB members. For example, one was alleged to have 
said that they joined the Board for “dinner [party] material”, and others were 
described as getting in the way of incidents that were being managed by staff or 
asking what were seen as inappropriate or inane questions during crises. These
stories emphasised issues of social distance and questioned the competence of 
IMB members.        
Managers played an active role in attempting to control the work of IMBs. 
Although nominally independent, the IMB spent significant amounts of time 
with prison staff and managers over a prolonged period of time, and had a degree 
of dependence upon them in order to do their job, as a result there was some 
pressure upon them to develop empathy and to assimilate their values, in other 
words there was the opportunity for them to be enlisted or at least managed so as 
to support the perspective of prison staff (see also Lloyd 2001). This sometimes 
happened directly, for example they would be given a formal induction, were 
briefed on security and control issues and would receive presentations and 
information prepared by managers. However, the majority of this shaping took a 
more subtle form through interactions with staff. Managers would attempt to 
form what they perceived as “good relationships” with the IMB, which generally 
meant that they were polite, consulted with managers before writing up concerns 
and did not cause too much difficulty. There were also attempts to shape and 
manage the relative relationships that IMB members had with staff and prisoners. 
Individual Board members were often judged as to whether they were perceived 
to be too trusting of prisoners and therefore manipulated into believing 
complaints raised. Some comments by managers included:
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“[They] turn up, believe everything the prisoner told them then 
walk away” (WFN 22)
“Sometimes with the IMB you just think that prisoner is totally 
playing you” (S5 governor grade)
“I get annoyed because they don’t always see the bigger picture, 
they take the prisoners word for something not happening or 
something going wrong without looking at the bigger picture. I 
know they’re here for staff as well as prisoners but it’s very one-
sided.” (S10 principal officer)
In the words of one principal officer, they were simply “prisoners’ friends”. Staff 
and managers had a degree of scepticism about prisoners and viewed the absence 
of this as a risk. Conversely, they praised those IMB members who took an 
interest in staff issues or elevated the concerns of staff above those of prisoners. 
For example, those singled out for praise included members who thanked staff 
for their involvement in events such as family days for prisoners, took an interest 
in staff well-being after incidents and asked about members of staff who were on 
sick leave. Such members would receive more positive interactions with staff. 
Some managers went so far as to want the IMB to become a staff advocacy 
service: 
“I think perhaps they can be more staff orientated because at the 
end of the day their dual role is both staff and prisoners, but I 
think a lot of it is maybe prisoner based. I’ve never seen them run 
a staff clinic here.” (S26 principal officer)
Through this use of criticism and praise, some managers attempted to re-orientate 
IMB members towards the interests of staff and away from those of prisoners. In 
some cases, Board members, whether by nature or through this process had an 
antipathy towards prisoners. For example some IMB members would describe 
prisoners in disparaging terms such as “nasty bastards”. Others would be critical 
of issues such as diversity, for example one dismissed the racial monitoring of 
the use of force seeing it as meaningless or unimportant as in their view all use of 
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force was reasonable. Some therefore held more critical views of prisoners that 
resonated with traditional staff cultures. 
The second element of the IMBs that was questioned was their ability to provide 
effective internal scrutiny (Lloyd 2001). They provided a looser and less 
structured form of assessment and were part-time volunteers. There were often 
issues regarding the quality of their scrutiny due to methodological limitations 
and a limited knowledge of prison procedures, processes, rules and regulations. 
They rarely appeared to use the structured methodologies published in guidance 
but instead approached the role in a traditional manner learned through 
experience or passed down over time (Vagg 1985). As a result of their often 
limited knowledge, they would have to rely upon members of staff in order to 
explain decisions, prison processes, for access to information and for descriptions 
of prisoner’s behaviour. For example, one manager described:
“Sometimes I think the IMB don’t have as much knowledge when 
dealing with complaints, so they can’t always answer them 
because they don’t have the knowledge. They come to us for 
advice.” (W23 principal officer)
The potential undermining of scrutiny was summed up by one manager who 
said:  
“The problem is they ask questions of a member of staff; what’s 
the number of this they can have or that they can have and you’re 
thinking why are you asking me when it’s all on there [the 
computer] you’ve got access to it? What they should be saying is I 
know they’re entitled to that, why aren’t they getting it? It’s the 
wrong question if you like. Almost straight away it puts them on 
the back foot. They should know how to find the information then 
ask the question that comes from that, not the other way around. 
(S14 governor grade)       
The limited knowledge of some IMB members left staff and managers as the 
primary definers of the issues at hand. As a result managers could shape, 
neutralise and control the scrutiny being applied, and IMB members had “a 
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reliance on managerial judgements of the acceptability of the situation” (Vagg 
1985 p.129). 
.
In their external influence, the IMB was also constrained and controlled. Some 
members attempted to ask critical questions about broader issues such as the 
prison population or the detention of foreign nationals after the expiry of their 
sentences. One manager described how this happened through annual reports:
“Obviously the things they put down in their reports, they reflect 
on [the prison] but they also reflect on the bigger prison picture, 
which really goes outside their remit and they start lambasting 
the Governor for lack of spaces, overcrowding and we go on. 
Unfortunately it’s all very well writing that down on paper, but 
that comes back down to us to answer the questions they place. 
They’re trying to set at a national level not for the individual 
establishment.” (W7 governor grade)
The Board members were criticised by managers and demoralised by being told 
of the futility of their efforts to raise what were ‘national’ issues and therefore 
beyond their remit. They were discouraged by managers from developing 
broader criticisms of imprisonment and instead encouraged to simply focus on 
local management. This was an attempt to re-orientate IMB members from a 
public accountability role to a managerial one, focussing on the local delivery of 
pre-existing policies rather than raising broader questions about the practice and 
effects of imprisonment.   
It can be seen from the three key areas of independence, internal scrutiny and 
external accountability, that the role of the IMB was contested by prison 
managers. In particular, prison managers attempted to control, enlist and shape 




In analysing the work of the IMB in structural terms, the first observation is that 
they operated using more informal methods that were less clearly prescribed and 
controlled than others, giving significant latitude for subjective judgements. 
Whilst visits by IMB members took place on a regular basis, their work did not 
impinge heavily on the lives of prison managers and therefore tended towards 
being shallow in its effects. Their role was not widely discussed, but when it was 
it was contested. It therefore tended towards being discursive rather than tacit. 
Finally, there were limited consequences that flowed from the IMB, they were 
seen as being capable of causing some minor embarrassment but they were not 
seen as being significantly important. Their work was weakly sanctioned. In 
terms of the sources of power the IMB had, this tended towards the moral aspects 
of their role, in particular that they were seen as having a protective and 
preventative role in relation to human rights and their independence was valued. 
Their power was a soft power relying upon signification and legitimation.
The IMB provided the longest standing method for monitoring prisons and as a 
result they were less informed by modern practices but instead had a role rooted 
in history and tradition. Their role was less formalised and more subjective 
reflecting a form of local public accountability. However, their role was 
contested, constrained and controlled as they come under the dual assault of 
managerialism and traditional prison culture. These forces combined to create a 
pressure to neutralise and enlist the IMB, minimising their impact.      
Conclusion
Managerialism has been described as having an ever deepening grip upon 
organisations including prisons. This chapter has sought to explore the technical 
and structural qualities of performance management methodologies, but also the 
social aspects of their practice. In this closing section, some broader issues will 
be discussed and conclusions drawn. This will start with general observations 
about managerialism and its effects in prisons, and then go on to consider 
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individual performance measures in at attempt to use these micro observations to 
reveal broader issues.   
There was a wide range of performance measurement used in prisons. Together 
these formed an architecture that rendered managerial work visible and 
accountable. The depth and extent of this structure meant that this could be 
described as panoptic in as much as it attempted to provide an intensive and 
comprehensive form of surveillance (Foucault 1977). This had paradoxical 
effects on managers. On one hand they felt under pressure from the constantly 
prying eyes of senior managers, they felt vulnerable when poor performance was 
exposed and they were constantly aware of their need to concentrate on those 
issues that were measured. They self-regulated their practice in order to comply 
with organisational orthodoxy, so enabling what has been described as 
‘management at a distance’ (O’Malley 2004). This form of self-management 
could be felt intensely by some individual managers. However, they also 
experienced this as empowering when applied by them towards their 
subordinates. They found that it was a source of information that they could use 
to judge individuals and make managerial decisions. They could regulate the 
behaviour of others and direct them into patterns of conformity. Managers were 
in the position of being at the same time both the subjects and the perpetrators of 
the panoptic web enmeshing the organisation.    
Performance measures, particularly those that were strongly supported such as 
KPTs and audits, could exercise significant influence upon how managers felt 
about themselves and their work. There was wide support for these measures and 
they were generally described as being both legitimate and effective. Many also 
went further and described a powerful internalised drive to achieve targets. 
Support for these measures became so deeply entrenched that was in many cases
absorbed within individual identity and the professional habitus. It has been 
argued that whilst the initiation of managerialism and NPM was centred upon 
privatisation and commercial competition, this has been limited and instead it has 
taken root through the use of management techniques imported from the private 
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sector such as performance measurement (Armstrong 2007). However, in prisons 
it is suggested here that this has been given depth and intensity not through the 
development of technological apparatus, but through the absorption of these 
approaches within the identity or habitus of prison managers so that they become 
self-governing and self-controlling.
This is not to suggest that there was no diversity in how managers responded to 
managerialism. Some managers, who most strongly supported these 
developments, legitimised them and saw them as empowering and effective. 
They would absorb this within their identity more intensely. For the majority, 
they were aware of the limitations of performance measures but accepted that 
they were a fact of life. This was not dull compulsion, an unquestioning 
resignation, but instead they were pragmatists who accepted their own individual 
position in the power structure. They could see the strength and limitations but 
would ensure that the expectations placed upon them were met. As a result, most 
managers were equally pragmatic about issues such as the manipulation of data. 
They again accepted this as part of general practice and making things work. 
There were only a small number of managers who were more thinking and 
discriminating in how they approached performance management, using this as a 
means to focus on the underlying issues that they felt a personal commitment 
towards such as the humane treatment of prisoners and the promotion of 
rehabilitative opportunities. These individualistic managers attempted to use and 
reshape managerial targets so as to support wider objectives. 
A final general observation relates to the issue of the manipulation of 
performance measures. This took many forms including the misreporting of 
information, the collection of inaccurate date and preparing for assessments so as 
to present a more positive façade. This was not an isolated case of a few bad 
apples but was instead a chronic feature of the system of performance 
management. These acts attempted to present an appearance of compliance and 
were carried out and condoned for a number of reasons including self-interest, 
the desire to succeed in a competitive environment, it was perceived as 
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something everyone did and that it was seen as a necessity in order to cope with 
demands that were felt to be unrealistic. On the face of it, this acted to reinforce 
and support the regime of performance management by presenting a façade of 
compliance, conformity and success. However, this also acted in a way that 
ultimately served to undermine the credibility of the system by creating a ‘virtual 
prison’ where there was a dissonance between performance figures and the lived 
experience of prison life (Owers 2007). This also acted in a more subtle way in 
creating an ‘imaginary penality’ (Carlen 2008a), by this it is suggested that 
whilst managerial measures were presented as creating order, control and 
transparency, they instead fostered practices of distortion, misinformation and 
deception, so that the operation of the process undermined the aims that it 
purported to promote.  
These general observations suggest that managerialism in prisons is powerful but 
problematic. A more detailed micro-analysis of the individual performance 
measures can also reveal more subtle features of the culture of prison 
management. 
As explored in the sections above, not all of these performance management 
tools had identical structural properties. Using the analytical tools presented by 
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This table illustrates that there was a mixture of what can be described as ‘hard’ 
measures that were intense and exerted a powerful influence on managers, such 
as KPTs and audits, through to those that were ‘soft’ and carried less power and 
were less intrusive such as MQPL and IMB’s. The table reflects a hierarchy of 
influence, running from the measures that shaped the working lives of prison 
managers to the greatest extent, starting with KPTs, through to those that had the 
least influence. This hierarchy was reflected both in the stronger sense of 
commitment that managers expressed towards measures such as audits and 
KPTs, and also in the absence of resistance. In contrast, with some of the 
measures that were based upon structured professional judgement such as 
inspection, MQPL and IMB reports, there was more open criticism. 
Whilst there were some intrinsic qualities that differed between measures and 
this may explain the differences in how they were perceived by managers that 
did not provide the whole picture. The differences could also be discussed in 
relation to two issues – risk management and prison culture. In relation to risk, 
the emergence of performance management provided a means through which the 
complex tasks of prison management could be simplified and controlled. They 
were means of managing risk or at least presenting the appearance of doing so
(O’Malley 2004). The harder, qualitative measures were also more amenable to 
management action. They were clearer and more predictable and managers saw 
that their efforts could influence results. In contrast, those measures based upon 
structured judgement and prisoner perceptions were more unpredictable and 
unmanageable. The measures themselves therefore differed in the degree to 
which they were perceived as intrinsically risky for managers and to which they 
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could provide a means through which managers could control risk. The 
simplification and certainty provided by the harder performance measures helped
to explain their attraction to prison managers as it provided them with meaning 
and control.
The second issue related to culture. In particular, measures such as IMB reports, 
Inspection reports and MQPL were criticised because of the attention that they 
played to prisoners’ needs and views. This association with prisoners acted to 
spoil the identity (Goffman 1963) of these measures in the eyes of some 
managers, making them unreliable and unimportant. This related to a traditional 
cultural view of prisoners, who have been seen within the occupational group as 
being subservient and cast as the ‘other’ (Sim 2009). In contrast, harder measures 
were seen as meeting organisationally defined needs or more general needs of 
managers such as certainty and risk management as described above. The 
cultural context was therefore also important in understanding the differences in 
how measures were practiced.
Performance management, managerialism and NPM have become globalised 
phenomena. This has had a transformational effect in prisons by providing a 
technology of monitoring and accountability that has changed management 
practice and professional identities. However, this has not obliterated traditional 
practice and culture but instead there has been an accommodation and fusion, 
where globalised practice had been mediated through local influences (Kennedy 
2010). For example, the ways that targets were understood reflected traditional 
views about prisoners, hierarchy and social order, while the ways that they were 
pursued reflected a competitive machismo. Rather than simply being a unitary 
globalised practice, the use of performance management has been adapted and 
reshaped to take account of idiosyncratic and local features of the organisation. 
This collision, interaction and accommodation created a cross-cutting and 
distinct set of features that could not be described as purely local nor could it be 
described as purely global, instead it could be described as having a ‘glocal’ 
character. 
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The ways in which performance measurement was interpreted and understood 
through particular cultural lenses is important as it highlights the often 
overlooked issue of how local features persevere in the face of global change, 
albeit in altered, diminished or re-imagined forms. This has been observed in 
other criminal justice organisations, including the police, where it has been 
suggested that traditional culture has not been displaced by modernisation but 
instead interacts in a complex way across place and time (Loftus 2011). The 
cultural situation of performance measurement in prisons demonstrates how 
tradition shapes the use of new techniques and technologies and remains a 
prominent part of practice and thinking. It also highlights that the managerial 
process is enmeshed in the use of power, smoothing the way for a movement of 
control towards managers whilst at the same time maintaining the hierarchical 
relationship between staff and prisoners. From this perspective, performance 
management is not a detached, objective management tool, but is instead a set of 
practices that have important social effects.          
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Chapter 5
“We haven’t quite been turned into robots yet”: The role of 
individuality and subjectivity in prison management
The growth of the managerial infrastructure, as described in the previous chapter, 
has changed both the technical nature of prison work but also had an impact upon 
the approach of prison managers. This chapter attempts to explore the residual 
role of individuality and subjectivity within the working lives of prison 
managers.
It is generally recognised that the growth of managerial practices has seen the 
development of mechanisms for enforcing greater conformity and has been 
accompanied by an apparent increased willingness of prison managers to submit 
to this enhanced control (Cheliotis 2006, Bryans 2007). However, that control is
not complete and there remains some space where rules, audit baselines, 
performance targets and line management supervision do not prescribe or direct 
(ibid). It is within the nature of social worlds that such spaces always exist, even 
within a ‘total’ institutions such as a prison, the idea of the all-encompassing 
control of individual action is neither realistic nor desirable (Sparks et al 1996). 
This chapter is concerned with locating and exploring these spaces, where there 
are gaps or room for manoeuvre. The essential concern is with the survival of the 
personal effect in prison management.    
In trying to understand this, it is important to locate the discussion within the 
historical and social context of management in general and prison management 
in particular. In the Western world, managers and leaders are often heralded as 
heroic figures. There is a myriad of popular literature on successful 
organisational leaders and formulae for effective leadership (for summary see 
Mullins 2002). This creates what can be seen as a cult of the organisational 
leader. Prisons have not been immune from this and particular attention has been 
paid to prison governors, who are described as holding a special place in the 
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organisation. For example, Bryans (2007) quotes half a dozen official and 
academic sources from the previous half a century that hail the importance of 
governing governors in particular. Similar claims have been made by practicing 
governors, for example Coyle (2008a) acknowledges that prisons are shaped by 
wider social and political factors but also describes that managers established an 
institutional “ethos” (p.243). A similar case is also presented by Bryans and 
Wilson (2000) who describe that:
“An effective prison governor also understands the subtleties and 
nuances of the special nature of prison culture. In short the prison 
governor is often the conduit through which various interested 
parties, including prisoners themselves, make sense of what 
happens inside.” (p.xi) 
As with Coyle, the suggestion is that a prison manager provides a moral 
framework through which the prison operates. 
These writers highlight the idea that prison managers act with agency; a sense of 
individuality and subjectivity. Whilst this is not unconstrained, they suggest that 
there is substantial space for the prison manager to shape their working world. 
From this perspective, prison managers, particularly governors, hold significant 
power, which they exercise in individual ways, and despite the encroachment of 
managerialism they retain a significant residual effect. 
However, it has been discussed in the previous chapter how the new technologies 
of managerialism have not simply introduced techniques for organisational 
control, but they also involve the attempt to manufacture consent and enlist 
support from prison managers. Recreating employees as idealised ‘corporate 
citizens’ is a feature of managerialism in contemporary organisations (Parker 
2002).  It has been suggested further that this involves moulding employees not 
only to act in ways that are organisationally desirable but also to think in ways 
that are preferred (Rose 1999). This includes the use of human resource 
strategies ranging from appraisal, reward and progression to engagement, 
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consultation, communication and personal development (Parker 2002). This 
attempt to encompass the subjective capabilities of individuals within the sphere 
of organisational control has been described as ‘governing the soul’ (Rose 1999). 
The aim of these strategies is to deepen and intensify the achievement of 
prescribed organisational aims and facilitates greater central control and 
‘management at a distance’ (O’Malley 2004). These writers draw a picture of an 
organisation where the behaviour of individuals in those spaces where choice is 
open to them, is to act in a way that optimise organisational benefit. Their actions 
are patterned so as to achieve central aims. The personal effect is reduced and 
instead they stand as proxies for the organisation.   
A third perspective that may be drawn upon is that of occupational culture. As 
has been described in the previous chapter and in chapter 2, it has been argued 
that there is a strong and distinctive prison officer culture which plays a role in 
shaping prison work (Crawley 2004, Liebling 2007). The features of this include 
insularity, machismo and a hierarchical relationship with prisoners. It has been 
argued widely that occupational culture can seep into the subjectivity of 
individuals and this has variously be described as the habitus (Bourdieu 1977), 
‘practical consciousness’ (Giddens 1984) or ‘working personality’ (Skolnick 
1966). All of these formulations suggest that occupational culture is not 
consciously enacted but becomes embedded in individual thinking and 
behaviour. From this perspective, occupational culture may play a role in shaping 
the way that prison managers approach the spaces between explicit direction and 
overt control. 
In this chapter, an attempt will be made to delve into those spaces between rules, 
monitoring and supervisory observation. This is intended to explore how prison 
managers approach these opportunities for individuality and subjectivity. What 
beliefs and values do prison managers hold? Do they act upon these in their work 
and if so, how? Are these beliefs, values and practices shared across occupational 
groups? How far has this been eroded or changed by the development of 
managerial practices? How do they negotiate the various pressures upon them in 
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their practice? This exploration is concerned with prison managers as ‘micro 
actors’ (Kennedy 2010), making sense of the tensions between global and local, 
old and new, individual desires and organisational constraints.
This chapter will focus on five areas. The first is management values, which 
addresses managers’ approach, presentation, personality and world views and 
how these are incorporated into their practice. The second is management-staff 
relations, that is the ideas about how managers should operate, direct and 
integrate with those they manage. The third is discretion, that is where managers 
exercise a degree of choice in decision making, how they approach that task. The 
fourth is resistance, how managers act when their individual beliefs or 
preferences came into conflict with the expectations placed upon them. The fifth 
is the ways in which managers exercise and use the power that they hold. These 
elements, whilst not comprehensive, provide a means through which the 
individuality and subjectivity of prison managers can be explored within this 
particular work context. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the issues 
raised.         
Management values
Historically, the sociology of work has had much to say about the different 
styles, approaches and values adopted by managers. Various different typologies 
have been proposed, from the most basic such as Lewin, Lippitt and White’s 
(1939) distinction between autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire managers, to 
more sophisticated approaches such as the six styles described by Purcell and 
Ahistrand (1994). This has also been reflected in the literature on prison 
managers. As has been discussed previously, Rutherford (1993a) argues that 
criminal justice managers operated within three ‘credos’: expedient 
managerialism, humanity and punitiveness. Although he acknowledged that 
managerialism was starting to dominate, he did argue that criminal justice 
managers are a diverse group and their work is: “an arena characterized by 
competing ideologies” (Rutherford 1993b p.26). More recently, Bryans (2007) 
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acknowledged the dominance of managerialism but argues that there remains a 
diversity of approaches. He argues that there are four ideal types: general 
managers who focus on performance management and their own personal career 
success; chief officers who are hands-on operational managers who have worked 
their way through the ranks; liberal idealists who are concerned with the morality 
of imprisonment and engaged in wider penal reform; and conforming mavericks 
who are charismatic individuals who develop distinct and innovative practices 
whilst also achieving the majority of conventional targets. Bryans draws upon 
research on Chief Police Officers, which suggests that these types are “distinctive 
constellations…that can be seen as variations around central themes” (Reiner 
1991 p.303). However, he also recognises that these types are a construction and 
no individual was likely to precisely match them. Given that this is the case, 
Bryans suggests that the diversity of prison managers was almost infinite: 
“Governors, after all, are individuals with distinct attributes and unique histories” 
(Bryans 2007, p.159).   
These works focus on diversity, but in revealing an increasing trend towards 
managerialism, they also disclose a homogenisation of practices and values. A 
more complete analysis would be one that explores both of these factors. It has 
been argued that an emphasis on diversity and change alone produces an artificial 
neatness that underplays the complexity and tensions that exist within prisons 
(Loader and Sparks 2004) and also that this has a political purpose, presenting a 
more positive representation than may be the case and obscuring the more 
repressive elements of the penal system (Sim 2009).       
In this section, the variety of styles and approaches taken by managers will be 
considered. This will particularly take into account the penal ideologies 
managers articulate and worked to. This section will ask what the different 
values expressed by managers are? What do these reveal about the nature of 
prison management and prison managers? How far do these reflect individuality 
and how far do they reflect patterns of conformity? The section will close by 
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exploring how the issue of management values reflects agency in the work of 
prison managers.
Values in practice 
In the two prisons, managers in general stated that they brought their own 
personality and values into their work and that it was not possible to draw a neat 
distinction between the professional and the personal self. They also generally 
resisted the idea that managerialism had created a tightly manacled cadre of 
managers and instead suggested that whilst the development of rules and targets 
constrained them, they could still find space to express themselves. As one 
manager described: 
“Although I’ve been describing to you a very tight Prison Service 
where there isn’t an awful lot of room for manoeuvre in as much 
as you do need to follow the PSOs, follow the rules and 
regulations, I still feel that because we are a human business, not 
dealing with commodities, you can still bring your own 
personality into the job, we haven’t quite been turned into robots 
yet.” (S4 governor grade)
The values of managers were expressed in formal and informal aspects of their 
role. Through communications, their words and statements at meetings and in 
documents included explicit articulation of values. Examples of this included a 
discussion in one prison about prisoners’ access to contraception, which drew 
upon different discourses where one side emphasised public health whilst another 
cited moral opprobrium and security risks. Managers would also articulate 
organisationally constructed values such as ‘decency’. Whilst the use of such 
terms did in some cases accord with individuals’ views about the treatment of 
prisoners and this could be a way of legitimising these and gaining leverage, for 
others this was a form of managerial compliance, something they implemented 
because it was directed rather than through any personal commitment. 
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Managers also made strategic and resource allocation choices linked to values. 
Whilst the use of resources was constrained by rules and targets, there was some 
limited scope for choice. For example, in education, activities including arts were
not usually formally funded but managers would find ways to include this so as 
to create a broader curriculum. Managers could also make recruitment and 
promotion decisions in which they could select individuals who shared similar 
values, beliefs and approaches. 
The managers in the prisons described the values they held. These were clustered 
around three broad groups: professionalism; reform, rehabilitation and humane 
treatment; and punishment and security. In general these reflected the three 
credos described by Rutherford (1993a). However, it was also clear that 
constructing such idealised types obscured some of the complexity and tensions 
that were present.  
The most frequently cited values were those clustered around ‘professionalism’. 
This had instrumental aspects, for example managers described how they valued 
qualities included achieving success, acting “by the book”, or complying with the 
demands placed upon them. However, these managers did not see managerialism
as purely instrumental or ‘expedient’ as suggested by Rutherford, but instead 
many felt a deeply held personal commitment to meeting targets for their own 
sake. This had become part of their habitus or working identity. Others also 
looked beyond expediency and felt that some targets helped to improve the 
quality of service to the public or to prisoners. They therefore felt that targets 
could contribute towards morally progressive aims. 
The notion of ‘professionalism’ also had other moral and emotional aspects. This 
encompassed attributes such as conscientiousness, openness, good 
communication, honesty and integrity. Such characteristics usually related to 
dealings with staff, but were also relevant to those with prisoners. These 
characteristics were normative; describing an approach that was considered 
morally good. 
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Another element of ‘professionalism’ was a commitment to having good 
relationships with staff. This has been a staple of management studies including 
the study of human services (e.g. Gronroos 1984). In prisons, this was complex, 
as this staff orientation could operate in a way that privileged the perspective of 
staff and subordinated prisoners. This issue will be explored in more depth in the 
next section, but at this stage, it should be noted that there were problematic 
aspects of the construction of professionalism in this respect. 
Rather than being a cohesive set of values, the elements of professionalism could 
sometimes conflict. For example, the pressure to meet targets could lead to 
tensions with the values of honesty and integrity. As has been described in the 
previous chapter, there were a myriad of situations in which managers put 
managerialism first, for example manipulating performance data. However, on 
other occasions managers resisted this pressure and placed their integrity first. 
One manager described such a situation:  
“…I [had] a written complaint I was late for the month before 
last. I was three or four days late for various reasons. It was 
suggested that I backdate it to the date that would put it back in 
date. I wasn’t happy doing that to the point where I was basically 
willing to be ridiculed in front of the rest of the SMT…I wasn’t 
happy lying. I remember being told early in my career that would 
cause me all sorts of problems and ‘you’re far too honest’ and the 
rest of it.” (S7 governor grade)
This statement revealed the ways in which values came into conflict for an 
individual, but was also played out across an occupational group. This manager 
described how the wider group attempted to influence his behaviour by loosening 
his commitment to honesty, ridiculing him for not achieving a target and 
normalising the falsification of data. 
Overall, the notion of ‘professionalism’ as understood by prison managers was 
complex and conflicted, but it encompassed an intensified and personalised 
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commitment to meeting managerial targets and acting in ways that conformed 
with cultural aspects of the work including forming strong relationships with 
staff.    
The second cluster of values discussed by managers was based around reform, 
rehabilitation and the humane treatment of prisoners, what Rutherford described 
as the ‘humanity credo’. Again, this was more diverse and riddled with tensions 
than the notional ideal types suggested. For some, this reflected a moral 
commitment towards a liberal humanitarian approach including addressing social 
deficits such as education, substance misuse, employment, housing and attitudes. 
This could be viewed as a version of traditional ‘public service ethos’ that 
privileged the public good over private interests (McDonough 2006). For others, 
this was an extension of managerialism, with issues such as ‘rehabilitation’ 
‘reducing re-offending’, ‘resettlement’ and ‘decency’ being organisationally 
constructed objectives which were implemented because they were prescribed 
and monitored. That humanitarian ideas had been incorporated into managerial 
practices was seen as an enabling force by some. For example, one manager 
described that:
“It’s all very well to sit down and say to people this is my view on 
how we should do it, to which they could turn around and say 
“that’s your view”. It’s a little bit woolly. We’re a professional 
service, we’re professional people, so we should abide by the 
rules that encompass what we do. If within the staff handbook we 
should do this, we should maintain this that and the other, that’s 
what we should do, that’s what our boundaries are. If I saw 
somebody who was not up to that, I don’t want to leave them 
thinking “that’s his view”, no, you will do it, this is what’s laid 
down and you will do it.” (W7 governor grade)
  
In this statement, this manager reveals how managerial compliance could be used 
for progressive ends. This pragmatic view has also been articulated by senior 
prison managers (e.g. Wheatley 2005) and academics (e.g. Liebling assisted by 
Arnold 2004, Whitty 2011). 
153
The third way in which reform, rehabilitation and humane treatment was
understood by prison managers was with a punitive aspect. This could be seen in 
the way that one manager discussed these issues: 
“There are certain values that you can bring, like good manners. 
I think good manners are important. You can instil that and insist 
and get that from prisoners, providing you reciprocate that and 
speak to prisoners appropriately, address them appropriately -
please, thank you…how they dress at a particular time, they’re 
going to the servery to collect food, they should be in a proper 
shirt, trousers, not coming up in shorts, half undressed. Basic 
standards and values you can instil…Basically you can instil that 
and you can get the proper respect back from staff and prisoners.
If you insist on that, they will respond." (W30 governor grade)
This presented an image of prisoners as lacking social etiquette, feckless and 
lazy. This reflected what has been described as the representation of prisoners as 
‘feral’ (Sim 2009), unable to exercise basic care of themselves and participate in 
society. The role of staff was seen as being to “instil” and “insist” that these 
behaviours were observed so that prisoners could pay “proper respect”. This 
represented institutional compliance and control as reform, rehabilitation and 
humane treatment. This also illustrated responsibilization (Garland 2001), in 
which individuals were encouraged to act in ways that were aligned with state 
directed standards of behaviour, in this case complying with staff and behaving 
in ways that enabled the smooth operation of the organisation. Although 
presented as being reforming and humane, these behaviours actually placed
primacy upon institutionalisation, control and reinforcing power structures.          
For those who held more punitive values, the ideas of reform, rehabilitation and 
humanity could exercise a constraining effect. They sometimes set a boundary 
that prevented managers acting inhumanely despite their personal preferences. 
For example, one manager described: 
“Sometimes I thing, “oh fuck it, if the guy wants to kill himself, 
fucking get on with it” but when I’m on the shop floor I can’t 
demonstrate it can I? These guys on dirty protest, I’d like to 
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throw my own bucket of piss over them myself, but you can’t do 
that because it’s not humane. Doesn’t stop you thinking it though 
does it? I have to make sure that the staff hold that moral 
ground.” (W5 governor grade) 
In this statement, the manager’s knowledge that overt brutality was not 
organisationally approved, constrained how they acted and how they directed 
staff.    
What have been described as ‘humanity’ values (Rutherford 1993a) were not 
characterised by purely progressive liberal views, but also encompassed 
managerialism and punitiveness. Again, these values were not discrete and 
coherent but were in practice dynamic and characterised by conflict and 
complexity.   
The third cluster of values related to punitiveness and security. Although these
were the least frequently expressed values, some managers did express a respect 
for order for its own sake. For example, one manager described:
“I think it’s quite easy for me because my values of right and 
wrong are lawful. I’m the kind of person who doesn’t park on 
double yellow lines because I’m not supposed to park on double 
yellow lines, because there’s a reason why I’m not supposed to 
park on double yellow lines, because if I park somewhere in might 
restrict vision on the roads. I don’t use mobile phone in the car 
because it’s dangerous. Because I have an understanding of why 
rules are in place, that I believe a lot of prisoners either don’t 
understand or don’t want to understand, so I do encourage 
prisoners to look at those kind of issues…I have a very strong 
sense of right and wrong and that’s the way I operate at work and 
at home.” (S16 principal officer)
Other managers also expressed how they gained a thrill or enjoyment from the 
security aspects of their work such as detecting and intercepting drug supply or 
challenging difficult prisoners. There was a belief by some managers that 
security played an important role for them both professionally and personally. 
For others, punishment and security could play a legitimate role in creating a safe 
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and positive prison where individuals could address their needs, whilst for others 
it was important because it was reflected in targets and performance measures. 
Values as agency
Having revealed the ways in which managers discussed and acted upon their 
values, it is worth providing a more analytical reflection upon this, returning to 
some of the ideas discussed by Giddens (1984).
The discussion so far has shown that managerialism or ‘professional’ values have
become predominant. The progress of this was noted by Rutherford (1993) and 
Bryant (2007) and this study demonstrates that it has continued to become 
embedded in the values of prison managers. However, it was important that had 
not simply become accepted as a conscious motive, but had become more deeply 
embedded. This could be seen from the ways that it had been legitimated through 
the intense personal commitment held by some and the moral discourse that 
underpinned the justifications for managerial practices. The representation of 
managerialism as moral was part of the ‘soft’ power that legitmised it (Parker 
2002). In practice, these claims of moral force were problematic.
To a greater extent, managerialism had supplanted the traditional notion of the 
liberal, idealistic governor. Although there were some exceptions, generally 
managers saw themselves as achieving particular prescribed ends more than 
creating a moral climate.  Even when managers discussed moral aspects of 
imprisonment such as reform, rehabilitation and humanity this was often bound 
up in the managerial framework. Equally, there were also few who openly 
advocated security as a predominant moral value and the open abuse of prisoners 
had become unacceptable. It appeared that the rise of managerialism as a 
dominant value had reframed and to some degree subsumed conscious moral 
discourse from both ends of the spectrum. This could not be described as 
depoliticisation as managerial practice is itself deeply political, however, prison 
management did not generally feature the lively moral discussion that had been 
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described previously. This was both positive, in as much as it constrained the 
more punitive and inhumane instincts of some, but also negative in as much as 
there were less promotion of progressive reform.               
It was also apparent from the observations and discussions with prison managers 
that there was some continuity with the past. Elements of traditional prison 
officer occupational culture had been incorporated within contemporary 
practices. For example, good relationships with officers and having a close knit
team had been recreated as an aspect of ‘professionalism’, similarly machismo 
has been largely transferred from physical confrontation to the attainment of 
targets. It could also be seen that ideas of reform, rehabilitation and humanity 
were contested and could provide a means to legitimise the control and 
subordination of prisoners. Whilst these tensions were not openly discussed and 
did not form part of the reflexive or conscious agency of prison managers, they 
were part of their rationalisation and practical consciousness; they were part of 
their habitus and ‘working personality’. This illustrates how the perennial 
tensions of prison management were played out biographically in the practice 
and thinking of prison managers themselves.    
Management-staff relationships
The relationship between managers and staff has been a central feature of 
organisational research (see Pugh and Hickson 1996). This has also been seen in 
writings on prisons, where relationships in the organisation, particularly staff-
prisoner relationships, have been seen as particularly important. In their seminal 
study, Sparks et al (1996) described that relationships have a central role in 
creating order by establishing and maintaining the conditions of legitimacy, 
where the institution is perceived by those involved as being morally justified. 
They described that these relationships enabled prisoners to feel that they had a 
stake in the prison, both materially and through some, albeit constrained, bonds 
of affection. In addition, relationships were able to cushion the impact of ‘hard’ 
security measures such as searching, and controls on movement, property and 
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choice. Relationships could therefore make prisons feel more palatable to the 
imprisoned.  In their work on prison officers, Liebling and Price (2000) returned 
to this issue and described that relationships had both instrumental and normative 
aspects. In instrumental terms they described that relationships helped to get 
things done and secured more easy compliance so that the machinery of the 
prison and the specific work of individuals could be carried out more easily. It 
was also recognised by prison staff that relationships had an instrumental value 
in assessing the behaviour and risk of individuals and gaining intelligence, both 
of which could be used to enhance security (Dunbar 1985). In normative terms 
they described that positive relationships were a good in themselves that made 
the prison a more humane and tolerable environment. They had an important role 
in enhancing the quality of life for prisoners (Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004). 
Liebling and Price argued that relationships had a cascade effect, where the 
quality and nature of relationships between managers and staff could set the tone 
for the use of discretion by staff generally and could provide staff with 
confidence. Not all writers have been positive about relationships in prisons. In 
particular, Sim (2009) has described that one of the regressive elements of 
prisons is the occupational culture. He did not describe this as a sub-culture of 
rogue officers but instead a pervasive general culture that was influenced by 
management behaviour including the machismo of basic training, the 
indifference of managers to examples of abuse and the dehumanising process of 
managerialism which reduced prisoners from sentient people to objects of risk 
and operational management.  From this perspective, the relationships between 
managers and staff maintained and promoted a regressive culture of inhumanity 
and neglect. 
      
This section will briefly explore the importance of relationships in the work of 
prison managers. It will explore the different approaches that were taken to 
relationships and the means through which these relationships were utilised. This 
section will also use an extended example to explore the complexity of 
relationships, their effectiveness, purpose and consequences. 
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Relationships in practice
Staff-management relationships were a part of both formal and informal aspects 
of management. Relationships had to be established and maintained through 
formal channels including meetings, briefings, interviews, and written 
documentation, as well as more informal interactions on a day-to-day basis. 
Approaches varied across different dimensions, including the degree to which 
individual managers consulted and engaged those they were responsible for or 
were simply directive, the degree to which they were open or closed with 
information, and whether they were structured and formal or more relaxed and 
informal. There were tensions between these polar extremes, with the 
predominant view of the ‘right’ relationships being that managers were open and 
consultative with staff, but not so close that friendships blurred their management 
responsibilities.   
In general, managers discussed how relationships performed both instrumental 
and normative functions. Relationships with staff and prisoners were seen as a 
means by which normative standards could be modelled and promoted, and 
instrumental gains made including increasing productivity and encouraging 
compliance. Relationships were formed by managers being accessible, visible on 
the shop floor, taking time to talk to staff and prisoners, and humanising 
themselves through humour. However, topics of conversation often revolved 
around male concerns such as football, social drinking and particular television 
programmes, although they sometimes also touched upon domestic concerns 
such as family life. 
For most managers, relationships were not merely a way of securing rigid 
compliance but were a means through which attitudes and behaviour could be 
more deeply controlled.  They described that they role modelled appropriate 
behaviour to both staff and prisoners. Their conduct towards people would set an 
example to both the person they were interacting with, and others who saw this 
and this contributed towards creating a general climate. Additionally, and in a 
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more active way, some managers described that they policed boundaries by 
challenging what they saw as inappropriate behaviour and recognising good 
conduct. It was described that:
“…it’s about being around… making sure they see what your 
values and standards are…when you speak to prisoners you 
ensure you stick to those standards, it’s about when you hear 
other members of staff humiliating prisoners and you see 
inappropriate behaviour, challenging that member of staff and 
speaking to them. Same with a prisoner, if I see a prisoner 
misbehaving I’m not afraid to tackle a prisoner or a member of 
staff. Tell them straight, this is not the standard I expect, you 
wouldn’t like a member of staff to speak to you like that, I don’t 
expect to speak to that member of staff like that. If you 
consistently offer that approach, that’s when they know what to 
expect, same for staff and prisoners, it is consistency and insisting 
on it, don’t back away from it.” (W30 governor grade)
This described an idealised approach. However, the observed reality was that 
most prison managers overlooked a myriad of situations in which prisoners were 
talked about in denigrating terms, sexist language was used or rough ‘banter’ was 
deployed. Indeed, not only did they overlook this, they also engaged in it as one 
of the ways in which they maintained relationships with those they managed. 
Whilst the idealised, espoused view of managers was that they would take a strict 
line on such behaviour, the reality of their relationships was that they walked a 
line between tolerating and engaging enough with traditional elements of staff 
culture including machismo and their orientation to prisoners in order to be 
accepted and influential, without supporting overt inhumanity.       
One of the most critical formal settings in which relationships were modelled and 
displayed was in adjudications (Liebling and Price 2001), where prisoners faced 
charges for disciplinary infractions and risked punishments including the loss of 
privileges or even periods of solitary confinement. An example of a set of 
adjudications at one of the research sites will be used in order to explore the 
complex and multi-faceted ways in which relationships were used.  
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The governor conducting the adjudications had a distinctive individual style, 
utilising humour and ‘banter’. On the face of it, it could be said that his conduct 
was unprofessional such as swearing and making what could be described as 
inappropriate comments. For example, in one interaction with a prisoner charged 
with swearing at a member of staff:
Governor: “Do you swear a lot?”
Prisoner: “Yes”
Governor: “Fucking happens sometimes”
And at the end of that adjudication, he concluded by saying; “I would tell you to 
fuck off, but I don’t swear”. In other adjudications, similar phrases were used 
including “caution – now fuck off” and “shut up, you’re boring me now”. The 
manager also made comments about the process itself, saying to various 
prisoners: “At the end I’m going to win”, “Wheel the guilty bastard in” and “I’ll 
ascertain what happened, then find you guilty”. 
The outrageousness of the behaviour could simply be condemned. However, 
beyond the surface there was greater complexity. In all of the adjudications, the 
governor used the first name of the prisoners and he tried to build a rapport, 
partly through his jokes and outlandish comments. Many of the prisoners laughed 
at these comments and they largely appeared to be laughing with them rather 
than being laughed at. The manager also encouraged a sense of legitimacy, by 
ensuring that the prisoners appreciated the reason for findings and punishments.  
For example, a prisoner was charged with failing to work properly in an art class 
and initially pleaded ‘not guilty’, and as the adjudication progressed the 
following exchange took place:
Governor: Were you asked to draw a picture from the book you 
were given?
Prisoner: Yes, but I was thinking about it and doodling on the 
paper
Governor: So did you do what you were told to?
Prisoner: It was near the end of the class
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Governor: Did you draw a picture from the book like you were 
told?
Prisoner: No
Governor: So were you working properly?
Prisoner: No
Governor: Were you having a bad day or the teacher?
Prisoner: Probably me
In another case where a prisoner was charged with disobeying an order to leave a 
classroom, a similar exchange took place:
Governor: Did you go when you were asked to?
Prisoner: After I’d asked some more questions.
Governor: So did you go when you were asked to?
Prisoner: Not straight away
Governor: So the answer is…?
Prisoner: No
In this way, the manager got the prisoners to state their own guilt rather than 
imposing it upon them. His relationship with the prisoners and his approach 
enabled them to understand and accept the ways in which they had breached the 
rules.
Both staff and prisoners appeared amused by the style, but prisoners seemed to 
appreciate the substance, with comments such as; “someone said you’re the grim 
reaper, but you’re alright”, “you seem like a fair man to me” and “fair enough”. 
It was also noteworthy that the punishments given tended to be on the more 
lenient side.  
This extended example has been used as it appeared to contain elements that 
illustrated aspects of relationships. The first element was that the presentation 
was idiosyncratic rather than technocratic. In its own way it was charismatic and 
entertaining. However, it was distant from the image of a cold managerialist or a 
compassionate humanitarian. In style it owed more to a punitive and autocratic 
approach. There was part of the style which communicated a sense of traditional 
culture where the staff were indisputably in charge and prisoners were powerless 
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to challenge their authority, indeed this was conveyed by the fact that the 
governor grade could swear with impunity but the prisoner could not. 
Underneath that, there was a subtle way in which engaging with the prisoner, 
leading them to understand their guilt, using proportionate punishments and 
using a respectful form of address, created a sense of legitimacy and modelled to 
staff that this was possible without a loss of control. 
Whilst these adjudications were individual, idiosyncratic and would be distant 
from an organisational model of good practice, they illustrated some of the ways 
in which the tensions between the traditional and the modern are artfully worked 
through at a street level. 
       
Relationships as agency
This brief exploration of relationships has illustrated that managers use 
relationships for instrumental and normative reasons. Relationships could help 
them to get things done and could both soften the impact and oil the wheels for 
realising managerial aims. Relationships were also talked about in a way that 
suggested that they were used in order to shape individual workers into an 
idealised employee, reflecting the preferred values and attitudes of the 
organisation. Managers were not simply trying to maintain good relationships or 
achieve results, but instead were creating conditions where prison staff were 
enlisted in furthering the organisational objectives. It has been described that 
managers were “delivering results through people” (Brookes, Smith and Bennett 
2008). 
Beyond these conscious and reflexive ways in which managers discussed their 
relationships with staff, they also operated intuitively informed by practical 
consciousness. In particular, the nature of the relationships between managers 
and staff maintained and reinforced the relationship between staff and prisoners. 
Managers reinforced a sense that staff were superior and their interests 
paramount. This was done through the daily and ingrained ways in which 
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prisoners were denigrated through talk and also in practice where the views of 
staff were sought and treated as privileged. 
In their relationships with staff, managers walked a tightrope; engaging with and 
reinforcing traditional occupational cultures sufficiently in order to enlist support 
and reduce resistance whilst at the same time attempting to prevent the aims of 
the organisation being undermined. 
Discretion
The use of discretion has been described as central to the work of criminal justice 
professionals including judges (e.g. Hart 1961, Dworkin 1978), police officers 
(e.g. Skolnick 1966, Reiner 1991) and prison officers (e.g. Liebling and Price 
2001, Crawley 2004). It is an issue that holds a distinguished place in the 
understanding of criminal justice work. This was neatly summed up by Hawkins 
(1992):
Discretion – which might be regarded as the space, as it were, 
between legal rules in which legal actors may exercise choice –
may be formally granted, or it may be assumed. It is in the 
everyday discretionary behaviour of judges, public officials, 
lawyers, and others that the legal system distributes its burdens 
and benefits, provides answers to questions, and solutions to 
problems. (p.11)
It has been described that rules are essentially uncertain in three senses (ibid). 
First, rules are inherently uncertain due to the vagaries of language. The second 
element is that there are a diversity of circumstances that may exist and therefore 
the application and effects of rules may vary. The third element is the 
indeterminacy of official purposes. This suggests that in applying rules 
consideration is given to the intention of the rule makers and the social or 
political purpose that the rule serves. Given these uncertainties, it has been 
argued that those applying rules exercise a degree of choice about how they do 
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so. It is at the field or street level that the law is worked out in practice with all its 
complexity and its aims can be realized or distorted. 
In regard to police and prison officers, discussion of discretion has largely 
centred upon the idea that the enforcement of all rules or laws at all times is 
simply not realistically possible (Sykes 1958). It has also been argued that total 
enforcement of rules is undesirable as it would create inhumanity and undermine 
order (Sparks et al 1996). Instead, it has been argued that the use of discretion 
and selective enforcement is a means through which order and legitimacy can be 
created (ibid) and that positive relationships can be maintained (Liebling and 
Price 2001). In relation to prison managers, these uses of discretion have been 
described as operating in the same way to create order and legitimacy and it has 
also been suggested that the use of discretion by managers communicates a 
message to the staff group generally that has a cascade effect in influencing their 
use of discretion (ibid).
In this section, consideration will be given to the circumstances in which 
managers exercise discretion and the mechanisms that enable them to do so. The 
section will go on to explore the practice of discretion by prison managers and 
the ways in which this operates at a street level. Finally, there will be a more 
theoretical discussion of discretion as a form of agency.     
Discretion in practice
There are a myriad of circumstances in which prison managers exercise 
discretion. This may be formally prescribed and defined or may be informal and 
open-ended. It has been argued that there are four ways in which discretion can 
be structured (Hawkins 1992): ‘rule failure’, ‘rule compromise’, ‘rule building’ 
and ‘khadi’. Examples of each of these forms of discretion will be described and 
discussed below in order to provide a means through which discretion in prisons 
can be further understood.   
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‘Rule failure’ discretion describes the situation where scope for individual 
decision-making is formally structured into rules and policies (ibid). In prisons, 
examples of this included decisions in relation to early release, categorisation and 
managing self-harm, where the rules set out the criteria to be considered and the 
documentation and reports that should be taken into account. There were 
similarly structured processes in relation to staff including appraisals, job 
selection, and promotion. This form of discretion is established in recognition 
that every eventuality cannot be foreseen and therefore decision-makers have to 
act within a framework in order to turn the policies into practice. 
In making these decisions, managers would start by considering the factual 
information that was available to them. They acted in a rational way, making use 
of the resources available in order to understand the situation. In addition, 
managers would also take account of the purpose of the rules that they were 
applying. These would be seen as providing cues, directing their use of 
discretion. However, official purposes were not necessarily consistent, for 
example categorisation and early release combine security, efficiency and 
rehabilitation objectives. The balance between these was also unstable, for 
example during a period of population pressure managers were provided with 
central guidance pressing upon them the need to move as many prisoners as 
reasonably possible out from closed prisons and into open prisons. This informed 
their use of discretion in making categorisation decisions. Similarly, there had 
been conscious, centrally-directed efforts to shift the use of discretion in favour 
of more releases for home detention curfew. This interaction between the 
decision-making and centrally prescribed official purposes has been alluded to by 
Hawkins (1992), and it has been suggested that routinised decision-making 
draws a balance between imperfect information and an attempt to realise the aims 
and intentions of the framing policy (Feldman 1992). 
In his work on prison managers, Cheliotis (2006) argued that they resist the 
imposition of managerialism and instead negotiate a position between blind 
conformity and revolution. He argued that this has a humanising effect on the 
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prison environment. In this discussion of the use of ‘rule failure’ discretion, it 
appears that the position can be more complex. In particular, it is worth noting 
three aspects here. The first is that ‘rule failure’ discretion encouraged the 
exercise of some choice and independence by managers rather than their having 
to wrest this through resistance. The second issue was that many managers did
not seek to act in ways that were individualistic but instead sought further 
guidance in the aims and policies themselves. They therefore sought to use their 
discretion in ways that were conforming rather than resistant. The third was that 
humanity was not solely derived from the acts of agents but could also be an 
inherent aspect of the rules and processes. For example, although it can be 
argued that central interventions on home detention curfew and categorisation 
were directed towards the efficient use of accommodation, there was also an 
aspect of them that was about minimising conditions of custody where 
appropriate and reducing the harms of imprisonment.
The second form of discretion is ‘rule building’ discretion, where precedent is 
used to develop and build better rules over time (Hawkins 1992). This is a 
prominent form of rule development in jurisprudence.  In prisons, it was less 
obviously present. Of course, it was a feature of those processes that most 
resembled judicial processes. For example, adjudications processes were shaped 
by legal precedent. The growth of human resource professionals in prisons has 
also drawn in greater expertise about employment law including the use of 
discretion. A third example was in the way that some quasi-judicial bodies 
attempted to develop and promote case work as a form of precedent. The most 
obvious example was that of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, which 
publishes an Annual Report where they cite the outcomes of important cases and 
disseminate these (e.g. Prison and Probation Ombudsman for England and Wales 
2011). The practice of formal ‘rule building’ discretion was not generally part of 
prison management except in discrete, specialised issues. 
The third and fourth forms of discretion will be discussed together as they both 
encompassed those situations that were the least fettered and had the widest 
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range of choice open to the decision-maker. ‘Rule compromise’ discretion is 
where the issues are contentious and the scope for difference is more pronounced 
and therefore decision-making is left to individuals, such decisions effectively 
leave ambiguity and tensions unresolved (Hawkins 1992). Prominent examples 
of this included prisoner discipline where there was open-ended discretion given 
to staff to lay disciplinary charges, issue disciplinary warnings, use segregation 
or do nothing. Similarly, managers had wide discretion in many aspects of their 
management of staff. ‘Khadi’ discretion arises in ad hoc situations where there 
are no formal rules or procedures for guidance and therefore each case is decided 
individually taking account of law, politics, ethics and emotion (ibid). Many 
daily issues such as compassionate requests from prisoners for phone calls, visits 
or access to other facilities fell into this category.  
As with other forms of discretion, managers would act rationally by attempting 
to gather information about the circumstances they were presented with. One 
example can be drawn from senior officers working on units who often had to 
consider requests by prisoners for additional funds for phone calls. There were 
no published rules or guidance for how these decisions should be made. They 
would approach the problem by making limited inquiries into the exceptional
personal circumstances, for example, checking with the Chaplain, personal 
officer or looking at recent phonecalls. They would also seek information about 
the general conduct of the prisoner concerned and whilst poor behaviour would 
not in itself preclude additional funds being given, good or bad behaviour would 
be taken into account. In addition, checks for obvious abuses would also be 
considered, for example that the prisoner had spent their funds on other 
commodities such as purchases at the prison shop or had made several previous 
requests for additional funds. The collection of these facts and reports would 
usually lead to what was considered self-evident conclusions. As well as 
attempting to provide some rational basis for the decision-making, it can also be 
seen that the discretion in these cases was informed by the values of both 
compassion and order or security. 
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The exercise of discretion was varied in its forms but its use was informed by the 
values that were predominant in prisons; managerialism, humanity and 
punitiveness. These will be discussed below. 
There were three particular ways in which discretion reflected managerialism. 
The first was that discretion was exercised in ways that took account of the 
impact on the organisation, including the delivery of targets and the use of 
resources. This was sometimes cited explicitly by managers as a reason for 
decisions being taken or a factor in their considerations. The second way was that 
managers would use discretion instrumentally. For example, some managers 
would allow informal punishments to be utilised in regard to prisoners perceived 
as difficult, such being slow in providing service or not following up queries. 
This also applied to staff. For example, access to annual leave was described in 
one prison as follows:
“[The manager] said that the leave entitlement was 14.5% so as 
long as that was not filled, there was an entitlement to leave. After 
that he described that it was “based on the relationship with that 
member of staff”. He said that the staff were divided into three 
groups: the first were flexible and worked closely with the detail 
office; the middle group come in when they have to, will work 
extra when asked, they are “not demanding, not a burden”; the 
third group “do very little except to help themselves”, take sick 
leave and whenever they are asked to stop on they have a reason 
why they can’t. [The manager] described that the more co-
operative people were, the more he would try to help them out. 
With certain situations such as bereavements and domestic crises, 
they would be given the time off regardless, largely because he 
believed that whether it was authorised or not, they would not 
come to work. In a second set of situations, such as childcare, 
there was a general rule that unpaid leave would initially be 
granted with ‘unco-operative’ staff, he would enforce this, but 
with ‘co-operative’ staff, “someone of good character”, he would 
look for a way to help them out by swapping shifts or arranging 
cover.” (SFN 8)
Discretion was used as a means of rewarding and punishing so as to establish, 
reinforce and embed norms. Whilst this use of discretion was managerialist in as 
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much as it sought to harness hierarchical power and control subordinates, it also 
reflected traditional cultural norms including encouraging good order amongst 
prisoners and team loyalty amongst staff. 
The third way in which managerialism was enacted through discretion was the 
way in which it was exercised as a means of controlling and managing risk. This 
was reflected in common phrases such as: “I will err on the side of caution”, “any 
decision I take must be based around is this defensible?”, “I’ve got to cover my 
arse and that of the governor”, “you get the finger pointed”. This reflected two 
particular issues. The first was defensiveness or risk aversion, where discretion 
would be used cautiously and was often exercised as a means of organisational or 
self-preservation. Comments such as “defensible” suggested a quasi-legal 
approach, a managerial response where decisions could be justified internally, in 
the media, politically or legally. However, other comments such as “cover my 
arse” and concerns about getting “the finger pointed” indicated defensive self-
interest. The other approach to risk avoidance was reflected in those who would 
“err on the side of caution”, rather than simply being a defensive posture, this 
suggested a decision that was embedded in a set of values where security and 
order were prioritised. Again, it was possible to see that what may be presented 
as managerial decision-making actually encompassed other values.          
As has been discussed, it has been argued that humanity was realised by some 
managers in their use of discretion. There were a number of phrases used by 
some managers to describe humanity in their decision-making process. For 
example, managers would use phrases such as: “what sounds fair to me, what is 
reasonable, what would I expect?” and “use the decency thing, put yourself in 
their shoes”. As discussed earlier, humane behaviour was more complex than the 
idea that individuals acted heroically in order to resist potential inhumanity and 
sustain more positive outcomes. Two examples will be used in order to illustrate 
this. Both relate to disciplinary actions; one situation involving a member of staff 
and one involving a prisoner.     
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In a staff situation, a manager described how he attempted to use discretion to 
resolve a conflict and take account of individual circumstances:
“Were you here the other day when we talked about an officer 
who went AWOL? He was challenged when he came back to work 
on the Sunday, he finished up having an eyeball to eyeball with [a 
manager], who is full of fucking testosterone, so bear that for a 
minute would you? The officer’s gone, “well fuck you, I’m going 
off”. That’s red rag to a bull with me that is, that’s “please 
explain”11 then we take it from there. Afterwards someone says to 
me surreptitiously…there may be more to that, there’s some real 
bad issues that guys going through at home. Doesn’t give him the 
right to do what he’s done. So, I task my P[rincipal] O[fficer], 
“tell me what’s going on, tell me what your view is, I’ll make the 
decision” He came back to me and I decided that discretion was 
probably the best way forward. I’ll have to speak to [the
manager] and explain why I’ve done that, because he’ll think 
[I’ve] gone soft…The member of staff needs to be spoken to when 
he comes back, “I know what’s happened, I know what’s gone off, 
that’s not the way you do it”. So, that’s discretion is as much as
the [manager] could have put him on a disciplinary charge, I 
could have formally investigated it, but I ask myself,  the officers 
pretty damn good, he’s well thought of, how does that look?”
(W5 governor grade)
In this example, the manager drew upon three factors. The first was that he was 
conscious of the context including that the confrontation was partly provoked by 
an overzealous manager who was “full of fucking testosterone”, and that the 
member of staff had some domestic problems. These were presented as 
mitigating factors justifying the outcome, in this case not taking disciplinary 
action. The second factor was that although the response was in favour of under-
enforcement and avoiding formal action, it was done in a way that was intended 
to reinforce order and power structures, or at least avoid undermining them. So, 
the member of staff was chastised and the manager reassured. The third issue 
was that although the primary justification that was presented related to the 
merits of the individual case, the decision-maker was also conscious of the wider 
                                               
11 a colloquialism meaning formal disciplinary investigation
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perception and asked “how does that look?”. This question revealed a 
consciousness of staff culture and the importance of working with it.
The second situation involved the use of incentives and earned privileges with 
prisoners. Some managers would talk in abstract about how they would intervene 
in order to ensure that the scheme was used in a way that was fair. For example, 
one manager described this:   
“It is important you keep your values. Things like the IEP 
scheme12 and staff use of discretion, it was clear we had a lot of 
different units at [the prison] and it was very easy for units to 
start going their own way, it was very easy to think we’re going to 
run the wing this way, then if you’re not careful you’d find all 
sorts of little rules and regulations are made such as we take that 
prisoners telly off him. Sometimes it was going in and saying stop 
everything you’re doing, show a bit of compassion, you can keep 
nailing this prisoner if you want, but all we’re doing is going on a 
downward spiral. I need to intervene now and stop this and I will 
use my power to move the prisoner and give them a fresh 
start...That’s what the decency agenda is about…” (S4 governor 
grade)
In practice, this operated in more complex ways. In one situation a senior officer 
described how he had to manage competing interests:     
“SO: there was a situation where a prisoner put in for his 
enhanced [IEP level] and sitting on the board with the 
P[rincipal] O[fficer], it was a borderline, where he would get it 
or not, but at the end of the day he had made great efforts in his 
behaviour, in finding work, in getting to work regularly. The PO 
and I both agreed he should be given a chance to prove himself. I 
had one of the officers say ‘why are you giving him his enhanced, 
he doesn’t deserve it blah, blah, blah’. I said if we look at his 
history sheet which is in his file, you’ll see the efforts he’s made, 
there’s nothing to justify not giving it him. The member of staff 
actually took that on board and said ‘yes I see what you mean, 
however, I’ve had a few run ins with this prisoner blah, blah, 
                                               
12 IEP scheme is the incentives and earned privileges scheme. This is a national policy applied in 
all prisons. Under this, prisoners are entitled to ‘basic’, ‘standard’ or ‘enhanced’ levels of 
privileges according to how well behaved they are and how far they conform with the 
expectations placed upon them.   
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blah’ and I said but unless it’s actually documented then we don’t 
know that’s gone off.
JB: So he was given enhanced?
SO: Yes” (S19 senior officer)
In this situation, the manager made a decision that was humanitarian in as much 
as they gave priority to the interests of the prisoner and sought to reward and 
encourage reform. The justification presented to the staff who challenged this 
was managerial in as much as their contention that the prisoner was not suitable 
for enhancement was not contested but instead the argument was made that 
without documented evidence the progression could not be resisted.  Instead of 
referring to values or judgements, reference was made to process and procedures. 
Managerialism was therefore used as a defensive guard. It appeared that this was 
because this avoided challenging occupational culture norms including 
supporting staff and subordinating prisoners.  
The final way in which managers discussed discretion reflected more punitive 
orientations. As has been described above, discretion was sometimes exercised 
instrumentally in order to punish difficult behaviour. However, it was rare for 
managers to openly articulate punitive values. However, one way in which this 
was expressed was in a general unease about discretion held by some. These 
individuals would be critical of inconsistency in the exercise of discretion and 
would express concerns that this would undermine control or open the prison up 
to allegations of unfairness. They would sometimes call for people to be “singing 
from the same hymn sheet”. Such individuals preferred blanket rules and usually 
ones that made conditions more restrictive, dispassionate and impersonal. 
Discretion had an ambiguous role within the prison, particularly in the eyes of 
those who had a more punitive orientation.
The use of discretion in practice reflected a range of values, illuminating the 
contested nature of prison management. In order to reflect on this more 
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theoretically it is necessary to return to a discussion of discretion as a form of 
agency. 
Discretion as agency 
Discretion was an essential part of the work of prison managers. This was 
integrated into their work in formal and informal ways. The use of discretion has 
been recognised in studies of prison officers and police officers, and it is equally 
important for prison managers in their approach to staff and prisoners. In this 
final section, the use of discretion will be discussed from a theoretical 
perspective. 
Prison managers appeared to reflexively monitor their decision-making. In 
particular they were conscious of the rules that set the framework in more 
formalised processes. Equally in less structured decision-making situations, they 
sought facts to clarify and simplify their choices. In this way, they acted in ways 
that were rational and bounded. Their consciousness was not limited to 
bureaucratic considerations, but they were also conscious of managerial issues 
regarding performance measures and cost. In addition, they also considered how 
their decisions may be viewed by managers or staff and were therefore conscious 
of organisational culture. In many organisations it has been noted that discretion 
can be informed by social factors including occupational cultures and prisons are 
no different in that regard (Baumgartner 1992, Manning 1992, Deetz 2000). 
Discretion was exercised in ways that not only drew upon individual choices but 
also drew on collective or cultural resources. 
As in other aspects of prison managers’ work, there were three predominant 
rationalisations, or sets of beliefs that informed their actions: managerialism, 
humanity and punitiveness. These rationalizations were often overlapping, 
conflicting and contested. Indeed, the defining feature of prison managers’ use of 
discretion was how they had to balance, and resolve tensions between these 
conflicting values, either within themselves or with other people. The craft of 
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prison management and the use of discretion, or practical consciousness, could 
be found in the ways that they resolved these conflicts and found solutions that 
maintained the interests and support of those involved. These practices often 
reinforced the dominant position of prison staff and promoted managerial 
concerns, but also ensured that necessary attention was given to the interests of 
prisoners. 
Discretion was a process through which managers brought their role to life. This 
was used to legitimise the organisation and dominant forms of practice. They did 
not heroically act to transform the prison environment, but instead they 
maintained, reinforced and entrenched the power structures but did so in ways 
that rewarded desirable behaviours, avoided excessive, heavy-handed or 
oppressive behaviours and attempted to avoid the development of revolutionary 
schisms. Discretion was one way in which staff and prisoners could be enlisted 
and controlled within the dominant mode of governance.  
Resistance 
In common parlance, resistance describes acts of opposing, withstanding or 
refusing to yield to a dominant force or power. The notion of resistance is 
intimately bound with that of power (Clegg 1994). In the context of work, the 
employment relationship inevitably involves individual employees surrendering 
a degree of choice and autonomy to act in the interests of the organisation, as 
officially defined, rather than in their own or other interests. In addition, and has 
been discussed previously, many individuals willingly act in conformity with 
organisational obligations and expectations. However, that does not mean that 
individuals conform, willingly or otherwise, and in all organisations there is the 
potential for individuals to act in ways that are counter to the interest of the 
organisation. 
Marxist ideas have shaped the way that resistance has been understood, placing 
this in the context of a wider, collective class struggle, but this has subsequently 
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been eroded with a greater focus on the individual and the ways in which 
resistance is linked to subjectivity and identity (Jermier, Knights and Nord 1994, 
Ackroyd and Thompson 1999). That is not to suggest that resistance has become 
dislocated from wider structural issues and it is has been argued that resistance is 
also linked to global and local factors such as unionisation and the employment 
market (O’Connell Davidson 1994). Resistance is situated in both an individual 
and collective context. 
It has been argued that relationships of power and subordination are 
characterised by a formal ‘public transcript’ and a ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 
1990). The public transcript is the acted ritual of deference and conformity 
offered by the subordinate and accepted by the dominant power. The hidden 
transcript is the actions that the subordinate engages in ‘off stage’, away from the 
gaze of the powerful. These hidden forms of resistance are pervasive and 
important. There is not a neat division between these spheres of public and off 
stage, but instead social relationships are characterised as “a zone of constant 
struggle…not a solid wall” (ibid p.14). In other words, resistance can also be 
seen being expressed in the public setting and there is a dynamic relationship 
between hidden transcripts and what is performed publically.   
Managers are sometimes assumed to be compliant with centrally prescribed rules 
and the enforcers of discipline and control. This has never been universally true 
and in the contemporary world, managers have felt the effects of measures such 
as restructuring, increased measurement, technological advances, and changes to 
rewards, promotions and tenure, creating fertile grounds for anxiety, frustration 
and alienation (La Nuez and Jermier 2004). In prisons, there has been significant 
discussion of resistance by prisoners (e.g. Crewe 2009) and prison officers (e.g. 
Crawley 2004). In relation to prison managers, there has been important work 
carried out which has identified resistance as a means through which prison 
managers ameliorate the effects of managerialism and ensure that humanity is 
preserved (Cheliotis 2006). However, this is a rare example and the broad focus 
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of academic commentary on prison managers has been concerned with 
compliance rather than resistance, particularly with regard to managerialism. 
This section will explore how managers resist dominant powers in the form of 
policies, decisions and general trends in practice. This section will ask what 
forms resistance by managers takes? It will also ask what the purpose of this is? 
What are the ideologies that they attempt to preserve or perpetuate through 
resistance? The section will close by returning to the idea of agency in order to 
provide a theoretical reflection on resistance.   
Resistance in practice
Where managers came up against rules, individuals or a general approach that 
they do not support, they had a range of methods for challenging and resisting 
this. There were six main forms that this resistance took: off-stage talk, public 
talk, humour, appropriation of work and time, ‘open mouth’ sabotage, and 
cutting corners. Each of these will be discussed in turn below.  
A typical example of hidden transcripts of resistance is the use of off-stage talk. 
This was common amongst prison managers where such resistance took the form 
of vocal criticisms or “rumours”, “bitching”, “grumbling”, having a “gripe”, 
“muttering in groups”, being “bad mouthed”. This could be directed at policies, 
decisions or the general direction of the prison, but could also be directed 
towards individuals. Generally this acted to harmlessly dissipate concerns; a 
substitute for more direct acts of assertive resistance. Managers at all levels 
would be both the subject and the perpetrators of these hidden transcripts.    
Public talk was also common and in most cases there was seen to be a legitimate
role for challenge and dissent. This was perceived as part of appropriate 
engagement with staff and was formalised in team and ad hoc consultative 
meetings, where views would be sought. This could be described as ‘pressure’ 
(Scott 2001), a form of counteraction to dominant power which was recognised 
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and institutionalised. This could have practical benefits by identifying 
weaknesses and improvements, and was also a way of managing resistance 
safely, providing a constructive and constrained space for opposition to be 
voiced. This was underpinned by an acceptance that following this discussion, 
compliance would be forthcoming whether a specific rule or policy was 
supported or not. As one manager described:
“I’ve resisted, on the grounds of putting a reasoned argument 
against, but I’m ultimately aware that I manage and I have a 
manager, and I believe that my manager with the right case 
pitched at the appropriate level he would take that on board and 
maybe look again at what we’re doing. But I would never 
blatantly refuse to do it, I’d like to think that my way of 
challenging rather than being negative about something, but 
saying I don’t think that rule is good, but here’s something that 
will be beneficial. I wouldn’t refuse to do it, purely because I’m 
aware of my responsibilities.” (W2 principal officer)
This form of resistance was therefore harnessed as a means of reinforcing 
authority. This could be described as ‘pluralist’ (Fox 1974), where there is a 
balance between competing interests and this conflict is seen as productive, 
where the differences can be accommodated and consensus achieved. However, 
some features of this need to be further drawn out. In particular, the zone of 
conflict and consensus was curtailed and defined, reflecting the power 
differential between the parties. In general, managers held more significant 
power and were able to define the negotiated space, in particular discussions 
would usually be accepted on how a particular objective was achieved rather than 
whether it should be pursued. In addition, there was the ultimate power of 
managers to follow a particular course whether agreed or not, a power that was 
generally accepted.
Outright hostility between managers and staff was rare. However, humour was 
sometimes used as a way of making hidden transcripts public. For example 
defiant statements and refusals would be delivered by subordinates with a smile 
and a laugh. Whilst this often meant that rebellious defiance would not be 
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forthcoming, it did indicate an attempt to maintain an individual identity 
(Ackroyd and Thompson 1999). Equally, some managers would respond by 
deploying humour to disarm and respond to such challenges, reasserting their 
authority, talking about disciplinary action with a smile and laugh. In this 
context, humour had hidden functions in the negotiation of power and individual 
identity.
      
Another common form of resistance was the appropriation of work and time 
(Ackroyd and Thompson 1999). This referred to the ways in which individuals 
left work early, wasted time, or absented themselves, and the ways in which they 
regulated the effort they made. This could be seen in routine practices, for 
example, it was described by one manager how the official timings for meals 
were rarely observed and instead lock up took place early in order to extend the 
staff meal breaks. However, this would be temporarily fixed during important 
events such as inspections, as one manager disclosed:
“If you look at notices to staff…audits or HMCIP you get times 
for say feeding the prisoners or evening association, if we say 
we’re going to get them out at 6.15, we get them out at 6.15, if we 
feed at 12 o’clock, we start feeding at 12 o’clock. Then what 
happens is that once the inspection is over or the audit baseline 
has been checked, then we’ll make it two minutes to twelve, then 
four minutes to twelve and eventually we’ll over step the mark 
until it’s half eleven. Then what happens is that somebody will put 
their foot in it and we’re back to twelve o’clock again, then we 
ease off and we ease off.” (W12 governor grade)
This was a means through which the interests of workers were served and there 
was an ‘indulgency pattern’ where this was tolerated by managers (Gouldner 
1964).
This would also be seen in response to specific decisions or changes. For 
example, and again in relation to attempts to regulate meal times, one manager 
described:
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“The only other one is the serving of the lunch meals or the tea 
meals. They’re always going on about you can’t get the 
trolleys…too early. A prisoner speaks to the governor and he 
jumps up and down and says right, tells the kitchen do not fill the 
trolleys until this time. This is when the resistance came in, we 
went down at the right time, took it back, served the meals and 
everyone was late locking up. That went on for a few days. So 
each time, two meal times, you’re fifteen minutes late and you’ve 
got forty staff, that’s quarter of an hour each, your TOIL [time off 
in lieu] starts bouncing up, so then he says get the TOIL down, 
make sure everyone gets locked up on time.” (W26 senior officer)  
These actions, supported by managers ensured that the changes were frustrated 
and the status quo preserved. In particular, they played the managerialist system 
by complying at crucial times such as audits and inspections, but when this was 
challenged on a more permanent basis, exploiting financial control as a lever. 
Managers and staff were able to use the process of managerialism as a means of 
resistance.   
Some individuals would also regulate their own efforts in response to issues of 
concern. This could take the form of withdrawal of goodwill where people 
would be less willing to carry out extra work, would be slow to comply, and 
would wait to be directed rather than showing initiative. This could be effective 
in making areas more difficult to manage and could be frustrating for managers. 
Occasionally people would withdraw their labour by taking sick leave, although 
this was generally viewed as an extreme measure that would have consequences 
for an individual’s perceived status and future career. These forms of resistance 
were less available to more senior managers who were accountable for 
performance measures and where reductions in effort would have a detrimental 
effect. 
‘Open mouth’ sabotage referred to the situation where people criticised
individuals or the organisation externally, so undermining their reputation (La
Nuez and Jermier 2004). In prisons this was a risky endeavour as it went against 
the cultural importance of teamwork, loyalty and hierarchy. However, 
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occasionally individuals would resort to the use of grievances as a way of 
exposing perceived problems to more senior managers outside of the 
organisation (see Austrin 1994). Going above an immediate manager, 
particularly to managers outside the prison, such as the area manager was also 
occasionally resorted to. 
Resistance would also be carried out indirectly by bending rules and cutting 
corners. This was sometimes done in order to make processes more efficient or 
effective. For example, procurement rules would be dodged by asking invoices to 
be split so as to avoid exceeding the value threshold that would entail the need 
for tendering. This would make the process of procurement quicker and more 
convenient and would aid the timely delivery of objectives, but would subvert 
the purpose of financial rules. Another example was with directed surveillance, 
which is the legal framework for intentional surveillance of individuals, such as 
the use of CCTV on visits. The legal requirements, which were potentially 
onerous as they required written authorisation prior to any directed use, were 
managed by finessing and creatively interpreting the rules, as described by one 
governor:
The key issues I have is…the use of overt CCTV, when does it 
become necessary to…do a directed surveillance application. The 
last application I did…[took] two and a half hours to fill in and 
another two hours [to check and authorise]…I argued the toss 
and we managed to come up with a method of words that would 
allow us to demarcate between that those that it is necessary to 
observe for 100% of their visit, i.e. directed surveillance, and for 
the rest who we would ordinarily be very interested in, we would 
keep the camera on for the majority of their visit, maybe not 
100%, but maybe 50% of the time…It was a play on words, but it 
got past the legal eagles. (W6 governor grade)
Many managers would pragmatically interpret rules in order to match with their 
priorities and the available resources. This sometimes meant undermining or 
ignoring the spirit and purpose of those rules.
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A third example can be found in the searching of prisoners where it was 
frequently suggested that carrying out searches in accordance with the 
procedures with the frequency they were required was unworkable. As a result, 
cutting corners and carrying out adapted searches was necessary. This was 
described by one manager:   
“ [An] example is the level of searching that should be done on 
prisoners coming out of workshop, because of the nature of the 
establishment, you have 2 or 4 staff actually searching prisoners 
coming out of workshops and you’ve got a time band of 10 
minutes, and each search if you did in properly, did it according 
to the LSS [Local Security Strategy] and all the manuals and 
everything else, would take you 3 or 4 minutes and you’re putting 
2 or 300 people through in ten minutes, I don’t quite know how 
we do it. We must be breaking the rules somewhere. There are 
lots of places where we do that. It’s not Spanish practices; it’s the 
only way that we can make it work.” (W25 principal officer) 
Unofficial work practices have been well documented in the sociology of 
organisations and function to facilitate smooth running in the face of the 
dysfunctional aspects of official rules (Blau 1963). They are paradoxical forms of 
resistance that oppose the strict policy whilst attempting to legitimise managerial 
modes of governance. 
Only rarely did resistance break into open hostility and take on a revolutionary 
force. This did occur in one of the prisons. This involved a female senior 
manager who joined the prison in succession to a male senior manager who was 
widely described as a ‘staff man’, had formed good relationships with staff and 
was generally seen as having improved the performance of the prison. The 
female senior manager was perceived as more aloof. Her style was said to have 
alienated other senior managers, for example she was described as marking 
written documents like a “school ma’am”. She also suffered an accident shortly 
after arriving at the prison and was therefore unable to be visible around her 
areas of responsibility. She was also criticised for failing to develop personal 
relationships with staff and being unfamiliar with the layout of the prison. The 
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ways in which she was talked about reflected a number of concerns, some of 
which related to gender, which will be discussed in a chapter 7. She was 
perceived as neither fitting into the traditional mould of a macho, heroic leader, 
orientated towards staff concerns, nor the new managerial and performance 
culture. Under her leadership, resistance built up. This started with the 
withdrawal of good will where staff were less willing to carry out additional 
duties or cover operational emergencies, such as medical escorts. This moved on 
to the open challenging of decisions and practices. This was more direct and 
hostile than the ‘appropriate’ form of challenge described earlier and would often 
take place where a group of staff were present and was aimed at making 
managers feel uncomfortable, challenged and under scrutiny. This escalated to a 
signal event which many recalled, where a full staff meeting resulted in so many 
hostile questions and such a tense atmosphere that another senior manager had to 
step in to end the meeting. The final piece of the jigsaw was a visit by a senior 
manager from headquarters, where there was concerted ‘open mouth’ criticism 
by a variety of staff and managers, who complained about the senior manager 
and the impact on the prison. Following this, the senior manager at the prison left 
her post and she was replaced by a senior manager who was seen as staff 
orientated and who indeed had worked earlier in his career as a junior manager at 
the prison. 
This case study provided an illustration not only of methods of resistance, but 
also the interests that this perpetuated, which centred on both traditional culture 
values and the new managerial ethos. 
Resistance as agency
Resistance formed an important feature of prison life. It illustrated how agency 
did not necessarily lead to the pursuit or realisation of individualised or 
idiosyncratic desires but instead was part of a wider web of power.
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Managers were conscious and reflective of many of the ways in which they used 
resistance. They institutionalised this through consultation and limited discussion 
in order to legitimate management control and contain the effects. Managers both 
used this approach and were the subjects of it. Such harnessing of resistance was 
a strategy of legitimation and one of the ways in which modern human resource 
strategies were deployed so as to enlist support and ‘govern the soul’ of 
employees (Rose 1999).    
Managers resisted practices that undermined their ability to appear to comply 
with performance measurement, as illustrated by the gaming with rules and 
practices. This form of resistance reinforced the dominant mode of governance 
but also exposed its weaknesses. This was a chronic feature of the system of 
performance management and created ‘imaginary’ aspects of organisational 
management (Carlen 2008a).     
The third major aspect to resistance was less conscious but was embedded in the 
practical consciousness of managers. That was that resistance reinforced 
traditional cultures. This could be in the individuals and practices they supported 
or opposed. The actions reflected support for prioritising the interests of staff, 
promoting machismo and focussing on internal concerns.
Resistance was an arena which illustrated the inter-relationship between the 
managerial and traditional agendas. This was the underlying transcript that was 
revealed through these practices. Rather than being a source of alternative 
ideologies or humane liberalism, resistance was instead deeply embedded in the
dominant culture and power dynamics of prison life.     
Power
Scott (2001) asserted that power was the production of causal effects, and 
suggested that this was integral to the idea of agency, “to be an agent is to 
exercise causal powers that produce specific effects in the world” (p.1). He 
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argued that patterns of power and relationships of domination take two 
elementary forms which then each have two sub-parts. The first was ‘corrective 
influence’. The two subsets of this were ‘force’, where coercion may be used 
such as threats or perceived threats of punishment or undesirable effects, and 
‘manipulation’, in particular through the use of incentives and rewards in order to 
mould behaviour. Such uses of power were instrumental and they sought to 
control behaviour and secure compliance without being concerned about the 
inner beliefs and values of the individual. In a similar vein, Giddens (1984) 
described what he termed ‘allocative resources’, in other words the ability to use 
financial and other resources in order to shape behaviour. The second elementary 
form of power described by Scott he termed ‘persuasive influence’, which sought
to build an inner commitment in the subalterns. The first element of this form of 
power was ‘signification’, a term also used by Giddens (1984), which described a 
moral authority imbued in the dominator. This may have been as a result of some 
intrinsic moral appeal such as charity or humanity, but may also have been due to 
the position of the dominator as an ‘expert’. This form of power relied on 
building a base of faith and loyalty in the subaltern. Foucault has been 
particularly interested in the rise of expert power and the way in which it has 
created a less coercive but more pervasive form of control (e.g. Foucault 1973, 
1977). The second part was ‘legitimation’, again a term also used by Giddens, 
which described the process by which a relationship of command was created, 
where the dominant power was recognised as having the right to give direction 
whilst the subaltern felt an obligation to comply. This relationship could be 
established through written laws and rules and through a socially structured, 
formal or informal hierarchy. Giddens (1984) similarly argued that position, 
prestige and personality combined to provide “authoritative resources” that could
be deployed as an exercise of power.      
It is important to acknowledge that themes of power permeate throughout this 
chapter but this section will seek to explore the ways in which prison managers 
exercised power directly in their day-to-day work. What are their preferred 
resources and forms of power, which they used in order to secure compliance? 
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What are the constraints on their power? How are they the subjects as well as the 
holders of power? This section will also seek to draw out wider issues regarding 
power as a form of agency.  
Power in practice
Prison managers saw themselves as having power to change the circumstances 
around them to some degree, rather than being wholly controlled by events and 
social or organisational structures. They saw themselves as exercising power as 
agents, but were also subordinate to more senior managers. Their position was 
intermediate in this regard. Their power was also intermediate in as much as they 
saw themselves holding power which was constrained. These issues will be 
explored below using Scott’s analytical tools. 
Force or the use of threats towards subordinates was viewed negatively by 
managers. It was considered to be both ineffective and wrong in itself. There was 
a shared image of a good manager being respected as a leader of their group, and 
this was contrasted with visions of abuse of power, including shouting, public 
humiliation of staff, ordering people to comply and relying heavily on asserting 
hierarchical rank structures. This was described by one manager in the following 
terms:
“The abuse of power has the ability to ruin your street cred…I 
won’t jump up and down and I won’t shout at anybody, I won’t 
have a go at anybody in open forum, but I also try not to use the 
label [i.e. rank] to get things done.” (W11 governor grade)
Prison managers generally felt reluctant to rely upon ‘corrective influences’, 
recognising their limitations in the long-term management of people, 
undermining trust and relationships.
Managers could also use allocative resources or rewards in order to manipulate 
behaviour such as the distributing finances and desirable commodities such as 
186
annual leave, job selection and appraisal, or decisions about IEP or early release. 
Control over finances was relatively limited as many resources were ‘ring 
fenced’ for specific purposes and could not be used for other purposes. However, 
managers were sometimes able to allocate resources to issues they considered 
important and so promote and develop those areas. In both of the prisons, 
resources were made available for staff, ostensibly to recognise them 
collectively. At one prison this took the form of a small bonus payment, whilst at 
the other it took the form of a social event for staff and their families. These 
approaches were too small and unpredictable to be effective as meaningful 
incentives, but they did produce short-term good will. More informal rewards 
and punishments were used, such as taking account of prisoner’s level of 
compliance in making decisions affecting them or considering member of staff’s 
attendance and co-operation in making decisions about access to annual leave. 
There was some limited scope for managers to use their allocative resources in 
order to mould and maintain compliant behaviour. 
In contrast, managers felt themselves to be subjected to more corrective forms of 
power. They perceived that rewards and incentives were available in return for 
conformity, in the form of giving or withholding promotion, progression and 
reputation through the organisation. As described in a previous chapter, the 
language used included: “…you’ve got to meet [targets] every month and God 
help you if you don’t”,  “we don’t deliver the right numbers, I personally get a 
kicking”, “[If they are not met] you get absolutely hammered”, “if we don’t meet 
them, we get our arses kicked if it’s our fault”. Such comments revealed how 
managers perceived that they were subjected to a punitive system of control. 
Nevertheless, despite this perception of managerialism as oppressive, as has been 
described earlier, many managers not only tolerated this but absorbed this within 
their identity and legitimised the system.     
Moving on to ‘persuasive influence’, managers drew upon what could be 
described as softer forms of power. In fact, many managers were wary of the 
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word ‘power’, seeing it as epitomised by coercion and instead sought alternative 
terms including “authority”, “respect” and “influence”. 
Managers could deploy ‘authoritative resources’, in particular managers drew 
upon the prestige of their position within the formal hierarchy. This was 
particularly significant for operational managers who were seen as having an 
elevated status. As one non-operational manager described: 
“An operational manager, even the lowliest operational governor 
has that kudos, that respect that any non-operational manager 
can’t have.” (W4 non-operational manager)
Positional power could also be wielded vicariously, by using the name of the 
governor or area manager. This was particularly deployed where a manager had a 
specific brief to manage significant changes. For example, one manager who was 
leading on the development of new accommodation in a prison stated that he had 
“used and abused” the governor’s name in order to exercise leverage with people 
inside and outside of the prison, including contractors and headquarters 
personnel.
However, managers also felt constrained by their position, feeling that there were 
boundaries and limits to their power. As well as being conscious of the authority 
that they held over others, they were also conscious that they were themselves 
subordinate to more senior staff. As one manager disclosed:
“…yes there’s some power to shape the morale of staff to some 
degree and to help people develop and shape that aspect of the 
work. On a wider level, I don’t have any power whatsoever, it’s 
also reinforced by my area line constantly: you just get on with 
it, you do as you’re told…you just deliver what you’re told to 
deliver in a way you’re told to deliver it.” (W21 non-operational 
manager)
In this statement, this manager revealed the degree to which they were subject to 
a hierarchical system that constrained them. Managers were both the holders of 
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and the subjects of authoritative resources, in particular positional power derived 
from the hierarchical structure.
There was a process which managers would undertake in order to secure 
compliance and legitimate their power including communication, discussion, 
consultation and explanation. This engagement with staff, treating them as 
thinking and feeling agents, was described as having both a normative value and 
instrumental effects. This process could also be built over time so that managers 
could establish trust and effective working relationships, and most managers saw 
this as fundamental to their approach. One manager summed this up as follows:    
“I don’t scream and shout at people because I don’t think that is 
necessary. It’s a case of over a period building up that respect. If 
I say something to these, they do it. I don’t have to work hard with 
getting the staff to comply with what I want now. That’s 
something that’s developed and probably developed because I’ve 
been here as a SO and then as a PO. They’ve seen the way I work 
and they know I won’t send them off on a wild goose chase, unless 
I’ve explained it fully. I do try to make sure everyone is aware of 
why we’re doing something, where we’re coming from with it and 
what we’re trying to achieve. People tend to do as they’re told if 
you approach it properly.” (W25 principal officer)
Here this manager described how they used communication in order to establish 
professional trust over a period of time. Other managers also described how 
relationships could be developed by knowing their staff and taking an interest in 
them as individuals and supporting them when they had difficult times. It was 
also described how demonstrating an ability to do frontline work was important 
for example by challenging prisoners, helping to lock up and unlock landings or 
serving meals. These strategies integrated managers with the managed and 
reduced social and professional distance. It was particularly noteworthy that the 
prison that had the better overall performance and had a noticeably closer 
attention to managerial concerns also had closer interaction and integration 
between managers and staff. This seemed to illustrate that relationships could be 
used as a way to humanise and legitimise management control.       
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Managers would appeal to particular values when introducing change or seeking 
compliance in order to persuade staff or prisoners to provide consent and 
support. This process of ‘signification’ was often described by managers in a 
managerial way by calling this ‘selling’ change. Sometimes these appeals were 
simply to the self-interest of staff, described in terms such as ‘what is in it for 
them’, for example a new system for issuing canteen goods to prisoners was 
marketed to staff on the basis that they would get more ‘flyers’ i.e. leave before 
the end of their scheduled shift times, and the introduction of a self-select 
rostering system was marketed on the basis that staff would get more days off-
duty. However, appeals were also made to values beyond individual self interest. 
In both prisons, managers set particular stall by the idea of teamwork and co-
operative, supportive relationships between staff in pursuit of a common cause. 
This idea of unity and cohesiveness was particularly important both as a means 
of maintaining a close knit and insular staff collective as well as a means of 
promoting performance. Many appeals were based upon the idea that compliance 
and managerialism had a value in itself, for example appeals were made on the 
basis that particular actions would improve audits, KPTs or other measures. 
Similarly, the fact that a rule or law existed was usually seen as sufficient in itself 
to provide justification for following a particular course of action. These appeals 
and this process of signification were therefore centred upon managerialism and 
occupational culture. 
Overtly moral appeals were less common and discussion of humanity and human 
rights were absent. Where appeals were made to issues such as ‘decency’ or 
‘reducing reoffending’, these were usually used in ways that presented these as 
organisationally sanctioned objectives and therefore more closely akin to 
managerialism than liberal humanitarianism. Some of the problems that may 
have arise from this are discussed in the final, concluding chapter. There were 
sometimes also appeals to issues such as security and control. These could be 
emotive. Managers were also the consumers of such messages. For example, at 
one prison there was a presentation to the senior management team regarding the 
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introduction of ViSOR, the violent offender and sex offender register, a multi-
agency database of intelligence being used by the police, probation and prisons. 
There were some potential issues regarding surveillance and privacy but the 
presentation focussed on justifying the process in emotive terms. The presenter 
projected large photographs of the victims in high profile child murder cases 
including Holly Welles, Jessica Chapman, Sarah Payne and Milly Dowler and 
went on to say:
“I have these pictures in my mind when thinking about ViSOR...I 
have a daughter the age of Milly. If we can stop just one offence, 
this is worth it…our families, our friends, the general public are 
the people who will benefit the most”. (SFN21)
    
These strategies were deployed in order to minimise potential concerns and to 
present an over-riding risk. Similarly and more routinely, the potential risks and 
dangers from prisoners were deployed more regularly than concerns about 
humanity in order to justify actions.   
The final element of ‘persuasive influence’ was that of expertise. Managers were 
perceived to hold expertise in the area they managed and this gave them 
authority both within their team and externally. They were seen as people who 
could provide advice, guidance and support to others. However, with this also 
came unrealistic pressures to continually provide answers. As one manager 
explained; “everyone thinks you’re the oracle, you’ve got the answer to 
everything, but you haven’t.” (W14 senior officer). 
However, not all expertise was equally valued, with prison expertise being 
privileged. Many people described how skills and experience accumulated in 
previous employment was overlooked, as if it had no value. There was also 
priority given to work of uniformed and operational staff and the work of 
managers. The skills of non-operational managers was generally less valued and 
often seen as narrow or marginal, so for example finance or psychology expertise 
was often seen as limited to and contained within specific departments and 
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processes. This was not seen as having the potential for any wider application. 
Many non-operational managers felt that their expertise was undervalued (see 
further chapter 7). Expertise was narrowly constructed as that relating to 
managerial or operational work whilst other skills carried less cache.  
The use of softer power or ‘persuasive influence’ was more common by 
managers in prisons. It was viewed by them as both morally preferable and more 
effective. However, the ways in which this was deployed was also intrinsically 
connected with the cultural context.    
Power as agency
The use of power by prison managers was varied and they exercised some choice 
about how they deployed this. However, this was patterned across the 
organisation. There was a bifurcation in the way that managers experienced 
power as principals and how they received it as subalterns. As subalterns they 
perceived that they were subjected to power that was characterised by 
impersonality, ‘corrective’ forms of action, demands for compliance, and 
exposure to punishments and rewards. However, they did engage with this, 
internalise it and accept it as legitimate. In their exercise of power as principals, 
however, managers relied less upon the use of rewards, punishments and 
coercive power. Instead, managers developed the ‘softer’ persuasive influences 
through the authority of their position and the building of relationships with staff. 
Although the use of power was, as Scott argued, an act of agency, it was also 
deeply embedded within the cultural context. For example, it can be seen that the 
process of ‘signification’ or moral appeals focussed on the needs of staff or 
managerial concerns. Similarly, the role of expertise was constructed in ways 
that privileged operational staff. The use of power was exercised by individuals 
but was patterned across the organisation and was located in the occupational 
culture and the demands of managerialism.             
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Conclusion
A number of studies of prison managers have focussed on acts of agency, 
representing them as diverse and individualistic, sophisticated professionals, and 
morally heroic. Writers such as Rutherford (1993a) and Bryans (2007) argue that
prison managers operate within a morally diverse environment where they have
to shape an individual style and approach. There has also been a school of work 
emerging from the Cambridge Institute of Criminology, based on ‘appreciative 
inquiry’ techniques, which suggests that prison work is more complex than has 
been previously recognised and those who work in prisons exercise individual 
choices and judgements in a sophisticated and professional manner (Liebling and 
Price 2001). They also suggest that these acts of agency are important 
instrumentally, in making the prison operate smoothly, and also normatively, as 
they maintain a space for empathetic humanity. Similarly, in analysing the work 
of prison managers, Cheliotis (2006) argues that they deploy ‘discreet 
discretion’, in other words the exploitation of spaces where individual choice can
be exercised, and use this in order to import progressive values and humanise the 
environment. These writings identify agency as individualistic and as a 
progressive force.
This chapter has sought to explore the ways in which agency is practiced by 
prison managers. There is in any social situation, some space in which 
individuality can be maintained and expressed and prisons are no exception. 
However, there is not an open expanse of choice with infinite possibilities, and 
instead this exploration has revealed that these choices are patterned and 
constrained. This reflects the work of Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977), both 
of whom identify that agency and structure are interlinked and that agency 
cannot be seen in purely individual terms but needs to be understood in the ways 
that it is connected to and contextualised within wider social relationships, 
practices and norms. In prisons, the emphasis on individuality and diversity has 
obscured these interdependencies and by exploring these, a more complex and 
ambiguous understanding of agency has emerged.
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The first way in which agency was patterned was in relation to managerialism. 
This ranged from the way that managers valued ‘delivery’ and the achievement 
of objectives in themselves, the way that they exercised discretion so as to 
conform with organisational needs, the bending of rules in order to make the 
achievement of prescribed targets more attainable, and the ways in which 
relationships and power were exercised in order to maximise productivity and 
compliance. In these various ways, individual choices and agency were used in 
order to perpetuate managerial practices. It is significant that managerialism has
seen not only the introduction of policies and procedures but has also been 
internalised by managers and other employees. It has been through adaptations in 
the habitus, ‘working personality’ or practical consciousness of prison managers 
that managerialism has been given depth, intensity and pervasiveness. 
The second way in which agency was patterned was in relation to traditional 
occupational culture. In particular, it can be seen that staff were given 
hierarchical preference over prisoners. This was reflected in values, relationships, 
acts of resistance and the use of power. These attitudes and practices were deeply 
embedded and were maintained and entrenched through the ongoing actions of 
managers. It was not simply that managers personally supported those attitudes
and practices, but as could be seen in the discussion of resistance, relationships 
and power, these were also the product of a negotiated order between managers 
and staff. Managers were constrained and controlled not only from above, but 
also to some degree from below.                 
Much has been made in previous studies of the liberal humanitarian instincts of 
prison managers and the ways that they perpetuate and preserve these values (e.g. 
Rutherford 1992a, Bryans and Wilson 2000). In this study, such values have 
been illustrated to be more complex and ambiguous than has been previously 
suggested. Where managers expressed humanitarian values or acted to advance 
such concerns in relation to prisoners this was often expressed in organisationally 
sanctioned terms such as ‘decency’ and ‘reducing reoffending’, or were the 
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outcome of structured decision-making prescribed in rules. From this 
perspective, humanitarian values were located in a more managerial framework. 
This illustrated that managerialism could to some degree be argued to be a means 
through which such values could be promoted and realised. However, in the 
absence of an explicit moral discourse, they may be fragile or ineffective, as will 
be discussed further in chapter 8.       
There was greater evidence of liberal humanitarism in managers’ conduct 
towards staff. For example managers expressed values regarding treating staff 
members as individuals, being aware of their needs, taking account of their 
interests in decision making and deliberately courting their support. This could
be seen in practice in the ways that resistance and power were deployed. This 
was derived partly from an affinity with a traditional set of organisational values 
that included having a staff orientation and privileging the needs of staff above 
those of prisoners. However, it also reflected the development of managerial 
practices including ‘human resource management’ that were aimed at securing 
compliance and increasing productivity (Crewe, Bennett and Wahidin 2008). As 
with the approach towards prisoners, humanitarianism was a complex notion that 
was reflective of the predominant values of both managerialism and traditional 
staff culture.
This patterning of agency raises some important issues in practice. In particular, 
the ways in which the embedding of these values in policy, practice and ‘working 
personality’ created a homogenisation of practice. This raises questions about 
accountability, professional diversity and progressive change. For example, it has 
been argued that the constraining of agency is a hidden form of control:   
“The decisions lack an open democratic character not because 
the calculus or calculations are distorted, but because the human 
character and needs are specified in advance rather than 
responsive to the situational complexities…The concern here is 
not just with managerial domination, but the corporate 
development of the obedient, normalized mind and body, which is 
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held up against equally legitimate but unrealized alternatives”
(Deetz 2000 p.146)     
In other words, the professional diversity described by Rutherford (1993a) and 
Bryans (2007) was being eroded and diminished. There was a homogenisation of 
professional identity.  This could also create organisational stasis. This has been 
described by Pat Carlen (2002b) as a process of ‘clawback’, where attempts at 
reform are drawn back by predominant cultural values. Although she focussed on 
‘carceral clawback’ which refers to penal values, it could also be said that 
contemporary prison culture carried the risk of ‘managerial’ clawback, where 
managers fell back on rules and targets to shape their working practices. Some of 
the potential problems arising from this are also discussed further in chapter 8. 
From a theoretical perspective, this discussion of the exercise of agency by 
prison managers highlights some important issues. Agency is rarely, if ever, 
unbounded, unconstrained and enacted in a social vacuum. Instead there are a 
range of social forces that come into play in order to influence and shape agency. 
This has been theoretically described in the concepts of habitus, ‘working 
personality’ and practical consciousness. In his seminal work, Giddens (1984) 
described that agency and structure are linked through the ‘duality of structure’, 
that is that the conscious actions of individuals, repeated over time space and 
across individuals, give a degree of permanence; a structural quality. However, 
the theory has been criticised as prioritising the way that actors create structures 
and underplaying the degree to which agents are the subject of structures, and 
there has thus been an argument that there should be a corresponding theory of 
the ‘duality of agency’ in order to explain how structure becomes embedded in 
agency (Caldwell 2006). This issue is encapsulated in the two different elements 
that appear to shape the agency of prison managers; traditional prison culture and 
managerialism. The traditional prison culture can be seen as an example of the 
duality of structure, in as much as it is a bottom up structure that has been created 
through the behaviour of actors over time and space and has taken on the form of 
a more permanent structure. However, managerialism has been a top down 
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creation, particularly over the last two decades. Despite the fact that it was a 
manufactured process, this has become embedded in the practical consciousness 
or habitus of managers. This is where the idea of an alternative theory of the 
duality of agency would be helpful in order to distinguish between the processes.
In conclusion, an appreciation of managers as agents needs to be situated in a 
cultural and social context, taking account of the ways in which traditional 
occupational culture and managerialism have come to shape their practice and 
identity. Managers particularly have to balance, rebalance, negotiate and interpret 
these competing forces. In this way, they acted as micro actors, a medium 
through which the intersection of global and local was facilitated and given 
discernable form as practice. This phenomenon also raises important theoretical 
questions about the process of structuration.
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Chapter 6
“I wouldn’t ask you to do something I wouldn’t do myself”: 
Prison managers and prison officer culture
The first two empirical chapters have considered how prison managers work with 
the managerial apparatus and how they negotiate the unregulated spaces and 
apply individual choice. In that respect they have focussed on structure and 
agency, but in a way that deconstructs them and illustrates how they are 
intertwined and interdependent. This third empirical chapter picks up on an issue 
that has emerged in the study - occupational culture and in particular the 
influence of the traditional prison officer culture.      
As has been previously discussed, the main features of this traditional prison 
officer culture are: insularity; machismo; and a hierarchical relationship with 
prisoners. Insularity describes an internal focus with strong bonds of solidarity 
between colleagues who feel cut off professionally and socially from those 
outside of prisons. Machismo emphasises male qualities directly and indirectly 
through the types of roles or duties that are afforded status. The nature of staff 
prisoner relationships is based on a broad consensus about what constitutes the 
‘right’ relationships (or at least what are the ‘wrong’ sort) and how interpersonal 
and professional boundaries are drawn.
It has also been discussed that ‘occupational culture’ is a contested term that has 
been used in many ways and has no fixed meaning (for example see Martin 
1992, Parker M. 2000). In this study, it is intended to follow the analysis of 
Martin (1992) and to view occupational culture from a range of perspectives. The 
first is integration, which emphasises the idea of culture as a homogenous 
manifestation where there is clear consensus without ambiguity. The 
differentiation perspective suggests conflicts between cultures or between a 
dominant and sub-culture. The fragmentation perspective focuses on ambiguity, 
suggesting that there is constant flux with no stable organization-wide or sub-
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cultural consensus. By viewing this from a range of perspectives, the complexity, 
dynamism and duality can emerge, 
By examining this multi-dimensional perspective, it is intended to view how 
occupational culture develops and influences managers, but also how it interacts 
with both individuality and managerial practices. This is an attempt to consider 
how global and local forces interact and how individuals make sense of that in 
their working lives. This will be done by asking questions about the ways that 
organisational cultures constrain, empower and otherwise shape the actions and 
thinking of managers. How do they deploy their sense of individual values, 
approach, or character in their engagement with features of occupational culture? 
How has occupational culture been altered by the development of managerial 
practices? How do managers make sense of and forge a coherent approach to the 
various tensions and pressures placed upon them? 
This chapter will approach these subjects by focussing on four issues. The first is 
the process of becoming a prison manager. Why do people become prison 
managers? How do they prepare for the role? What are the forces that shape their 
approach? The other three issues focus of the fundamental management 
practices: managing staff, managing teams, managing prisoners. These are 
features that bring to the fore elements of traditional occupational culture. There 
will be an attempt to examine how prison managers understand these roles and 
practices. What are the ‘narratives’ that sustain them? Are there dominant 
approaches or is it contested? By focussing on these micro aspects of individual 
practice, an attempt will be made to understand the lived experience and daily 
practice of prison managers, how they negotiate and make sense of the pressures 
and tensions around them.   
Becoming a Manager
Becoming a prison manager is not simply a matter of taking up a post, but 
instead it is described here as a process of socialisation in which over time an 
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individual becomes assimilated within the group, whilst also maintaining a sense 
of individuality and self. As Crawley (2004) has described in relation to prison 
officers:
“…the new recruit must acquire the ‘working personality’ of the 
prison officer. This is not acquired through mere habituation and 
repetition; rather it involves inhabiting a way of being. It is in this 
sense that the prison officer himself, like the occupational culture 
to which he must subscribe, can be described an ‘achievement’ or 
‘process’ produced over time” (p.92) 
It is similar with prison managers, that those taking up management roles 
undergo a process of inhabiting a ‘working personality’ and learning how to 
express themselves within this and use it creatively. 
This section follows the journey that people make from joining the prison 
occupation through to taking on and learning the management role. This section 
will ask what motivates people to start working in prisons and then to take on a 
management role? It will consider how far they import values, practices and 
behaviours and how far they themselves are shaped by the occupational cultures? 
What are the forces that press upon them? How do they bring their own sense of 
self into their role? This section will then close with some concluding reflections 
on the process of becoming a prison manager and how this relates to wider issues 
of occupational culture and identity.   
Why become a manager? 
The first stage in this journey was the initial decision that individuals made to 
work in prisons. Most managers did not enter with a particular moral perspective 
on the work, and they rarely cited this as a reason for joining. Instead, pragmatic 
reasons were usual. Of 62 people interviewed, 38 stated instrumental reasons for 
joining such as job security, financial rewards or career opportunities. A typical 
example was:
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“I saw it as a steady employment with a fairly good basic wage 
and good pension package. When I joined a few years ago, we’d 
just come out of recession, so I saw it as a good move really”.
(S11 senior officer)
Many such people had experienced casual or variable employment and had been 
threatened with or experienced redundancy. These people came from a variety of 
occupations including construction work, catering, sales and mining. Often their 
decision was taken as the result of life stage influences such as marriage or 
parenthood. One staff member described how his experiences of working and 
personal life led him to seek stability: 
“I’d been in manufacturing for twenty years, been through the 
redundancy process six times, made redundant twice, I had a 
young family that had just come along and I wanted something 
that would give me job security” (W18 officer)
The initial interest that people had was stimulated from a variety of sources, 
although most frequently cited were friends, family or acquaintances who 
introduced the idea of working in prisons. Nationally advertised recruitment 
campaigns also attracted some people. In these circumstances, prison work was 
often one of a number of options that would be considered, including the police, 
armed services and other parts of the public sector. It was therefore the material 
stability that came with the work rather than other intrinsic qualities that had 
appeal.     
A second smaller group were those from an armed forces background who joined 
as they left those services. Such people often saw prisons as a way of extending 
the armed services ethos of camaraderie and teamwork into their civilian life, as 
one prison officer described it, “a natural progression”. These people often saw 
prisons as one option amongst similar public sector professions including the 
police and fire brigade. A typical response of this group included: 
“I was released from the Royal Navy and I knew I was going to 
be discharged and I wanted to stay in a disciplined service, so I 
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applied to the police, the fire service and the prison service and 
the first one that came along was the prison service.” (S3 
principal officer)
Those in this group not only sought material security, but also wanted social 
aspects of the employment experience including being part of a close knit team, 
working in conditions of stress and conflict, and being part of a uniformed, 
public service.  
A third group were those that sought a professional challenge in particular 
working in what they perceived as a testing interpersonal environment. They 
were attracted to the intrinsic occupational challenges. This was not necessarily 
seen in terms of criminological values but instead was described in terms of the 
prison being a human service, one that required one to work with people with all 
of the unpredictability and variability that brought. For example, one person in 
this group stated:
“I thought it looked very interesting. I thought this is something 
I could do rather than the same old mundane routine production 
line scenario. It was change, something different every day”.
(W7 governor grade)
Such people did not express a particular moral view about how that challenge 
should be approached, but instead saw it as an issue of interest in itself. 
A final group were those who joined with a moral perspective. Only four people 
described this. Three of these related to reform and rehabilitation, inspired by 
either religious conviction, or personal experiences of living in marginalised 
conditions. An example of this included one person inspired by their own 
personal life history:
“I was homeless when I was sixteen. I went into a YMCA-type 
hostel and the kind of people I was mixing with, I thought [I 
could] help, it was something I wanted to do, I wanted to 
straighten people out, if I can put it that way.” (S28 officer)
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One person described themselves as having a natural affinity with “law and 
order” and they were attracted by both the mechanistic, rule-bound order of 
prison routine and what they saw as the moral basis of punishment:
“I was brought up in that kind of disciplinarian kind of way. 
I’ve always been a lawful kind of person. When I was at school, 
I was never one of the kids that started smoking like some of the 
others, I was never led by peer pressure, I always felt that I had 
a very strong sense of my own identity and I didn’t feel I had to 
pander to certain other boys in the class in order to be accepted. 
I felt quite confident in who I was. I just had that particular way 
of thinking, that particular drive that I like law and I like order”
(S16 principal officer)
Such moral perspectives were rare and were exceptional in generating the 
reasons why individuals joined the Prison Service. Instead the original reasons 
were more pragmatic or more orientated around the relationship between staff 
and the challenges of the job. 
Relatively few managers stated that they had joined with the intention of 
becoming a manager. Those that did were often graduates, had been managers in 
previous employment, or saw themselves as joining an organisation that offered a 
predetermined career structure. However, the majority of those who became 
managers did not join with that as an ambition but rather took on managerial 
roles after a period of time at the basic grade level. These people often described 
their move into management as “natural progression”, a seamless move informed 
by their experience of prison work, their observation of managers, the structured 
system of progression and their own personal development. The feeling that this 
was a state that crept up upon people meant that they never identified an 
epiphany but more often described that this seemed to open up as an possibility 
once they were anchored in the occupation (Schein 1988).
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The most common reason presented by those who entered management (14 of 
44) was that they observed that their managers were poor and they believed they 
could do as good or better job. For example, one manager stated:
“I thought the Prison Service had poor quality manager, poor 
quality people leading us, poor quality decisions and there 
didn’t appear to be the professionalism that I wanted. That’s 
why I chased the managerial posts” (W11 governor grade)
There was also a process through which individuals saw peers progress into 
management ranks, often peers who they perceived as being less able to carry out 
managerial roles. For example, another manager described this process:
“[I became a manager] on the back of seeing people get 
promoted and people already at the senior officer level and 
thinking they don’t know what they’re doing, they don’t know 
how to get the best out of me, they don’t know how to talk to me. 
They were not very good managers some of them. There were 
some excellent people as well. I thought to myself I could do just 
as good if not a better job, that’s why I went to be a SO”.  (S5 
governor grade)
There was a process through which management positions came to be perceived 
as obtainable. This gradually crept up on those who had not previously 
considered this, but having become established then started to look ahead. For 
example, one manager stated:
“I don’t ever remember ever making a conscious decision to be 
a prison manager. I think it just happened. I looked around at 
some of my managers and thought I could do a better job than 
some of them could. I think that’s how a lot of people start”.
(S18 governor grade)
This evolutionary and emergent view was far more prevalent than those who felt 
that they were identified as having potential and positively nurtured by their 
managers. Only four mentioned that this had occurred.
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Of those interviewed, ten also mentioned that there was a push factor from their 
boredom with officer work, which they felt was becoming routinised and under-
stimulating. Management was seen as a route to greater job satisfaction, 
autonomy and professional challenge. It was also seen as a means by which 
people could have a greater impact on the organisation. For example, one 
manager described:
“As an officer I got into a routine, because prison routines are 
the same every day, I found myself in that situation being bored. 
I got frustrated, I wanted something else to expand on”. (W26 
senior officer)
From this perspective, there were intrinsic qualities of the management job role 
that offered an enriched occupational experience. 
In contrast to the reasons that people presented for joining the Prison Service, 
only six people mentioned the material benefits arising from becoming a 
manager, and none of those mentioned this exclusively. Indeed, for some, the 
financial rewards for becoming a manager were so small that this was irrelevant 
to their decision. As one manager explained: 
“When I first started doing it I was a bit [exhales] because it’s 
not a money thing for me because I’ve done a long time anyway. 
It’s certainly not a jump in money for the extra responsibility, so 
it’s got to be for your own personal reasons.” (W16 senior 
officer)
On entering the prison, people appeared to be open to being shaped by the 
expectations, culture and values of the organisation. They tended not to 
emphasise their own personal values but instead entered into the employment for 
instrumental reasons. However, where they did bring values with them, these 
largely related to camaraderie and relationships with colleagues rather than 
particular views about prisoners. This aligned with aspects of traditional prison 
officer culture previously discussed. On entering a managerial role, people were 
open to new ideas and experiences as they saw this as an opportunity for job 
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enrichment. However, they more clearly carried expectations that were anchored 
in their experience of working in prisons. As a result, values shaped by prison 
officer occupational culture were imported into the managerial role.  
Socialisation and the process of becoming a manager
On entering management at any level or even changing role within a managerial 
grade there was a period of adjustment and adaptation, what might be described 
as a state of ‘liminality’ or limbo, where they pass from one occupational identity 
to another (Turner 1969). This was the challenging period of truly ‘becoming’ a 
prison manager, through a process of learning the craft, acquiring the 
competences and becoming accomplished at managing the expectations and 
competing demands placed upon them. 
Prior to taking up a post, there would often be a period of preparation or ‘pre-
learning’ (Watson 2001). For those who were being promoted or were 
transferring prisons, the selection process itself would require them to read about 
the prison, perhaps make a preliminary visit, and start to think about their 
potential role. Some staff described how reading performance information such 
as policy documents, inspection and audit reports would provide a basis for 
starting to think about the prison. Others described how the selection process 
marked a point at which they started to psychologically prepare for a new role. 
For other managers, they were specifically selected for posts, based upon their 
experience in particular areas such as audit, security or industrial relations, or 
based upon a previous working relationship with a more senior manager. People 
in such a position often had a clearer idea of what was expected of them from the 
outset and therefore experienced a quicker adaptation. Part of this quicker 
adaptation was also due to the fact that either through their expertise or 
relationships they would be more readily established and supported, whereas 
those that were unknown were seen as untested and had to prove themselves.     
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Taking up a management post could be a difficult adjustment. A number 
described this as a “sink or swim” experience for which they found themselves 
insufficiently prepared and inadequately supported. This was similar to the 
‘culture shock’ and ‘reality shock’ that has been described as being experienced 
by prison officers taking up post for the first time (Crawley 2004). Some 
managers described that they had to create social distance from people with 
whom they had previously been peers, this was difficult as they moved from 
being “one of the boys” to learning how to “take a step back and take it from a 
managerial point of view” (W19 Senior officer). This process of renegotiating 
relationships was a difficult process both because those relationships had a 
professional value but also because there were sometimes personal bonds of 
friendship. 
Most managers described that on taking up a post they would undertake a period 
of observation and relationship building with staff before starting to implement 
change. This usually involved watching staff at key times, asking about practices 
and processes and carrying out introductory interviews and team meetings. It was 
rare for managers to describe that they would speak to prisoners during this 
period. This period allowed them to understand the performance of the area, what 
the problems were and helped them to understand the people they would be 
working with. This was also described by managers as an opportunity for staff to 
get to know them as individuals before they started to take on a more directive 
role. This induction process was a two-way process, as it was a means through 
which managers could understand how to change the teams they led, but was also 
a means through which they could accommodate and adapt to the existing 
practices and expectations. For some, they faced barriers as established staff 
battled for control with them, offering a challenge to their authority, for example 
questioning decisions in meetings or being slow to comply with instructions. 
These tests were often a rite of passage to being seen as a credible manager. This 
initial period was where managers established their authority but this had to be 
negotiated rather than imposed. 
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In learning a new job, many looked to others for help and support. Sources of 
support were varied. Most commonly, managers would seek support from their 
own managers, from their peers and from subordinates. Some managers stated 
that they received a briefing from their own managers about what was expected 
of them and this gave some clarity to their role, however, others described that 
they had no such briefing and were instead left to their own devices. Some 
sought the views of their managers, seeing this as a necessity in order to ensure 
that they were complying with the expectations of their seniors. The most 
commonly cited source of advice and guidance was more experienced peers. 
These were used as in order to show the ropes to new managers. Others 
described that they had to rely upon experienced subordinates in order to guide 
them initially until they got a sense of how the area worked. The choice of 
support could alter the ways in which managers developed and adapted to their 
role.
Many managers presented their tenure through a particular narrative of change. 
In this, they joined an area that was difficult or poorly performing and that during 
their period this transformed. These narratives were often deployed with little 
evidence and based upon subjective assessments of factors such as “staff morale” 
or being “dynamic”, while the end result was that they “sort[ed] it out” or 
“turned it round”, “got the whole jail involved” or became “probably the best 
team in the jail”. Such judgements partly reflected managerial concerns and ways 
in which managers created a ‘virtual’ or ‘imaginary’ prison (see Owers 2007 and 
Carlen 2008b) in order to protect or promote themselves. However, this was also 
a reflection of the personal journey they made from new arrival, through a 
liminal state, building confidence and relationships to the point where they were 
established and accepted in their role.
Discussion
The process of becoming a prison manager was notable for the prominence of 
traditional prison officer culture. When people entered prison work, they 
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generally took on the prison officer ‘working personality’ (Crawley 2004) and as 
has been described above, those who sought to enter the management grades 
generally only did so once they were anchored in their occupation. These 
individuals carried that ‘working personality’ and culture with them as they 
entered their new role. In addition, when they became managers, they found that 
they were not tightly moulded but instead went through a ‘sink or swim’’ 
experience where they had to negotiate their authority with those they managed. 
The influence of traditional culture was imported by those who became managers 
as an embedded part of their ‘working personality’ and it was also maintained 
through the power of the prison officer occupational group who had a dialectical 
relationship with their own managers.   
The role of managerialism was less prominent initially, but was not absent. It 
formed part of the pre-learning by those who became managers and it was also 
part of the expectations that were set for them by more senior managers. Those 
who became managers also noted a shift in their perspectives and relationships as 
they entered a state of liminality where they developed greater social distance
from former peers and started to understand the expectations placed upon them. 
Instead of being tightly moulded, there was a subtle and longer term process 
through which managerialism became embedded in the practice of managers. 
The process of becoming a manager was characterised by both continuity and 
change. Traditional occupational culture was imported and maintained, but there 
was also a gradual introduction into newer, managerial concerns. Managers 
experienced uncertainty and even anxiety as they tried to make sense of these
structures that were placed upon them from above and below. Having navigated 
through this period of liminality, managers developed a mode of practice and a 
sense of professional identity where they could balance and reconcile these 
competing demands. Having reached this stage, many managers constructed a 
narrative of change to celebrate the rite of passage. These narratives reflected 
that the development of an individual sense of professional identity, making 
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sense of the competing structures and creatively working with them was a 
significant accomplishment and one that was achieved through struggle.   
Managing staff
Conventional management studies assert that managing staff requires a balance 
between focussing on the needs of individuals and focussing on the tasks of the 
organisation (for a summary see Mullins 2002). This is also a staple of 
management training and a feature of policies and practices in organisations 
including prisons. This approach reflects an assumption that a participative style 
and an engaged workforce will produce greater outputs and results. This is 
situated within a broader trend where organisations aspire not simply to manage 
the actions of staff but also their subjectivity and way of thinking (e.g. Rose 
1999) so that they embody the aims, aspirations and values of the organisation.
This section will focus on the relationship between managers and staff. This was 
explored in interviews, where managers described what they perceived to be a 
‘good’ manager. This section will also draw upon observations of the ways in 
which managers conducted themselves with staff. Broadly there were two 
dimensions that shaped these interactions. On one hand there was a focus on 
delivery and task achievement, what will be described as the managerial aspects 
of the work. On the other hand, there were expectations based on the nature of 
interpersonal behaviours and the quality of relationships. The relationship 
between these two aspects could be described in conventional management 
studies terms as being the quest for the optimum balance between task and 
people. However, this was not simply a technical issue relating to productivity 
but was a social phenomenon with a localised character, which replicated the 
tensions found elsewhere between traditional and managerial cultures. 
This section will open by discussing management values and practices regarding 
the attainment of organisational tasks, the managerial elements of the role. It will 
then discuss how managers understood and approached their role in managing 
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staff. This section will go on to discuss the inter-relationships between these 
elements and draw broader observations about the working world of prison 
managers. 
Managing tasks
As has been previously argued, managerialism and the attainment of 
organisationally prescribed objectives had become increasingly important. This 
was reflected in the ways that ‘good’ managers were described.   
In this study, managers’ descriptions of ‘good’ management practice emphasised 
what could be termed traditional heroic notions of ‘leadership’, in particular that 
managers should be “visible” (see chapter 5). This idea of visibility often meant 
managers demonstrated their ability to carry out prison officer duties or their 
willingness to carry out the more risky elements of the work, including 
challenging prisoners. This acted as a way of signalling cultural affinity and 
ascribing status to particular aspects of the work, including dealing with conflict 
and using force. Being visible in different parts of the workplace on a regular 
basis was also often used as an opportunity to build informal relationships with 
staff through discussing work and non-work matters. Non-work matters often 
included football and television programmes, and work issues often included 
issues such as attitudes towards prisoners. These informal discussions reflected 
and reinforced values such as machismo, and demonstrated shared work and non-
work identities. From this perspective, ‘good’ managers remained part of the 
prison officer occupational culture. 
However, the notion of ‘visible’ management also facilitated management 
checking and observation. As one manager said “people know I’m watching and 
observing them”. For example, during visits to areas, managers would check 
documentation such as observation books, self harm documentation and 
searching records, and asked questions of staff about targets and incidents. There 
was a distinction made between visibility and micromanagement, one manager 
211
described that the ideal manager would be “visible but not too visible”. 
Interactions with staff also had this managerial dimension but this could have a 
more divisive and alienating feel to it if was overused or not balanced with 
demonstrations of cultural affinity.   
Managers generally described that it was important to meet targets and 
performance measures. This was often described in terms such as “come up with 
the goods”, a phrase which strips away the human element of the service and 
paints it as a mechanistic, commercial operation. The way that many managers 
discussed how they achieved these outcomes often emphasised machismo and 
aggression. Phrases such as “he’ll come down on you like a ton of bricks”, 
“they’ll get a kick up the backside”, “give a bollocking” and “ruled with a rod of 
iron” were not uncommon. Some managers even described themselves or others 
as “disciplinarian” and “autocratic” with a sense of pride or admiration. This 
macho language painted a picture of a strong, male, heroic leader able to 
dominate and control others through force of character or strength of will. This 
indicated the ways in which the macho aspects of traditional occupational 
cultures seeped into contemporary management practice. However, this language 
did not necessarily reflect practice. As with much ‘canteen culture’, this may 
have exaggerated or manipulated reality in order to represent a way of behaving 
that was considered admirable (Waddington 1999). For example, one principal 
officer described that on taking up his responsibilities in an area, he introduced 
himself to the team and started by “throwing some fucks into them”, however, 
when he elaborated upon this, he had set out the performance of the group to the 
team as a whole and discussed personal performance on an individual basis in 
private. At no time had he actually sworn in speaking to them but instead such 
phrases were used as a culturally recognised short-hand, whereas actual 
behaviours were different in content, tone and effect. In many cases, the 
behaviours were staples of contemporary management practice such as 
performance management and feedback, but the ways in which they were 
discussed and described was situated within a local culture.   
212
The discussion of the attainment of tasks also emphasised terms such as: 
“direction”, “decisive”, “clear about their role and responsibilities” and 
“organising”. Such terms focussed on organisation as a practice, where managers 
provided a sense of order and purpose to the tasks at hand. In this sense, ‘good’ 
managers gave structure and clarity to the work. In doing so, they were often 
drawing upon wider organisational structures such as business plans and also 
enacting the organisational infrastructure in the form of group and individual 
appraisals and target setting. What distinguished a ‘good’ manger was not simply 
that they could use these as bureaucratic mechanism, but instead that they 
embodied these, bringing them to life for people, making them relevant to their 
daily work and providing guidance and support.  
The way that managers thought about and enacted the managerial aspects of their 
role was not the amoral and mechanistic manner implied by a term such as 
“expedient managerialism” (Rutherford 1993a) or the dull bureaucracy of the 
“general manager” (Bryans 2007). Managers sought to embody the managerial 
aspects of their role, meeting targets, enacting prescribed policies and following 
organisationally directed aims meant something to them personally. This was 
part of their identity; it was part of who they had become. However, this was also 
infused by a distinct appreciation of the local cultural context. The practice of 
managers reflected and maintained elements of traditional cultures including a 
close affinity with officers, machismo and a particular orientation to prisoners. In 
achieving tasks, managers both used this cultural capital and invested in it.       
Managing People
The importance of relationships between people has been a feature of both 
conventional management strategies and prison occupational cultures. In 
management, the development of strategically aligned, instrumental human 
resource management has become the dominant orthodoxy in professional 
literature and practice, including in prison (e.g. see Crewe, Bennett and Wahidin 
2008). In contrast and as has been described earlier, traditional culture has 
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emphasised a close and insular relationship between staff that serves their 
interests in preference to others including prisoners and the organisation. 
The new language of human resource management was frequently deployed in 
the ways that managers talked about their relationships with staff. For example, 
phrases that reflected this included: “develop”, “communication”, “meeting the 
needs of the individual”, “empower”, “emotional intelligence”, “understanding 
people”, “support”, “enable”, “approachable”, “knowledge”, “listener”, 
“involves”. Such terms described an emotionally connected and sensitive 
manager who paid close attention to the needs of staff but also used these 
relationships in a purposeful way in order to achieve organisationally approved 
outcomes. 
For many managers, this involved walking a tightrope between taking control 
and allowing individual discretion. Whilst a good manager was seen as one who 
took a direct and active role in setting targets and achieving results, it was clear 
that this should not undermine the autonomy of staff. In particular, many people 
spoke about how once they were tasked they wanted the space to achieve the 
results in their own way. For example, one manager described that:      
“The main thing I want in my line manager and I’ve always 
wanted is to make it clear what I have to do, leave me to get on 
with it, be there when I need you.” (S20 non-operational 
manager)
This was described by one manager as “letting go but also being in control” (W4 
Non-operational manager). Many described how they did not like to be overly 
managed, and found that this was counter-productive. One manager illustrated 
this in the following words:
“[Good managers] allow you that room for manoeuvre, that 
autonomy and allow me to make my own decisions…I don’t like 
being micromanaged I have to say, I don’t. I find it very 
214
irritating, very frustrating. I like to be allowed to get on with it 
really”. (W13 principal officer)
These comments illustrate the dialectic of control, the negotiation between 
managers and the managed in defining appropriate behaviours and boundaries. 
  
Many people believed that managers should be approachable, listening and 
consultative. By approachable, this meant that people could go to their managers 
with personal and professional difficulties and this would be treated seriously, 
confidentially and positively. They wanted to know that this would not be seen as 
a sign of weakness but instead would be respected. There was also an expectation 
that managers would listen to what staff had to say; “I mean really listening not 
just the words going on actually listening not just hearing” (S7 governor grade). 
Where this was an issue of practice or performance rather than a personal one, 
the boundaries and expectations were drawn differently. There was an 
expectation that managers would listen but this was curbed by the rider that this 
was “without always agreeing” and that they would “not be pushed over”. For 
managers the process of listening was not simply the right thing to do, it had an 
instrumental value for them. The nature of their role was often described in 
commercial, marketing terms, describing how they would have to “sell” change 
to staff, to “win hearts and minds” and “get people on board”. As one manager 
described:
“To me, a good line manager would be someone who knows you, 
who is prepared to listen to you, contributions you can make and 
what you can say, and includes you within the decision making 
process, involves you in that decision-making process in some 
form or other. By doing that you make that person feel more 
valued, even if it’s just cosmetic, you make them feel more valued 
and therefore you get better reaction and more productive work 
from that person. That’s the basic skill of a good line manager.”
(W22 senior officer)
215
Communication and consultation would be used where changes were being 
developed and the process would involve discussing this with staff and eliciting 
their views. Often the reasons for changes would be presented, sometimes
appealing to the self interest of staff, for example the introduction of a new 
prison shop system in one of the research sites was promoted on the basis that 
staff would be able to complete their work and go home before the end of their 
shift time. The quality of consultations were variable, these meetings were often 
ad hoc and informal, based on speaking to whoever was available at the time. 
Occasionally, and largely in respect of operational incidents, the opinions of staff 
were decisive, for example, during a day long strike, the concerns of staff who 
continued to work about what they would be expected to do with the prisoners 
led to the curtailment of plans to unlock prisoners for activities such as exercise 
and phone calls. Another example was a manager agreeing to a decision 
regarding the availability of contraceptives to prisoners despite his personal 
misgivings about it after the majority of the team argued in favour of it. 
However, on many other occasions consultation was limited, teams often being 
given an opportunity to simply air their views before a pre-determined policy 
was introduced, or were simply given an input into how a policy was introduced 
rather than about what the policy was or whether it was introduced at all. In these 
ways, consultation, communication and listening were part of the ways in which 
human resource management promoted the use of interpersonal relationships as 
instrumental management tools. 
Many people described that ‘good’ managers should attempt to develop 
individual staff. This meant both immediate feedback and learning, but also 
longer term growth. Again, whilst the ability of managers to switch between 
styles and approaches that worked with different people may be presented as 
sensitive interpersonal management, it was also instrumental. It was described as 
being an exercise in which people would be developed in order to achieve 
particular results, for example in phrases such as: “I’ve shown them how to deal 
with it and they can implement it themselves next time” and “empower and 
ensure they deliver to the level I expect”. This instrumental purpose was also 
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seen in longer term development with a “strategic” view, building competencies 
and skills or “giving them the tools”. This suggested development was not 
simply about individualised personal growth, but also had an instrumental 
purpose to make people more productive resources.
Despite the extent of the instrumentality in interpersonal relations, there were 
also some normative boundaries. The ‘good’ manager also had qualities of 
“honesty and integrity”, “openness” and “fairness”. It was also important the 
people felt that they were treated in a humane way. This could be detected in 
phrases such as : “not being brutally honest”, “not just thinking as a manager, 
‘they’re my underlings’”, “poor line managers who will use every opportunity to 
beat their chests and bawl and shout”, “can’t be too dictatorial” and “no feeling 
that you’re being bullied”. These phrases indicated that management behaviour 
was normatively constrained and that there was a base level at which individual 
feelings had to be respected. 
Discussion
The way that prison managers approached the management of staff did in some 
ways reflect conventional management strategies. In particular, there is an 
appreciation that the needs of individual staff members and the needs of the 
organisation had to be balanced in order to maximise productivity. As one officer 
neatly summarised:   
“[A good manager is s]omeone who understands his staff. He 
understands that there’s a job to be done, but understands there 
are two sides between a job to be done and the people who do it. 
The job is to be done whatever way, but at the end of the day you 
have to get the staff motivated to do the job”. (S30 officer)
The way that this was manifested in prisons, however, also had a distinctly local 
texture, which reflected the ways that managerialism and traditional culture co-
existed. 
217
There were ways in which managerialism had changed the nature of relationships
between managers and staff, leading managers to use them more instrumentally 
and incorporate elements of formal organisational human resource practice into 
their work. However, managerialism had not replaced or eliminated localised 
practices, but instead this interacted with traditional culture and resulted in 
adaptations or reinforcement. For example, managers would enact cultural 
displays, particularly through ‘visible’ leadership where they would carry out 
prison officer duties or get involved in conflict with prisoners. This reinforced 
and legitimised some aspects of traditional culture including closeness to staff, 
attitudes towards prisoners and machismo. At the same time, this also provided a 
means through which managers could enlist staff and reduce resistance to 
managerial measures. 
There were two strong structural forces that came into contact through the work 
of prison managers. Individuals did not generally challenge these but accepted 
that they would be a feature of their working lives. The way that they developed 
their sense of identity was through creatively managing the dynamic interaction 
between these structures in order to balance and advance the needs of individual 
staff and the organisation. Their approach humanised managerialism and made it 
effective, crafting an accessible and acceptable localised and individualised form 
of practice.    
Managing teams
Conventional management literature emphasises the importance of teamwork 
(for summary see Mullins 2002). This suggests that cohesive teams have 
enhanced morale, productivity, flexibility and innovation (ibid). Conventional 
management theory pays particular attention to the creation of teams that work 
collaboratively towards pre-determined organisational goals. However, the 
reality of this is often more complex and problematic, including that close teams 
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can become isolated from the wider organisation and can create distorted 
perspectives through ‘groupthink’ (ibid).   
In this chapter, the various norms that shape working lives are explored. The 
issues of loyalties, teams and teamwork were particularly significant as they were 
not only central to conventional management studies, but they also reflect the 
tensions that exist within occupational cultures in prisons. Approaches to teams 
were a central tenant of both traditional occupational cultures and the newer 
managerial ethos. Traditional prison officer culture has featured a tight-knit and 
insular occupational group (see Crawley 2004, Liebling 2007). These groups 
were comprised of people who relied upon each other for safety and for getting 
their work done. They did not feel that those outside of their working group truly 
understood or appreciated the pressures they faced and the skills that they 
deployed. They were also suspicious of others within the organisation, including 
more senior managers who they perceived threatened their sense of security 
through investigations, policy initiatives and also under valued them as 
individuals in favour of managerial targets. In contrast, managerialism has 
involved processes of opening up, being controlled from higher up in the 
organisation and having a wider, external perspective. This also fostered a sense 
of competition between different teams and units. Both approaches shaped team 
work and did so in ways that both conflicted and reinforced one another. 
This section will seek to explore these issues and to look in depth at three aspects 
of this team working. First it will look at where managers’ loyalties lay and 
where their locus of interest was directed? Were they looking inward or outward, 
up or down? Did they see themselves as part of a local entity or a broader 
corporate organisation? Secondly, the relationship between managers and their 
teams will be explored, asking how managers presented themselves to their 
teams? How did they establish and maintain their credentials and where did they 
see themselves in relation to the team? Finally, the issue of competition will be 
considered and how this has influenced or changed the nature of prison 
management and the notion of collaboration and team working? 
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By exploring these issues, this section sets out to further reveal the norms that 
shape the working lives of prison managers and how individual managers 
navigate these. 
Loyalties and locus of interest
Loyalties are those bonds of allegiance between people that shape who they give 
their attention, commitment and trust towards. This section will seek to explore 
the allegiances formed by managers and what this revealed about their work.    
Managers reported a range of overlapping loyalties, from their immediate team to 
the particular prison they were working in, towards the Prison Service as a whole 
and beyond towards the government and the public. However, there were 
variations in emphasis and priority with some loyalties being stronger than others 
and these differences were pronounced between groups of managers. 
In general, officers and senior officers were more likely to describe that their 
loyalties lay within their immediate team. This partly reflected the organisation 
of their work as they were part of settled and established groups in specific parts
of a prison. This also reflected the nature of the work and the environment as 
they worked directly with prisoners and this was perceived to involve risks to 
safety that required solidarity for protective purposes. For example, an officer 
and a senior officer reported similar concerns that underpinned their loyalties to 
their immediate colleagues:
“My immediate loyalties are to people around me, whoever that 
is. At that time, the people you are with, that you’re working with, 
who’s backs you’re watching, and are watching your back. In that 
respect it will be the team around me.” (W18 officer)
   
“It’s the wing staff because I work with them. If there’s an 
incident we have to rely on each other to get ourselves out of that 
danger if it happens.” (W26 senior officer)
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These loyalties were tested when there was a national one day strike called by the 
Prison Officers Association, which took place during the fieldwork phase at one 
of the prisons. This circumstance placed senior officers directly in the position of 
deciding whether they were on the side of officers or whether they were on the 
side of governor grades, who operated the prison during the action. The 
overwhelming majority of principal and senior officers chose to join the strike 
rather than support the more senior managers who worked. 
More senior managers, both governor grades and non-operational managers, saw 
their loyalties generally falling within the prison, either describing themselves as 
having a generalised loyalty to the prison or personalising this to the Governor. 
Occasionally the commitment to the Governor reflected a personal relationship 
or individual loyalty, but largely this reflected a means by which commitment to 
an abstract entity such as ‘the establishment’ was made tangible, and the loyalty 
was to whoever held the post of Governor. Again this localised loyalty reflected 
to a degree their working structure as they were often part of a senior 
management team often over a number of years and therefore had emotional and 
professional bonds that tied them to both the place and particular people. 
However, they did have more of a corporate sense of loyalty and interest, 
focussing on an entity and a hierarchical formulation rather than specific 
individuals and groups.   
Some managers were conscious of wider responsibilities to the Prison Service, 
government or the public. This commitment was stronger for those who had 
moved around several prisons and therefore did not see themselves as tied to a 
particular prison or manager.
In general, loyalties were localised amongst all managers, with a focus on 
particular establishments or teams. However, there was a difference between 
uniformed managers and those out of uniform. Those in uniform tended to have a 
stronger attachment to that specific uniformed staff group and had a more insular 
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focus, based on a shared sense of threat and danger. This replicated the sense of 
teamwork seen in traditional prison officer culture. Governors and non-
operational managers still had a localised locus of loyalty but also focussed on 
the whole establishment as a corporate entity and a bureaucratic structure rather 
than particular individuals or groups. The loyalties displayed by them were less 
affective than uniformed managers and more based on a mechanistic 
understanding of the organisation and effective management practice.   
Managers as team members
As has been previously described, managers were valued for their visibility and 
leadership. This notion will be explored further in discussing the ways that
managers attempted to reduce barriers between themselves and their team 
members through particular norms, rituals and rites. 
Many managers and officers described how they liked their managers to lead by 
example and one informal norm that was frequently cited by managers was that 
“I wouldn’t ask you to do something I wouldn’t do myself”. This was a phrase 
that had multiple meanings and implications. 
On one hand it described that a manager had a general level of knowledge and 
experience about the working conditions of the staff that were being managed, 
often accumulated through a period of experience prior to taking on a managerial 
role. For example, one manager described: 
“You’ve got to be honest and you’ve got to be capable of doing 
the job. I’ve always said, I came up through the ranks, I did the 
prison officer job so I’m not telling anybody to do anything I 
wouldn’t have expected to do as an officer”. (W12 governor 
grade)
This manager recast and represented themselves as a prison officer, sharing their 
experiences and values. Many managers played up and glorified their experience 
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in shop floor roles and these stories and legends were used to enhance their 
status. At the same time this implicitly undermined the status of those who had 
not worked as prison officers, such as non-operational managers or operational 
managers who had entered on fast-track management development programmes. 
This phrase was also used in a literal sense in as much as prison managers would 
sometimes actually carry out officer duties and get their ‘hands dirty’, for 
example by unlocking cell doors, serving meals or challenging prisoners. One 
officer explained the value that they placed upon managers who did this:
“As an officer, having worked with different line managers, my 
preference is for somebody that is willing to get stuck in…I like 
the line manager to be the kind of person that in the morning 
meeting says we’re a bit behind on searching, [X] we need to 
crack a few out, then in the afternoon says have you got a spare 
minute, [X] come and do a search with me. I much prefer that 
sort of proactive approach than somebody who would remain 
very much removed...” (W27 officer)
The manager in this context was literally taking on the burdens and role of a 
prison officer. In some circumstances this was required in order to get work done 
on time. However, some managers did this for symbolic reasons, for example 
senior managers occasionally appeared on a landing and assisted with unlocking 
or locking up. Whilst this did little to actually reduce the work load, it had a 
ritualistic value in demonstrating their affinity and ability. 
Another example was managers who personally dealt with difficult and 
aggressive prisoners or gave bad news to people. This was seen as a sign that 
they were willing to do the difficult tasks and did not simply leave it to others to 
do. Examples of this included managers who would summon prisoners to their 
offices or go to their cells after lock up times flanked by a number of officers, in 
order to challenge their behaviour. This was seen as a way of demonstrating 
courage and personal strength, but was also deeply seeped in a culture of 
machismo. 
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In this regard, the relationship between managers and their teams was 
particularly important as it revealed ways in which traditional cultures have been 
maintained in the contemporary penal system and indeed this has been 
encouraged and entrenched through modern notions of leadership and visibility.   
Competition
A particular feature of managerialism has been the importation of competition 
through the creation of a market for public services, including prisons. However, 
for most prisons and prison staff, the prospect of participating in a commercial 
competition was remote. Notions of competitiveness have been also promoted 
and perpetuated by techniques such as quantitative performance measurement, 
league tables and the award of performance ratings (e.g. see Armstrong 2007). In 
this section, the effects of this will be briefly considered and in particular how 
this related to traditional occupational cultures which emphasised insularity and 
closeness between staff.   
Managers were conscious of and interacted with the performance management 
technologies. For example, when prison performance was discussed, the 
weighted scorecard would be used as a measure of relative achievement, and 
comparisons would often be drawn with other prisons in the geographical area as 
a way of benchmarking. Particular vitriol was reserved in one of the prisons for a 
nearby private prison, described as a “civvy jail”. Staff would revel in stories of 
their failings, including an escape. However, competition did not only relate to
inter-prison rivalries, but was also evident within the prison where departments 
would compete with one another. Some described this as “healthy”, acting as a 
spur to greater effort, but many also highlighted the negative consequences. For 
example one manager discussed the benefits of competition but also the 
fragmentation that could take place:
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“There’s a bit of a ‘them and us’ attitude.. I’ve found ever since I 
joined the service that even within your own wing you get the 
different divisions13, even the same group of staff, during the week 
you all work together and then at the weekend there’s a ‘them and 
us’ attitude, wherever you work it’s always “that fucking 
weekend, what have they done this weekend, this weekend have 
done nothing”. It’s always that your weekend does all the work 
and the other weekend does nothing. If you swap weekends it 
would still be the same, nothing changes. The Res[idential] thing 
is the same, we say “[those wings] they’re fucking useless”, and 
they’re probably saying the same about us. It’s them and us. 
Sometimes I think it’s a bit of humour, its done tongue in check 
and it gives you that morale boost within your own group, and 
sometimes it forges more team work, even without realising it. If 
you’ve got a bit of friendly competition, sometimes you think we’ll 
do better than them. Sometimes it is quite a good thing”. (W26 
senior officer)
There was a knock on impact across group and team collaboration. Whilst 
performance measurement may have acted to focus managers on particular 
objectives, this could make them myopic. For example, one manager described:
“There’s always an element of competitiveness, because at the 
end of the day we spend a lot of time looking at performance and 
everybody is sitting there thinking yes I want to help other people 
but I don’t want to be the one whose audit area is receiving 56%. 
At the end of the day I have to put my area first because I want all 
my audits to be achieving 90% and I don’t want to be seen as 
missing targets. While you have a senior management teams that 
are performance driven you’re never going to be able to get away 
from that, there’s a bit of live and let die”. (S4 governor grade)
Competition could also be defensive. Just as the spotlight could shine on those 
departments that performed exceptionally well, it would also fall on those who 
performed poorly. When attention was focussed on these, it would provide relief 
from close management attention for others. Two managers summed this up by 
saying:
                                               
13 Prison officers and often senior officers work alternate weekends. The two groups are often 
referred to as ‘divisions’
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“I refer to this [x wings] as ‘the dark side’…why should I bother 
if [they] are getting themselves into trouble? It looks better for 
me, although I wouldn’t deliberately stitch them up”. (WFN 14)
“You look after your own area. Everyone always feels that either 
someone else is being given more, while you are getting more 
grief. While the governor is beating the shit out of [x] wings, it 
means [y] wings aren’t getting it. I’m not going to help, because 
if I was in their place, they wouldn’t be running over to tell me 
what I could do.” (WFN 30)
Of course, the use of performance measurement did not always undermine 
teamwork, and as was described in chapter 4, there were examples where the 
attainment of particular targets required cross-departmental co-operation and the 
use of performance targets was a device through which this had been facilitated. 
On an individual level, the effects of competition were sometimes described as 
divisive as it eroded inter-personal relationships and trust. Within the 
management group, those who were identified as competitive were talked about 
using pejorative terms such as “political manoeuvrings”, “jockeying for position” 
and “looking for smartie points”. Such terms highlighted a view of competition 
as childish and vacuous but also self-interested. 
Some managers also argued that competition had a distorting effect and would 
lead to people being less honest. This was sometimes described as people trying 
to “sell” their achievements, engaging in “putting your stall out”, or choosing to 
“blow our own trumpet a bit” or to “put a spin on things”. This was usually in 
order to impress more senior managers either for individual advantage or to make 
their department look good, this was criticised by some as creating an “I, I, I, me, 
me, me culture” where people were both selfish and boastful. This could also 
contribute towards rhetoric overtaking reality, creating a ‘virtual’ prison.  
For others it could be even more destructive, creating an aggressive culture 
where people had to engage in “fighting my corner” and had to “shout loud, be 
very political, spell out the consequences of decisions on targets…It’s the only 
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language they understand” (WFN 24). Others described how competitive 
individuals could affect a whole team:
“It’s weird, it’s one of those things where you get a member of 
staff that just creates a feeling of mistrust, everyone feels 
uncomfortable and that spreads, it’s like a disease almost”. (W28 
officer)
Although traditional prison culture has been characterised by closeness, 
insularity and co-operation and there were examples where performance 
measurement has been a spur to cross-team collaboration, these accounts 
highlighted the emergence of a less corporate, more individualised culture. The 
working environment had come to incorporate elements of the intense inter- and 
intra-agency competition described by Cheliotis (2006).
Discussion
Working with teams again highlighted the confluence between the traditional 
occupational culture and the newer managerial practices.  
It appeared that the changing structure of prison management, with its more 
globalised, managerial outlook, created a force towards a more atomised, 
competitive culture. Although this sometimes encouraged people to work 
together in order to achieve objectives, this was a weaker more transitory and 
superficial sense of togetherness. The sense of competition also drove people 
apart rather than pushing them together. There was either a sense of individual 
one-upmanship or a defensive collective desire to avoid the negative effects, a 
sense of shared misery. The structures of prison management appeared in this 
respect to work against deeply felt camaraderie. However, a sense of place, 
belonging and shared identity has remained important. This was often seen in the 
ways that managers had a sense of loyalty to a particular establishment or group. 
It was also evident in their engagement with traditional culture for example by 
displaying their affinity with prison officer work.  
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These pressures played upon all managers, but the balance between them had to
be sensed and managed differently according to roles. In particular, uniformed 
managers (senior officers and principal officers) had a closer loyalty to staff as a 
result of their mutual dependence arising from the perceived risks of their 
working environment and roles. A broader and more externally influenced sense
of loyalty pervaded the views of more senior managers. The attainment of targets 
and corporate objectives loomed larger in shaping their outlook.
The art of prison management lay in the way that individuals were able to take 
the structures they worked within and moulded them into an operable and 
sustainable set of practices that kept teams together and made them effective.  
Managing prisoners
In discussions of prison officer culture, relationships with prisoners have featured 
prominently (for example see Liebling and Price 2001, Crawley 2004). As has 
been described previously, this has emphasised an asymmetric relationships 
where prisoners occupy a subservient position. However, the relationship has 
also been shown to be complex as prison officers also act to ameliorate the pains 
of imprisonment for prisoners. Prison officers generally view prisoners as less 
deserving and hierarchically below them, but despite this generally exercised 
their power responsibly.  
Managers had a less direct role with prisoners than officers and this was a less 
prominent feature of their working lives. Interactions were largely restricted to 
set piece events such as adjudications, recategorisation and early release boards, 
and dealing with formal requests or complaints. There was therefore a greater 
social distance between prison managers and prisoners and their relationship had 
less of the intimate domesticity that was characteristic of officer-prisoner 
relationships (Crawley 2004).  
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This section will explore two issues regarding the relationship between prison 
managers and prisoners. The first is how managerial thinking had influenced the 
ways prisoners were seen and understood. The second is to understand and 
explore ways in which traditional cultural views about prisoners have persevered 
in the practice of mangers. Throughout this research, orientations towards 
prisoners have been discussed and the intention of this section is not to repeat 
those observations but instead to summarise key elements and to analyse them
more systematically.
  
The quantification of prisoners
As was discussed in chapter 4, the structure of prison managerialism, including 
KPTs and audits had taken an increasingly strong hold over prison managers and 
their habitus. As a result, prisoners were often seen through this prism of 
managerialism. From this perspective, prisoners were the recipients of prescribed 
services monitored through targets such as offending behaviour programmes, 
work skills accreditations or purposeful activity. Additionally they were seen as 
the unknown quantity in the management of performance risks such as assaults 
or complaints. Prisoners were seen in relation to their influence and effects upon 
performance measures rather than as thinking, feeling agents. Of course, none of 
this is to suggest that providing purposeful activity or preventing assaults were 
not of value, but this does indicate the ways in which managers could perceive 
prisoners under the influence of managerialism.
This could also be seen in the ways that decisions were made about prisoners 
including early release and recategorisation, as discussed in chapter 5, which 
shifted with central direction. As has been discussed, the use of discretion was 
informed both by actuarial calculations (Feeley and Simon 1992) considering 
previous history, and also senior management direction that could redraw the 
boundaries, as when recategorisation was deliberately encouraged in order to 
ensure that spaces in open prisons were being used. 
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The quantification of prisoners represented them as units in business processes. 
As a result, humanitarian concepts promoted by the organisation such as 
‘decency’ and ‘reducing reoffending’, tended to take on a more managerial shape 
rather than having an emotional immediacy. They were seen to represent 
particular prescribed services (such as offending behaviour programmes or 
employment), or specific behaviours (such as not abusing prisoners or calling 
them by their first names) that had been specifically articulated by senior prison 
managers. As has been acknowledged, the services that were being provided 
were by no means unimportant but it was the shift in thinking and perceptions 
that was particularly relevant.        
Prisoners as the ‘other’   
A feature of traditional prison culture has been the asymmetric relationship 
between officers and prisoners, with prisoners being subservient. There were 
several ways in which managers reinforced and maintained this in their practice.
As has previously been described, managers would sometimes make macho 
displays of challenging prisoners. In addition, some managers would tacitly 
approve of denigrating comments about or behaviour towards prisoners, which 
would be in breach of formal organisational policies. For example, a prisoner in a 
constant observation cell due to his high risk of suicide was described as “that 
creature”, some staff described how they informally punished prisoners for 
demonstrating a poor attitude by being slow to provide them with goods or 
services they had requested, and some staff described how they had been 
verbally abusive to prisoners in response to what they perceived as a poor 
attitude. In all of these instances, the managers did not challenge the comments 
and thus tacitly supported them. 
Managers often described that their general approach would be to treat everyone 
equally, whether they were staff or prisoners. There were certainly examples of 
where managers did show compassion to individuals and communicated with 
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them empathetically. However, managers were also keen to “support” staff, 
which generally meant that they would back up decisions when challenged by 
prisoners or would challenge poor behaviour as described above.     
As has been acknowledged, there were examples of prison managers showing 
compassion and individualised care, but they also participated in and reinforced 
the traditional asymmetric relationship with prisoners. Their demonstration of 
this cultural affinity could help to reduce the social distance between managers 
and staff.  
Discussion
In this short section, it has been highlighted that prison managers generally had a 
more distant social relationship with prisoners than officers and that the process 
of managerialism led to a quantification of prisoners whilst traditional cultural 
values placed prisoners in a subservient position.
These processes had an impact upon prison managers and staff. The aims of 
managerial targets were instrumental and for a team to be effective, a shared 
sense of purpose was important. The shared cultural values, including the attitude 
towards prisoners could help to bind teams.  
These processes also had an impact on prisoners as both processes acted to 
dehumanise them. Interpretive denial (Cohen 2001) describes a situation where 
acts of rationalisation and sanitisation obscure the full human experience and 
context. In prisons, traditional cultures did this morally by denying that prisoners 
were deserving of sympathy but instead were the undeserving subservient strata 
of the prison system. Managerial techniques were not based upon such overt 
judgements about prisoners, but by quantifying them and making them business 
units, they were based upon a denial of the rounded humanity of the subject. As a 
result, managerialism and traditional culture both came together in the work of 
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prison managers to reinforce the asymmetrical structure of the social world of the 
prison.        
Whilst there were some examples of managers acting creatively or 
compassionately in individual circumstances, this was not an embedded and 
extensive mode of practice that has been suggested elsewhere (e.g. Cheliotis 
2006). Instead, prison managers generally used attitudes towards prisoners as a 
means of creating and maintaining the cohesion of the staff team.  
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to consider how people become prison managers and 
once in the role how they approached major aspects of their work. This has been 
used as a means to explore the lived experience of prison managers. This has, in 
common with the previous chapters, revealed two major factors. The first is the 
development of managerialism in prisons, through performance management 
methodologies, actuarial tools, efficiency, competition and the shaping of a new 
professional ethos. The second element is the influence of a traditional prison 
officer culture comprising of machismo, an asymmetric relationship with 
prisoners and insularity.  This discussion has shown that two structural forces 
played a leading role in shaping the working world of prison managers, but also 
that they had a complex inter-relationship in which they were sometimes in 
competition and are sometimes reinforcing. 
There were at least three reasons that these two forces were able to co-exist. The 
first was the power held by different players and groups. Managerialism was 
initially pushed by senior managers but over time has gained a hold throughout 
the organisations so that there was a growing constituency of supporters. The 
more localised traditional culture was maintained by an influential group of staff 
and managers who were important in making the work of prisons effective. Both 
factors therefore had widespread support and were deeply embedded in the 
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practice of individuals and groups. These micro actors are the ones that realise 
and enact this intersection of global and local: 
“It is ordinary people in their everyday lives who cope with and 
sometimes react to the global forces penetrating their particular 
life spaces…even though they do not always understand or 
interpret them as global forces” (Kennedy 2010 p.13).
The second reason was that there were instrumental grounds for engaging both 
trends. Managerialism provided tools, means and justifications for empowering 
managers, but traditional culture also provided a means through which the 
subjectivity of a range of staff could be accessed. Engaging with traditional 
culture reduced resistance and enabled the ‘hearts and minds’ of staff to be won 
and their commitment secured. Both could be combined therefore to make the 
organisation effective. From this perspective, localism was an enabler of global 
forces but equally, globalised forces were a means through which the 
particularity of local practice could be maintained.
Thirdly, there were affective reasons that the two were accommodated. As 
Richard Sennett argues:
“One of the unintended consequences of modern capitalism is 
that it has strengthened the value of place, aroused a longing for 
community. All the emotional conditions we have explored in the 
workplace animate that desire: the uncertainties of flexibility; the
absence of deeply rooted trust and commitment; the superficiality 
of teamwork; most of all, the spectre of failing to make something 
of oneself in the world, to “get a life” through one’s work. All 
these conditions impel people to look for some other scene of 
attachment and depth” (Sennett 1998 p.138)
He therefore suggests that, as appears to be the case here, the re-energising of 
traditional cultures can be a response to the conditions of modern organisations. 
Managers experience a change in their sense of meaning and belonging, in part 
they respond to this by finding new senses of identity but they also respond by 
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looking to the past; retaining and expressing localised forms of cultural 
expression.
The culture of prison management reflected the uncertain, unstable and fluid 
relationship between global and local forces that characterise late modernity.
Managerialism and traditional prison officer culture existed in a state of flux 
where managers had to creatively draw upon elements of both and draw them 
together so as to make sense of and operate effectively within their working 
world. Managers were not passive agents in this process but instead they were 
active creators and interpreters of it. 
It has previously been described that in some occupations (including prison 
officers) there existed a ‘working personality’, which included relatively clearly 
defined ways of acting and thinking (Skolnick 1966, Crawley 2004). Such a 
concept was not adequate to describe the more dynamic and conflicted 
expectations placed upon prison managers. This could be better described by 
returning to Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1977). In this he described that 
agency should be situated within the conflicts and tensions between groups 
within a particular field. He argued that the ability of individuals to act with 
agency was constrained by the relative power of the groups to which they 
belonged. As could be seen, prison managers were constrained by the structures 
from above and below. He also argued that individuals participated in these 
power struggles and this was so central that: “The subjectivity of actors is only 
rendered ‘agentic’ when collectivized by field struggles” (Parker, J. 2000 p.48). 
This is relevant as the agency of prison managers was demonstrated not in 
idiosyncratic practice but instead in the ways that they interpreted, balanced and 
recreated the relationship between traditional culture and managerialism. 
Managers were active participants, or micro agents, in the intersection of these 
forces. The accommodations and adaptations between these were the 
accumulated outcome of the actions of agents over time, including prison 
managers.
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This was also an ongoing and continuous process. Managers had to creatively 
interpret and imagine the relationship between managerialism and traditional 
culture. This could be seen in the ways that they had to make fine judgements 
about how they balanced, blended, chose or were constrained by these two 
forces. As has been illustrated, practice would vary according to a range of 
factors including the experience and seniority of the individual manager, the 
nature of the issue at hand, the relative power of the staff, whether the issue was 
locally or nationally generated, the time within the monitoring cycle and the 
operating context. As a result boundaries were blurred, judgements contingent 
and practice involved creative acts of agency.    
This chapter has suggested that there has been a shift in the working world of 
prison managers. This has come to be dominated by two structures: 
managerialism and traditional prison officer culture. These changes have 
constrained and reshaped the practice of prison managers. Whilst agency has a 
place, it is different from the moral vibrancy and unconstrained individuality that 
has been described in the past (e.g Rutherford 1993a). The practice and craft of 
prison management has not been eliminated, but it has been reframed, being 
located at the nexus of globality and localism that is so central to late modernity.     
235
Chapter 7
Hidden Injuries of Prison Management
This chapter can be read in conjunction with the previous chapter and can be seen 
as an exploration of some of the effects of the dominant working identities and 
cultures that exist in prisons. In particular, it will seek to identify those who 
experience ‘hidden injuries’, the nature of those injuries and their source. This 
will be used to draw wider observations about prison management, occupational 
culture and their effects.        
In their 1972 book The Hidden Injuries of Class, Sennett and Cobb explore the 
impact on working class communities in Boston of a series of social changes 
including the displacement of traditional inner-city and ethnic communities 
through the process of ‘urban renewal’. They describe that the challenges 
experienced were not simply material, for example being concerned about entry 
into the burgeoning consumerist society indeed many had made progress and had 
achieved a level of affluence that made them materially middle class. However, 
rather than simply ‘melting’ into the middle class mass, these people experienced 
‘hidden injuries’ that were cultural and social in as much as many were left 
searching for a sense of place and identity within wider American society. Many 
described that they had entered a world in which they did not feel at home and felt
isolated, with a diminished sense of dignity and self esteem.  The way that the 
authors explore the relationship between class, social change and individual 
identity has been described as a pioneering attempt to “grasp the consequences of 
structural positioning biographically” (Crawley and Sparks 2005 italics in 
original). 
Sennett continues to explore these themes in his studies of the working world and 
the social consequences of ‘new capitalism’. This term is used to describe 
changes in the world of work, including a focus on short-term benefits, and 
developments in technology that allow direct communication up and down a 
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company, reducing ambiguity and interpretation, and increasing panoptic 
supervision, as well as more distant and less personal interactions. There have 
also been changes in the architecture of organisations including casualization 
(short-term contracts and contracting out), delayering (reduced management 
layers), and non-linear sequencing (moving around tasks and changing to respond 
to need and demand). The effects of these changes, Sennett argues, include that 
people have a reduced sense of place, drifting between jobs and not understanding 
how their role fits into the wider organisation; they have increasingly routinised 
jobs that leave them feeling unsatisfied; and that social capital is reduced as 
people feel that experience is not valued and relationships are superficial (Sennett 
1998). He further argues that experience is undervalued as it is perceived as a 
form of resistance and that emotional self-sufficiency is required with those who 
need support being perceived as ‘needy’ or ‘dependent’(Sennett 2004). He argued 
that these changes result in three social deficits; low institutional loyalty, 
diminishment of informal trust and weakening of institutional knowledge. 
It has to be acknowledged that it has been countered that ‘new capitalism’ is not 
as prevalent as has been suggested (Doogan 2009). It also has to be acknowledged 
that prisons are not ‘new capitalist’ enterprises, at most it could be argued that 
they incorporated some features of managerial practices, but tenure is secure and 
as has been described previously there is significant continuity as well as change. 
However, what Sennett points the way towards is appreciating that social changes 
take place within wider patterns of social power and that the effects of this are 
experienced differently by individuals.    
During the fieldwork stage of this study it was apparent that although the logic of 
managerialism was presented by many practitioners as objective, neutral and 
equal, the world of prison managers contained hidden injuries. Certain groups 
were able to articulate how they struggled to find a sense of place and how they 
did not feel at home. These were often groups that have been identified in the past 
as suffering structural disadvantage in the workplace, relating to such issues as 
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation and ill-health. Another group, non-
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operational managers, has also been identified as suffering in the past within 
prisons, where they were treated as less important than ‘operational’ staff such as 
officers and governor grades (see Bennett, Crewe and Wahidin 2008). It has been 
argued that such groups lack power and a legitimate platform to articulate their 
needs and interests and as a result become dislocated, experience indignity and 
feel the effects of disadvantage personally (Crawley and Sparks 2005). This 
chapter is an attempt to draw out those experiences and illustrate how structural 
disadvantage is manifested biographically amongst prison managers. 
Gender
Whilst prison staff are formally integrated and the days of single sex workforces 
are in the distant past, prisons are not gender neutral workplaces. The two 
research sites were men’s prisons, employing a majority of male staff in direct 
roles with prisoners and were quantitatively male dominated organisations. Two 
thirds of staff in prisons are men, but this is more heavily concentrated in the 
unformed staff group, where almost 80% are male (Crewe, Bennett and Wahidin 
2008).
Gender has been a core element of the sociology of work. Within the criminal 
justice system, issues of gender have received some attention in relation to both 
the police (for example Westmarland 2001) and prison officers (for example Tait 
2008, Crewe 2006). However, the main research in the UK on prison managers 
has conspicuously ignored gender issues (for example Bryans 2007). This appears 
to be a particularly significant omission given that the numbers of women prison 
managers has been increasing over recent years (Liebling, Price and Shefer 2011) 
and studies of gender in the workplace have highlighted this as an important issue.      
This section will explore the occupational experience of women managers. It will 
start by describing the extent to which women filled managerial positions and the 
roles that they generally held. The section then goes on to explore aspects of 
women’s experience of the workplace and how they were perceived. This will 
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include both the positive benefits a mixed occupational environment was 
perceived to have brought as well as the criticisms that were often levied against 
women managers. The continued existence of openly sexist language and ‘banter’ 
will also be discussed. The section will go on to discuss the resistance 
experienced by female managers and how they adapted to the working 
environment. There will also be a discussion of how the structure and culture of 
prison management reflected gender. The section will conclude by drawing 
together observations about gender in prisons.      
The experiences of women managers
In the two prisons studied, women were a minority of the managers. At the two 
sites, 31% (95 of 310) and 36% (137 of 384) of staff were female, amongst 
managers this was 29% (17 of 59) and 24% (19 of 61), but amongst operational 
managers i.e. governor grades, principal officers and senior officers, this dropped 
to 16% (five of 32) and 10% (five of 52). This indicated that the roles that women 
held were gender defined. 
On the two senior management teams, women were more likely to be in non-
operational administrative roles such as finance and human resources. Even 
managers in operational roles were often, but not universally, directed towards 
roles such as resettlement and rehabilitation of prisoners rather that security based 
roles. Within their roles, it has been suggested that women could also find 
themselves excluded from the management of incidents and the use of force, 
partly because of a chivalrous view that they were deserving of protection but also 
because of a more chauvinistic view that they were unsuited or incompetent for 
such roles (Crawley 2004). Such allocations of work and opportunities reflected 
the gendered structure of prison work, where direct work with prisoners, 
particularly security and control, was seen as ‘man’s work’, whilst caring and 
administrative roles were seen as ‘women’s work’. Such allocation of tasks has 
also been highlighted amongst police and prison officers (Westmarland 2001, Tait 
2008). The structures of recruitment, training and deployment contributed towards 
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this gendering of the workplace. However, in both sites there were women, albeit 
a small number, that occupied managerial positions that involved security and 
control and some men, albeit a small number, occupied roles requiring empathy 
and care, indicating that the segregation was not complete.      
The default position of most managers was to assert that they were treated and 
judged equally regardless of gender. These claims were based on a belief that 
there was a universal basis upon which managers were judged. This was 
expressed through phrases such as “strength of character” and “credibility” as 
well as the “product delivered” or “how they get the job done”, indicating that this 
encompassed both the achievement of particular outcomes and the display of 
particular professional characteristics. However, it appeared that such benchmarks 
reflected and entrenched issues of gender identity and difference.  
There were some positive views articulated. In particular, the presence of women 
managers was seen by many men as having beneficial effects. First, female 
managers were believed to bring a “softer” or “more gentle” approach to their 
dealings with staff and prisoners such as demonstrating empathy and care, which 
reduced confrontation and smoothed conflict. Second, they were seen as being 
more emotionally connected and more temperamentally suited to providing a 
listening ear with personal and domestic issues; “a mother figure or a big sister”. 
Third, women were believed to be better able to manage a number of different 
tasks at the same time, and this multi-tasking was valued in busy roles that 
required good organisation and planning, for example one manager commented: 
“Women have a more natural skill and multi-tasking. I don’t know if that’s a 
scientifically proven fact but they certainly do”. This role was close to that of the 
domestic organiser and administrator. Fourth, the presence of female managers 
was said to encourage chivalry, resulting is a less macho approach from others, 
such as more polite behaviour including less swearing and ‘banter’. Whilst these 
perceived benefits reflected stereotypical female roles and characteristics, they 
were situated within the local context, reflecting the centrality of managing the 
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risk of violence and the ordering of the essentially domestic nature of prison life 
(Crawley 2004).  
Not all attitudes towards gender and not all experiences of women managers were 
positive. Some men were not content to be managed by women. Criticisms 
particularly focussed on the perceived “emotional baggage” carried by women or 
the extent to which they were too ‘emotional’ generally. For example, one 
manager stated:
“I would say on balance I would rather work in a male 
environment…Where I’ve had some bad [female managers] to 
work with they’ve been awful, it’s the emotional baggage that 
they bring, tends to cloud some issues whereas males don’t tend 
to have that sort of stuff, they will say what they want, shut up 
and get on with it.  (S15 governor grade)
Such views represented women as uncontrolled, vulnerable and unable to function 
effectively in the professional environment. Women managers often described 
that they were conscious of this and would manage the display of emotions as a 
result. For example one stated:
“I get frustrated sometimes, I can get very stressed and have 
done, but I won’t cry because then the problem is ‘you’re a 
woman’,’ she’s just being emotional’ or ‘silly’, so I take great 
care. Even if I want to cry with sheer bloody anger, I would 
never cry in the workplace. (female manager 1)
However, everyone experiences emotions at work and this is intertwined with the 
experience, whether that is the joy and happiness of success, the frustrations of 
failure or the anger at injustices (Fineman 2003). In prisons, there was a cultural 
expectation that emotions should be concealed behind a façade of indifference 
(Crawley 2004). This was a form of ‘emotional labour’ where there was an 
expectation about how workers should display or conceal emotions at work 
(Hochschild 1983). This construction of ‘emotions’ was itself gendered as the 
experience and display of feelings by men and women could be perceived 
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differently, for example mutual affection and inter-relatedness, more often 
displayed by women, may be constructed as ‘emotional’, but feelings such as fear, 
competitiveness and aggression, more often displayed by men, may not be 
constructed as ‘emotional’ at all and may be perceived as culturally acceptable
(Wajcman 2000).  The open expression of emotion was threatening because it 
undermined the façade of indifference deployed as a coping strategy by the 
majority of (male) employees, whilst the display of overt empathy threatened the 
depersonalisation of prisoners that underpinned the social order.   
A second element of female identity that was seen as threatening by male 
managers was sexuality.  In prisons, sexual relations were repressed and there was 
an attempt to expel these from the workplace towards the home (Burrell 1984). 
This was both because lack of sexual relations were one of the ‘pains of 
imprisonment’ and therefore an integral part of punishment (Sykes 1958) and also 
because this was seen as behaviour that could potentially present a risk to order, 
control, safety and security. Following a female officer being discovered at one of 
the prisons with contraband in her possession which she was attempting to traffic 
to a prisoner she had formed a relationship with, there were concerns expressed 
by some staff that women, particularly young women or women in roles other 
than that of prison officer, were vulnerable to engaging in sexual relationships 
with prisoners. Such instances became part of organisational history and held 
particular discursive power, being used to illustrate that this risk was genuine. 
This fear had a spillover into more general perceptions of women managers and 
staff. This linked to the male perception of women as emotionally unstable and 
vulnerable and played a part in the construction of prison work as men’s work for 
which women were not suitable. It was useful to contrast this with the examples 
of where male staff had been corrupted, for example bringing drugs or mobile 
phones into prisons. This was usually seen as an individualised issue and did not 
result in any broader spillover into judgements about male staff, their suitability to 
work in prisons or their vulnerability.   
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Prisons, along with other public sector organisations, have developed equal 
opportunities training and policies (Bradley 1999). These have been designed to 
eliminate discrimination and offensive language and behaviour, including sexual 
harassment. However, there remains within prisons elements of a culture
characterised by machismo where sexist language and bawdy jokes are not only 
tolerated but were perpetuated by workers at all levels. Such cultural displays 
reinforced the dominance of men in the workplace but also acted to cement the 
close bonds of camaraderie between staff. In the research sites, there were 
numerous examples of sexist comments, banter and jokes ranging from jokes 
about wives to a description of overweight women as “pigs in knickers”. These 
comments were perpetuated by managers at all levels. Whilst many managers, 
male and female, described that they felt uncomfortable with this, they believed 
that engaging in this to some degree was a route to acceptance and that 
challenging this on every occasion was not a realistic option. More subtly, group 
solidarity was also reinforced through discussions of predominantly male 
pastimes, in particular football, where the wheels of relationships would be oiled 
by talk about the latest scores and upcoming fixtures. However, women rarely 
participated in these discussions and where therefore excluded from one of the 
main means through which social solidarity was maintained. 
Many women described how they had to prove themselves before they were 
respected by their peers and staff. Often they faced preconceived ideas from 
largely male workforces and had their positions on trust rather than by right. For 
example one manager described:
“When I knew I was coming here as the only female and the only 
female they had ever had…I wasn’t concerned or worried,[but] a 
little bit apprehensive. But I fitted in really well, I feel they have 
accepted me. I think it was my first week, one of the turned 
around and said “we had reservations about you but you’ve 
fitted in really well”. It was all a bit concerning”. (female 
manager 2)
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Women managers were concerned about resistance and some felt that this meant 
that they had to be careful when settling into their role and had to bide their time 
before they were accepted sufficiently in order to take more proactive action. One 
manager described this struggle:
“I did feel that maybe people were looking to see if I was going 
to fail. I think at the very beginning when I first started 
temporary promotion I was very wary of stepping on toes and 
sticking my heals in and saying ‘I’m not doing this’ or’ you are 
doing that’ and that took me a year really, maybe eighteen 
months to overcome that and say ‘this is me and this is how I’m 
going to do it’.” (female manager 3)
There were elements of the culture that were exclusive of and indeed hostile to 
women and as a result they could be inhibited from reaching their potential and 
could be left with negative feelings including a perception that they had been 
treated unfairly or harassed (Stanko 1988).
Adaptation
A number of women managers described how they adapted and faced the 
challenges that arose from being a woman in what was essentially a man’s world. 
Many described how they continually had to work harder than men in order to 
achieve recognition. It was not unusual for women managers to use words to the 
effect that they had to work twice as hard to get the same recognition as their male 
counterparts. This could be a source of considerable stress and foster a sense of 
unfairness (Alvesson and Billing 1997).
Women also used gender roles as a means through which they attempted to 
operate as managers. This could be by adopting more masculine traits or by 
exaggerating their female characteristics. The risk of this was that what was 
presented was a distorted version of their individual identity, but also a distorted 
version of gender identity that was constructed around a male perception. As one 
senior officer described:  
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“Sometimes women can either be seen to be soft or too harsh. I 
think that’s because they are trying to be a women in a man’s 
world and try to adopt male attitudes or they may be more soft 
on people and more forgiving”. (W14 senior officer)
This was an issue that had been observed more widely in the world of work, but 
rather than being an objective reality, it has been suggested that these polar views 
are created by the perceptions of women managers imposed by male staff. For 
example it has been described that:
“Any action may be interpreted in a radically different way 
depending on whether the actor is a man or a woman. For 
example, a particular action or experience might be defined as 
‘firm’, ‘decisive’ and ‘rational’ when constructed in relation to a 
man, and as ‘bossy’, ‘hysterical’ and ‘irrational’ where a woman 
is involved. A woman exercising a democratic leadership style 
may be seen as soft or indecisive” (Wajcman 2000 p.259)
Those women that adopted more masculine characteristics, such as being more 
aggressive, directive or confrontational came in for particular criticism from men. 
Such women were criticised not only for the actions in themselves but also 
because they were perceived to be acting in a manner that was contrary to their 
assigned gender role. They often faced resistance both informal and through 
formal complaints and grievances. As one manager described:
“If a women approaches things like a man that can be construed 
almost as bullying, whereas a man that’s a characteristic of a 
male to be more forceful. There are women who are like it and 
the women who are like it, without exception, I can’t think of one 
who hasn’t, been on a charge for bullying”. (female manager 4)
  
Some women also played up their female characteristics in a way that was 
described as using their “feminine charm” whether that was being flirtatious, 
engaging in sexualised banter, or providing an accessible source of empathetic 
support for colleagues. A number of women also took an approach of fighting fire 
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with fire, and they were equally capable of demonstrating prejudices such as 
sexism, homophobia or racism. 
Discussion
The key issue in the adaptations that women underwent in the workplace was that 
they had to fit in to a culture that was essentially constructed by and dominated by 
men. Although a niche had been carved within that for what were seen by male 
staff as natural ‘female’ skills, women were generally judged in the context of a 
cultural that privileged the male perspective. They were subject to marginalisation 
in their roles away from dealing with prisoners and operational problems, were 
the subject of sexist behaviours and had to construct occupational identities that 
did not neatly mesh with their social identities. By conforming and being 
controlled by these male notions of appropriate presentation and behaviour, power 
inequalities became entrenched (Adkins 1995). It also exerted a price, where 
some women managers felt stereotyped, constrained and experienced dissonance 
between their personal and work identities (Cockburn 1988).  
Managerialism was sometimes posited as a means through which traditional 
cultures could be undermined and equality of opportunity promoted (e.g. Bradley 
1999). For managers, this particularly arose from the objective and even scientific 
claims made for performance management, suggesting that a level playing field 
had been created in which the best would prevail. This claim was one that had 
great currency in prisons. This was the basis upon which many prison managers, 
both male and female, denied that gender difference existed or was relevant in the 
contemporary prison. Two protective factors arising from managerialism that 
mitigated prejudice and supported equal treatment were cited. The first was that 
there was a universal basis for judging managers, a set of competences that 
marked out a good manager from a bad one. This used familiar terms such as 
approachability, listening, decisiveness and clear feedback. As has been described 
previously, such terms are not as unambiguous as may be assumed. The second 
was that performance management such as targets and audits provided an 
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objective basis upon which to judge achievements and this eliminated bias. Both 
claims deserve closer scrutiny.
The culture of management and the widely accepted norms of good management, 
rather than providing a universal leveller, entrenched a particular gendered view 
of managers. Many men and women described prisons as “macho” or “male 
dominated”. This could be seen in the admired management characteristics such 
as making decisions rather than developing others to do so, giving direct feedback 
rather than encouraging self-reflection, providing directive clarity rather than 
encouraging self development. Management was seen as task focussed and 
controlling rather than person-centred and developmental. It could be argued that 
such a construction is gendered, elevating male characteristics and attempting to 
objectify them uncritically. A similar argument could be made in respect of 
performance management, which focused on task and encouraged competition 
and individualism. Again this approach could be said to reflect a gendered 
perspective which entrenched a male orientation towards work. Indeed, it has 
been argued that the discourse of management itself is embedded with gendered 
ideas, such as the “masculine concern with personal power and the ability to 
control others and self” (Collinson and Hearn 1996 p.3). Far from being objective 
and detached, performance management and the construction of a good manager 
were deeply gendered. Women not only had to manage a workforce with 
particular perspectives, they also had to navigate in a role that was itself gendered.
The second claim was that managerialism provided an objective measure of 
performance. However, as was revealed by women managers, they perceived that 
they experienced greater resistance than their male colleagues and therefore had 
to work harder in order to compensate for this. As a result of this, quantitative 
measures not only masked these differences but also objectified and legitimised 
them, providing a basis for arguing that men were better managers. By focussing 
on measurement, the qualitative experience of work was obscured and hidden 
from view.  
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As a closing comment in this section, I wanted to draw upon an anecdote 
provided by an officer in one of the research sites. In this, the officer recounted 
how a colleague had challenged a visiting senior prison manager about changes 
such as improved services and care of prisoners and had criticised this to them as 
“feminising the Prison Service”. A number of elements of this were particularly 
salient. The term “feminising” was used as a pejorative term as if it was a 
distortion of the ‘true’ prison. It was also no coincidence that this term was used 
towards a senior manager who was a man and therefore the comment was 
intended to call into question his masculinity. It was also important that not only 
were people viewed in gender terms, but particular policies, practices and 
strategies were also imbued with a gender identity, in this case care for prisoners 
being attributed with female characteristics. The final observation was that this 
encroachment of gender, particularly female gender, was seen as a threat to order, 
control and traditional culture. What this anecdote exposed was that gender was a 
matter of power and culture, issues which were deeply embedded within the 
structures of prisons and within the identities of individual workers.
Prisons remain gendered organisations and machismo permeated individual views 
and behaviour, but also the structure of managerialism and the practices of prison 
management. Whilst many women were able to navigate the environment and 
were able to enjoy success, many experienced a general sense of resistance, 
dissonance and even marginalisation.             
Ethnicity
Ethnicity in the criminal justice system has been a pervasive issue relevant to 
every branch of the system (for example see Cavadino and Dignan 2007, Spalek 
2008). Black people and members of some minority ethnic communities have 
been significantly over-represented throughout the system. This was partly an 
outcome of the poverty and deprivation that they disproportionately experienced, 
and also a function of the increased policing and differential treatment they 
received. Similar ‘race penalties’ were replicated across society, including in the 
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occupational field (Modood 2000). For prison staff there has been a long-standing 
issue regarding under representation of minority ethnic groups and negative 
occupational experiences (Bhui and Fossi 2008). 
In prisons, the issue of ethnicity has undergone major change in how it has been 
represented and understood in official discourse. The period prior to the late 
1990s could be described as one of denial where it was not officially recognised 
that there were race issues in prisons and indeed it was more common to hear that 
there were no problems (McDermott 1990). The early development of race 
relations policies was largely peripheral and failed to address more fundamental 
issues of power and inequality (Alfred 1992). Following the Macpherson Inquiry 
(1999) which reported on the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence and the 
inadequate investigation by the Metropolitan Police, the Prison Service along with 
other public bodies publicly accepted that they were institutionally racist. This 
was defined by the Macpherson Inquiry as:
“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an 
appropriate and professional service to people because of their 
colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in 
processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to 
discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage 
minority ethnic people”. (ibid p.28)
The existence of institutional racism was confirmed by the judicial inquiry into 
the racist murder of Zahid Mubarek at Feltham prison in 2000 (Keith 2006). Since 
that time, there has been significant investment in race equality in prisons with the 
appointment of race equality officers and race equality action teams, and changes 
to policy and practice including a specific complaints process, more sophisticated 
monitoring and auditing, the introduction of equality impact assessments, and the 
establishment of a staff support group called RESPECT. Similar developments in 
the Metropolitan Police led the Chief Commissioner to claim that the term 
‘institutional racism’ was no longer “appropriate or useful” in describing the 
situation or motivating change (The Guardian 24th February 2009). No such 
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official claims have been made about prisons, instead the changes that have taken 
place over the last decade have been assessed as improving the situation but it has 
also been recognised that this has not transformed the experience of Black and 
minority ethnic staff and prisoners, who still experience racism, albeit in less 
overt and more subtle forms (National Offender Management Service 2008). For 
example, people from minority groups performed less well on selection and 
promotion assessments and received poorer appraisal markings (ibid). In addition, 
the under-representation of Black and minority ethnic staff has proven persistent. 
Between 2004 and 2008, despite improvements, the percentage of minority staff 
employed in the Prison Service remained below the national target (ibid), 
although in 2008-09 this target was finally met (National Offender Management 
Service 2009).     
Another extensive recent examination of the experience of prison staff was 
contained in a thematic review carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons 
(HMCIP 2005). The findings of this research showed that half of the Black and 
minority ethnic staff said that they had experienced racism from colleagues, 
whilst 36% said that they had experienced racism from prisoners. This racism 
could take the form of ‘jokes’ or ‘banter’ but could also take the form of concerns 
about their associating too closely with prisoners and being denied fair
opportunities to progress. There was also a more elusive and intangible way in 
which some staff from minority ethnic communities felt that they were treated or 
perceived differently as a result of underlying and unspoken prejudices.  These 
staff also reported that attempts to address racism, such as promoting diversity 
and monitoring the percentage of minority ethnic staff led to counter attacks in the 
form of claims that recruitment was manipulated to meet targets rather being 
based upon merit, and generalised claims that the race equality agenda was 
constricting and overbearing on the majority of staff. Staff from minority ethnic 
communities were generally less positive than their white counterparts in their 
perception of the treatment of minority ethnic prisoners. The report concluded that 
these staff had a poorer occupational experience and whilst some improvements 
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had been made, more attention needed to be paid to their emotional experience of 
work in order to provide better support and enhance their quality of working life.      
In this section, the diversity of the managerial cadre in the two prisons will be 
discussed as well as general attitudes towards managers from minority ethnic 
communities. The section will go on to explore the experiences of two prison 
managers from minority ethnic communities and discuss their encounters with 
resistance and their strategies for adapting to, coping with and navigating the 
challenges of the prison world. It will then go on to discuss some of the structural 
aspects of the work of prison managers including the managerial framework and 
the occupational ideal of a ‘good’ manager, exploring how these effected those 
managers and how they played a role in the dynamics of ethnicity in prisons.    
Processes of denial
The two prisons in this research study were located in rural areas with small 
ethnic communities. In both prisons there were few minority ethnic staff. In one 
site they comprised 1.8% of staff (n=5) and in the other 2.3% (n=9). In each site 
there was only one manager who was visibly Black or Asian. Some staff 
recognised that this limited exposure to diversity could have an impact on the 
views and behaviour of individuals as they may be unfamiliar with and insensitive 
towards ethnic diversity. For example, one officer commented:
“It’s how you’re brought up. Coming from this area of the 
country, you can quite easily be, not racist, but have racist 
tendencies, purely because of where you are. My kids have them 
and I try to knock it out of them. It’s purely because they go to a 
school in a backwater…there are no Black kids, there are no 
Asian kids, there are no Chinese kids. Everybody is white and 
80% of them come from farming backgrounds. At the age of eight 
or seven, to all of a sudden we had a Thai girl start and a Black 
lad start at school and it was a big thing. They were making 
statements or using names that in this PC world of ours are 
unacceptable, but they didn’t know, they didn’t mean anything by 
them, it wasn’t a racist comment, it was kids being kids. If they 
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were kids from a big estate in the city you can deem that as being 
racist because they are aware of what racism is.” (W28 officer) 
The majority of white managers recognised that ethnicity was an important issue, 
particularly as it had received high profile, senior level recognition in prisons. 
However, many also believed that this related to the past and that subsequent 
changes meant that discrimination had been reduced or even eliminated. Many 
managers engaged in literal denial (Cohen 2001) about the idea that there may be 
problems arising from ethnic differences. They would often argue “we don’t have 
a problem here”, “Their experience wouldn’t be different at all”, “I definitely 
know there isn’t racism in this prison”, “there certainly wouldn’t be a problem 
with the staff”, “they’ve had no issues”, “I don’t think they would be treated 
differently”, “I don’t think there would be any problems whatsoever”, “there is no 
racial discrimination”, “no issues at all”. There was a strong view that racism did 
not exist or was not an issue in the prisons. This was similar to the denial that had 
been noted in the late 1980s and early 1990s (McDermott 1990), however, 
whereas that denial was based upon the idea that there never had been any 
problems, contemporary denial was based upon the idea that historical problems 
had now been addressed and circumstances improved. 
A significant element of this claim of progress was based upon the development 
of managerial practices. Managers frequently cited that all managers would be 
judged against a widely accepted consensus as to what constituted a ‘good 
manager’ and the objectivity of performance measurement meant that there was 
equality of expectations and any differences in treatment could be justified. 
However, the way that this operated could vary. For example three comments 
from managers illustrated these views. The first described this directly:
“…the bottom line is, they have their job to deliver, they have 
their remit, they know their role, they know the end product 
that’s desired. It’s as simple as that.” (W2 principal officer)   
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The argument here was that there were objective standards against which 
performance was judged and they applied equally to everyone. According to this 
argument, managerialist measures have levelled the playing field.
The second comment focussed on how this operated in practice, describing how 
good performance could act as a protective factor:
“I don’t have a problem with anyone’s sexuality or gender or 
anything like that. A key for me is can they deliver what I’m 
looking for. Providing they can deliver in the manner I expect, I 
don’t have a problem with them.” (S9 governor grade)
This comment implied that there was both an objective performance criteria in 
terms of what was achieved, or ‘delivered’ and a cultural criteria relating to the 
“manner” in which that was done. Again this implied that there was a unitary and 
transparent set of criteria against which individuals could be objectively 
appraised. From this perspective, performance was a leveller and ‘good’ 
performance would outweigh any other factors. The achievement of results acted 
as a key to unlock the door to acceptance. If managers, including those from 
Black and minority ethnic communities met these prescribed standards, they
would be recognised and move beyond racial identity. However, lurking beyond 
this was the implication that in the absence of the right results lay a less 
supportive approach, even rejection.
The third comment also revealed a different approach:  
“If that person is managerially a tosser, it doesn’t matter 
whether they Asian, Chinese, transvestite, they’re just a fucking 
tosser.” (W5 governor grade)
The grouping together of ethnic groups with “transvestite” and the use of the term 
“fucking tosser” presented an air of mocking flippancy and implied a rejection of 
the idea of difference and diversity as legitimate. Again, it was underpinned by 
the notion that there was a unitary measure and a level playing field for all 
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managers. There was a more macho and punitive attitude contained here and 
appeared to imply that those who failed to measure up were susceptible to being 
degraded, derided and abused.
These comments suggested that there existed objective forms of measurement that 
provided a means through which individuals could overcome barriers such as 
prejudice, making it a matter for individuals to succeed through compliance and 
‘delivery’. This section will later explore whether there was a ‘level playing field’ 
and will use the experiences of two managers to illustrate these issues. 
Under the surface, the image of the progressive and fair organisation was exposed 
as being less complete than many of the statements by managers suggested. Many 
people held generalised and stereotypical views about ethnicity. For example, 
many people expressed political views that reflected racialised perspectives such 
as voicing  criticisms about ‘Indian call centres’ or the rights of migrants in the 
UK. Others also were sceptical about what they saw as ‘political correctness’ and 
claimed that this had become unbalanced to the extent that the white majority 
were powerless victims in the face of manipulative racial minorities. This was a 
form of interpretive denial where it was suggested that it was the majority who 
were at risk from the minority (Cohen 2001). 
As there were few Black or Asian prison managers, generalised views were often 
shaped by limited experience. This could be particularly damaging where those 
experiences had been difficult. Stories of perceived poor performance by Black 
and Asian managers were recalled at both prisons suggesting that these incidents 
had a deeper impact due to the relative rarity of having staff in those groups. 
Many of the criticisms of Black and minority ethnic managers revolved around 
the issue of what were perceived to be false claims of discrimination. It was 
described that such claims were used in a defensive way in order to deflect 
criticism of poor performance, or in a more instrumental way, attempting to gain 
advancement by threatening grievances or litigation. This moulded with another 
frequently heard criticism, which was that Black and Asian prison managers were 
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recruited to meet “targets” or as a result of “positive discrimination”. This view 
was based upon the existence of monitoring of HR practices and a KPT for the 
percentage of staff from Black and minority ethnic groups employed at each 
prison. These perceptions fed scepticism about the ability of Black and Asian 
prison managers and questioned whether they were in post on merit. Minority 
ethnic managers themselves raised this issue, feeling that they were undermined 
by rumours about this issue. Far from entering a level playing field, minority 
ethnic managers entered a working arena where they had to face greater scrutiny 
and had to overcome scepticism about their suitability for the job and the weight 
of institutional biography.  
Experiencing resistance 
Black and Asian managers described how they faced resistance in the same way 
as women managers; in subtle ways where authority was not given as a right but 
instead was contested, challenged and contingent. As one manager described:
“You know when you’re being challenged…it’s not overt, but 
you know it. You’re there, you’re being challenged, your 
authority is being challenged and there is an expectation from 
the group, what are you going to do about it? How are you going 
to handle it? The way you handle it will decide whether or not 
you get respect or whether it goes the other way. …we all know 
that this officer has said something or in his actions has 
challenged your authority, that he wouldn’t have challenged the 
SO who was on yesterday. As a female, or Black or something 
else that separates you from the rest of the group, how are you 
going to challenge it? How you challenge it will depend whether 
or not the respect comes.” (manager)
It was suggested that sometimes such resistance was fed by an underlying attitude 
towards ethnicity held by some members of staff, but not openly stated. It was 
also described that more senior managers were insensitive to how such resistance 
made achieving results more difficult and meant that some staff had to work 
harder to achieve the same ends. This was an example where the ‘objectivity’ of 
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performance management acted to obscure reality and entrench discrimination. 
This was described by one manager who reflected upon his own experiences:
“When I dealt with those kind of issues, it was at a time when 
there was no support structure…My own personal view is that I 
found that when I was challenged in that way, sometimes very 
openly challenged, there was no support from management. The 
expectation was get on with it…just get on with it, sort it. You’re 
still expected to deliver the job of any other SO but you find you 
have to work quite a lot harder at it, just to be seen as any other 
SO. You churn out more work that’s not taken into account 
you’re just regarded as any other SO, but you know that you’re 
doing more than the officer over there…It was if you don’t like 
the heat get out of the kitchen, that sort of thing.” (manager)
Acceptance only came after a prolonged period of absorbing and dealing with 
these difficulties and gradually achieving recognition as a manager. 
For managers in this situation, the fact that the prisons were located in rural 
communities with little diversity meant that there was little support. They were in 
“what is basically a white male environment”. Not only did they have little 
support in dealing with challenges, they also found that they had little support in 
championing them and accessing informal networks that assisted with 
progression.
Issues of ethnicity, however, were not simple. For some managers, their way of 
coping with difference was to deny or adapt to this. For example, one manager 
described himself as having “an amazing tan” and accentuated his regional British 
identity. His view was that nicknames relating to ethnicity were no different from 
those based upon British regional identity, such as Liverpudlian’s being called 
‘Scousers’. Some people constructed alternative identities in order to adapt to 
their circumstances. It was also widely recognised that challenges may come from 
prisoners who held prejudicial views or even targeted Black and Asian managers 
for particular vitriol for perceived betrayals to their ethnicity or potential 
vulnerability. Equally it was argued that some Black and Asian staff themselves 
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held prejudiced views about other identities such as gender and sexuality. These 
observations illuminated that there was not simply a Black and White dualism but 
instead there was complexity and diversity (Pilkington 2001).   
Discussion
Although this study included only two managers from minority ethnic 
communities, their experiences resonated with other studies of ethnicity in prisons 
and other workplaces (e.g. HMCIP 2005, National Offender Management Service 
2008). This section has described that despite progress, there remained denial, 
both literal and interpretive, regarding the issue of ethnicity. There also remained
attitudes and values that were either conducive to discrimination or hostile to the 
promotion of diversity. Many saw there being an objective standard against which 
individuals were judged encompassing both managerial performance and a shared 
cultural understanding of what was a ‘good’ manager. This widely held belief 
suggested that there was a level playing field for all managers. This belief acted to 
responsibilise minority ethnic managers, suggesting that it was for them to 
overcome prejudice through performance and that any failure to do so was a 
matter of personal competence. However, the reality of the experience of the two 
managers in this study suggested that this was problematic. On the one hand it 
was suggested that there was not a level playing field as they faced greater 
resistance and it was more difficult to achieve the ‘objective’ performance 
criterion. As a result, these managerial measures acted to obscure the issues, 
whilst also legitimising and entrenching discrimination. On the other hand, it was 
also suggested that diversity was not valued and promoted within the management 
cadre, but instead there was encouragement for a process of assimilation into a 
homogenised, dominant culture. Whilst laws, policies and processes have 
changed, it was these more subtle and unseen social factors that persevered in 
occupational groups, including prison managers.                
Sick absence
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Across organisations there is significant concern about absenteeism from work, 
particularly sick leave. Concerns often centre on waste and the costs in terms of 
loss of productivity and covering absences through overtime. There is also 
concern about the effects on individuals and the personal cost of ill health. As a 
result, most organisations have procedures to manage and minimise absenteeism. 
There has been particular criticism levied at the public sector, where persistently 
higher levels of average absenteeism than in the private sector have been 
described as “a sick joke” (Paton 2005). It is been estimated that £1.4 billion 
could be saved if public sector organisations matched the private sector average 
(Confederation of British Industry 2008). However, it has been suggested that 
when account is taken of demographic differences such as age, gender and size of 
organisation, the differences are negligible (Health and Safety Executive 2005). It 
has also been suggested that absenteeism is under-reported in the private sector 
and attendance is distorted by different policies, such as not paying the first three 
days of sick absence (ibid). It has further been argued that the nature of public 
service, including face-to-face contact with the public means that the work is 
more stressful but that despite these demands, public sector workers are more 
likely to report that they attend work whilst unwell (ibid).
There have been concerns expressed by employers in both the public and private 
sectors that sick absence procedures are abused. It has been estimated by 
employers that 12% of absenteeism is non-genuine (Confederation of British 
Industry 2008). This is not backed up by empirical evidence but is instead a 
reflection of the scepticism of managers.
This concern about the costs of ill-health is not exclusive to employers, but is also 
an issue of concern in relation to welfare and social security. Ericson (2007) 
argues that there is uncertainty about the cost of making welfare payments, but 
also about the diagnosis and assessment of incapacity. He suggests that this has 
led to the development of a system that restricts eligibility and stigmatises
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claimants. This is underpinned by a construction of incapacity as a “drain on 
collective prosperity” (p.73) and claimants as potential frauds.    
The response of the public sector to these issues has been to attempt to reduce 
absenteeism. New approaches include more intensive contact with people who are 
absent, closer adherence to procedures for warnings, more extensive use of 
occupational health referrals and greater scrutiny of suspicious patterns of absence 
(Ministerial Task Force for Health, Safety and Productivity and the Cabinet 
Office 2004). There have also been attempts to focus on creating longer term 
effects through improved occupational health services and working environments 
(ibid).
Prisons have historically had one of the highest levels of absenteeism in the public 
sector (Ministerial Task Force for Health, Safety and Productivity and the Cabinet 
Office 2004). As with other parts of the sector, there have been attempts to reduce 
this. New procedures were introduced in 2002 with tighter trigger points for 
warnings for short term absences and clearer processes for managing longer-term 
absences. The aim of the policy was described in the following terms:
“The P[rison] S[ervice] O[rder] is being introduced to 
strengthen the current arrangements for managing attendance. It 
increases the range of mandatory actions to tackle sickness 
absence and poor attendance. The PSO introduces the 
Attendance Score for assisting in the management of attendance. 
The aim of the new rules are to assist in reducing levels of 
sickness absence across the Prison Service” (HM Prison Service 
2002)   
There has been a consistent decline in the level of absenteeism in prisons between 
2002 and 2009, excluding a small rise in 2007-08. This has seen absenteeism fall 
from an average of 14.7 days per member of staff to 10.8 days (HM Prison 
Service 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, National Offender Management 
Service 2009)
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Revised procedures were introduced in 2008. These again made the trigger points 
for warnings more stringent and provided for clearer processes for long-term 
absences. However, the official aim of these policies articulated a more rounded 
approach emphasising both efficiency and support for employees:
“Policy on sickness absence is in place to ensure the smooth and 
efficient running of the Service whilst providing appropriate 
support for staff with health difficulties. The Service expects 
regular attendance at work of staff but does recognise that 
absence may be necessary on medical grounds and will respond 
sympathetically and supportively in returning staff back to work 
quickly where possible.” (HM Prison Service 2008b p.4)
As can be seen from this discussion, sick absence is seen as a “Leviathan” 
(Ericson 2007 p.31), a demon that threatens to engulf the economy and place the 
well-being of the majority in jeopardy. There are concerns both about the cost of 
absenteeism and the genuineness of it. There are attempts to reduce sick absence 
which focus on making procedures more punitive but there is also an emphasis 
placed upon prevention and supporting those in need. 
This section will discuss how sick absence was perceived and managed in prisons. 
It will start by describing how prominent sick absence was, how this was 
managed and what role this has in the working lives of prison managers. It will 
then go on to explore the perceived effects of absenteeism, what impact this had 
on teams, the organisation and individuals. The section will then discuss how 
those who take sick leave were perceived, the effect this had on their standing at 
work and how they were treated by managers. The attendance management 
procedures will then be discussed and in particular how these were perceived and 
used by managers. The section will close by discussing what the management of 
sickness and ill-health was able to illustrate about the nature of prison 
management and its effects. 
The impact of absenteeism
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Staff sick absence had a prominent place for prison managers in the two research 
sites. It featured at daily morning meetings where absentees and feedback on 
contacts would be read out and commented upon, full staff briefings where the 
absenteeism figures would be reported and feedback provided on the 
organisational impact, and there was even a notice at the entrance of one site
reporting the level of sick absence and the financial cost that this entailed. This 
not only took up a lot of time quantitatively, as will be discussed later this 
preoccupied managers and generated intense feelings.  
Much of the prominence and importance of sick absence was derived from it 
being a national priority that was reflected in performance management such as 
KPTs and the weighted scorecard, and managers were conscious of that. As one 
officer commented:
“I understand that it’s a lot more damaging to the governor than 
say a prisoner going over the wall, weighted scorecard-wise.”
(W3 officer)
Whilst this may not have technically been true, this comment did convey a sense 
of the widely held perception that managing and reducing sick absence was so 
important that it was coming close to being the raison d’être of prison 
management. 
Absenteeism also created knock on problems by jeopardising delivery and 
undermining the smooth operation of the prison. As one manager described: 
“The resources we have got are stretched and when somebody 
doesn’t turn in that’s something that isn’t being delivered and 
somewhere along the line that is something we are going to fail 
at. That time when we are stretched, some prisoner is going to be 
able to move drugs around the jail.” (S6 principal officer)
This comment illustrated that performance, order and control were all tied 
together in representing the effects of absenteeism. 
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Many managers commented that sick absence meant that other members of staff 
had to fill the gaps. Some managers referred to the past where they described that 
abuse of sick absence was common place. One stated:
“We’re not in the good old days where everyone’s allowed ten 
days sick, treat that as part of your annual leave entitlement. 
When I joined the Prison Service, that was it, everyone was 
entitled to ten days sick, you could almost pre-book it because 
someone else got overtime. That was probably one of those 
dodgy practices.” (W25 principal officer)
In the contemporary prison, there was no advantage to other colleagues from 
absenteeism as there was no longer unregulated overtime. Instead this had a direct 
and undesirable impact on colleagues who had to cover shortfalls. 
There were some mixed views about the effectiveness of the procedures. Some 
managers described that the procedures were too prescriptive with insufficient 
discretion. This meant that they sometimes found themselves issuing warning and 
taking other punitive action when they personally did not feel that it was justified. 
Some managers stated that they wanted discretion not to issue warnings where the 
absence was “genuine”. However, others found that the procedures were too 
bureaucratic, that there were a “lot of hoops to go through” and that great 
attention to detail was needed if the action was to be supported, it “needs to be 
spot on”. In the view of these managers, the system was too easy to manipulate. 
For example, some managers described how individuals were aware of the rules 
on sick leave warnings and would manage their absences around those 
procedures, so avoiding warnings or returning to duty before they incurred half 
pay. One manager described his frustrations: 
“I find it difficult to comprehend some of the integrity of staff 
sometimes going off duty. It seems to be the same old faces for a 
period of time, then you challenge them and they’re okay, you 
take your finger off and they’re back on it again. It’s managing 
those people, I don’t think we do it effectively. They do in the 
262
private sector, they’d manage them out the job very quickly. 
We’ve got all sorts of procedures in place we’re stuck with and it 
takes forever to remove these people. It’s frustrating for staff at 
ground level because they see these particular individuals, they 
know these particular individuals and they say why aren’t you 
doing something about that, he’s done it all his service, why 
aren’t you doing something about that. We are tied by our 
procedures and consultation we have to go through and the time 
it takes to get these people out of the service. I do find it 
frustrating.” (W30 governor grade)   
This frustration was underpinned by a sense of uncertainty and lack of control 
experienced by managers. For example, they felt that they lacked expertise and 
that medical knowledge and power limited what they could do. As one manager 
described:
“I need to take the officer’s statement that they are sick, because 
I’m not medically qualified to say ‘get in here, because you are 
not’. It’s annoying in that respect. We’ve got someone here at the 
moment who is playing that kind of game. He managed to talk his 
doctor into giving him a sick note at the start of his nights - that 
was a big struggle to cover that. Then once his nights had 
finished saying he was fit for duty. That’s annoying…It’s things 
like that that annoy you, but your hands are tied a bit as to what 
you can actually do.” (W22 senior officer)
Some of this uncertainty was also created by the legal constraints, including 
employment law and employee rights. This meant that there were checks and 
balances in the system before dismissal for absenteeism was considered. Another 
manager described how this combination of medical and legal constraint had been 
both a source of frustration to him, but also something he had used when he was 
unhappy with his own manager: 
“I laugh when we sit in the morning meetings and they say this 
person has gone to level 5, how many levels are there? I don’t 
blame people for abusing the system when they can abuse the 
system and nothing happens to them…there’s a nucleus of people 
who take the mick and know they can get away with it. I think 
that if anything went the wrong way for me and I was in my last 
six months [before retirement] I’d say…I’ll join that band of 
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sickies and there’s nothing they can do because I know that in six 
months time I can just get my pension because they can’t get rid 
of me. A lot of doctors will just give sick notes out. I’ve seen it, 
I’ve once done it myself where I put the doctor under a bit of 
pressure and he gave me a sick note…” (W12 governor grade)
As managers were not in a position to directly assess absenteeism because of their 
lack of medical expertise and because of the legal constraints placed upon their 
actions, they felt frustrated and powerless. 
In managing sick absence, managers often described that the appropriate approach 
was to be “robust” but fair and to follow the laid down procedures. There was 
much macho and punitive language used in relation to sick absence management, 
such as “pursuing” individuals, calls to “get a grip” of cases and targeting 
individuals who were “in my eyeline”. Robustness was seen as the need to take a 
hard approach towards the difficult decisions. Many saw the answer to the 
problem of sick absence in reducing the rights of employees and increasing the 
use of what were seen as commercial practices, such as stopping pay for absences 
and dismissing people more easily. 
It can be seen that absenteeism had a managerial impact for the organisation, but 
also that it was represented as causing problems in terms of control and security 
and for staff more generally. It had become an issue that was no longer looked 
upon in a universally sympathetic way within prison officer culture as it violated 
norms regarding staff cohesion and undermined the ability of staff to manage 
prisoners effectively. These two strands combined to produce a negative 
organisational response to absenteeism in which there was frustration about 
bureaucracy and the lack of immediacy in tacking action against individuals. 
Managers craved greater control and certainty and saw this as available through 
reduced rights for absentee staff and the use of more punitive responses.
The emotional texture of managing ill-health
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The degree to which sick absence was central to the working world of prison 
managers and their own ‘working personality’ was evident in the intensity of the 
emotions they expressed regarding this issue. The way that managers talked about 
their own attendance and that of other people was heavy with emotion and value 
judgements. This section will explore those feelings and will also explore the 
experiences of those at the receiving end of attendance management procedures. 
Managers often stated a strong personal commitment to avoiding sick absence, 
they were often able to cite how many days sick absence they had during their 
career and this was worn as a badge of honour providing an example of their 
commitment, professionalism and machismo. For example comments heard 
included: “I’ve never had a sick day in my life”, “I can’t remember the last day I
had sick”, “I don’t do sick, personally”, “I’m very rarely sick”, “I have never been 
one for taking sick”, “I’ve never had a day off personally in almost 20 years”, 
“it’s not in my nature to play the sick, I won’t take sick unless I’m on death’s 
door”. 
Managers were often critical of those who did take sick leave. Several managers 
described their feelings in intense and emotional phrases and one even went as far 
as declaring: “I hate people that go sick”. Absenteeism was seen by some not as a 
health issue, but an issue of character and those who did take sick leave were 
often described as having a poor “attitude” or lacking commitment, other 
managers went further, for example, one described those who went onto sick 
leave as having “a lack of gumption, lack of comradeship, totally sticking two 
fingers up at people” (W7 governor grade). Some of those who were on sick leave 
were described in terms equating them to prisoners, for example suggesting that 
they “address his offending behaviour” and that an individual was “a drain on my 
limited resources”, appropriating a phrase used to describe difficult prisoners.  
Within the cultural context, this can be seen as a response rejecting those taking 
sick leave and casting them out of the occupational group.
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However, when individual cases were explored in more detail, there was not a 
simple formula that all sick absence was bad. Instead, there was a distinction that 
arose between what might be termed ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ absenteeism. 
Deserving sick absence was that which was related to serious accidents, injuries 
or serious ill health and operations. This was seen as undisputable and clear. 
However, other sick absence, particularly short term sick absence was viewed 
more sceptically. This was summed up in the words of one manager who said:
“I accept when someone is really ill, I’ve had staff off with heart 
attacks, and you go all out to support them, I’ve had staff off with 
serious bouts of depression a male member of staff and that hit 
that person very hard, again, supported them and worked very 
hard to get them back to work at the right time for them. I’ve had 
staff off with a broken leg, they were off for a while. I’ve also got 
what I call piddly widdly peripheral sickness which sometimes is 
just people can’t be fagged to get out of bed because it’s been a 
good weekend or it’s going to be a nice weekend.” (W21 non-
operational manager)
Those that were off for ‘deserving’ absences generally had problems that were 
serious, visible and quantifiable. This was summed up by one manager who said:
“It’s frowned on, people don’t like people to go sick. I can 
understand from a business point of view, and I guess I can 
understand from a detailing point of view that sick can cause its 
own problems. However, the only thing I do struggle with is that 
it can take away the humanity bit. Some people do get poorly, 
everybody becomes ill at some point, and sometimes through no 
fault of their own they might break something, they might have a 
car accident, they might be assaulted, they might have a heart 
attack.” (S13 senior officer)
These cases were talked about in positive terms and this was often described as 
“genuine” sick absence. The individuals concerned were often offered supportive 
visits and were talked about positively, both in terms of their recovery and 
attitude, with comments such as “she’s eager to get back”, “he’s keen to get 
back”. Such people did not have their character questioned but instead received 
positive support.
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This was not a view that was universally applied to long term sick absence cases. 
Some people were criticised for their previous record of absences, where they had 
“cried wolf too many times”. There was particular ambiguity around the issue of 
absence for stress-related reasons. There were cases were this was viewed as 
‘genuine’ and dealt with supportively, but others were seen in more negative 
terms and individuals described as “bone idle”, unsuited to prison work, or simply 
acting churlishly in response to management decisions. This was summed up by 
one manager who discussed this issue:
“There are people who are genuine, who may have had a major 
operation, who do need time to adjust, there are people who may 
have broken down due to mental health problems and we need to 
be very sensitive of that, but some jump on the bandwagon when 
they experience pressure. The word stress can be used like the 
word flu. If you’ve got flu you’re in bed, if you’re stressed that 
bad you’re in bed. I’ve seen people stressed out and I know what 
stress is, I’ve seen people with flu and I know what flu is. These 
words get bandied about. Someone says “I had flu yesterday I’ve 
miraculously recovered”. “I’ve been so stressed out I just 
needed to have a month off”, “did you have any treatment or 
anything?”, “no the doctor said I just need a break”, bloody 
hell, don’t we all need a break?” (S8 governor grade)
Short-term sick absence was criticised more vocally. This was described in such 
terms as “swinging the lead”, “taking the piss”, “lazyitis”, “skiveritis”, 
“malingerers”, “shysters”, “shirkers”. One manager made a typical comment that 
“Staff do take the piss going sick at the drop of a hat” (W7 governor grade). Such 
absence was often treated with disdain, scepticism and mockery, for example: 
“I can’t abide ad hoc, single days sick for all sorts, it’s the 
anniversary of the dogs death and that sort of thing, and the wife 
was upset – get a life. I’m sorry, that’s the way I am.” (S6 
principal officer)
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This short term absenteeism was where it was most keenly perceived as a matter 
of character and managers described that they set high standards for themselves 
and others. One manager commented:
“As an ex-military man you drag yourself into work and if you 
can’t perform at work, there’s two sides if you get yourself in 
you’ve tried your best then you go home I think yes okay at least 
you’ve tried your best, your managers can see that. There are 
others, I’m not talking about extreme cases, but people say 
they’ve got flu or a cold and they’ve got a runny nose and they 
say their not coming to work. One example was a young officer’s 
mother phoned up on the Wednesday to say he had a migraine 
and he wouldn’t be back until the Friday. That’s a hell of a 
migraine for 72 hours.” (S1 senior officer)
Managers also described how they lived these standards and would come into 
work when unwell. For example, one commented:
“I very much subscribe to the view that if you’re sick you should 
be off work, but at the same time if you wake up a bit ropey, like I 
did this morning, you still come into work because if you’re 
ropey you can still do your job effectively. I’m very much of the 
opinion if you’re sick you should be off but if you’re not sick you 
should be in.” (W27 officer)
Another also described how they suffered for their work:
“I can’t live with people who phone in with headaches, who 
phone in a little bit unwell, we all feel unwell sometimes, 
sometimes the majority of the week.” (S8 governor grade) 
Sometimes these expectations would be pushed beyond the realms of 
reasonableness. For example one manager suggested: 
“Sick to me means you are unable to carry out your day-to-day 
work, you can sit at home with diarrhoea or you can have 
diarrhoea here, it doesn’t stop you doing your job.” (S9 
governor grade)
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One issue that underpinned this attitude to absenteeism was scepticism about the 
genuineness of sick absences. It was sometimes claimed that this exploited as a 
way to avoid undesirable management action, pursue other interests such as 
employment or education, avoid working at times such as the Christmas period, or 
attend to domestic issues such as childcare. This scepticism was not unique to 
prisons, but it has been described by Ericson (2007) that this is a means to cope 
with uncertainty. He has described in relation to the welfare system that: 
“The over-arching myth of the war on social benefits fraud is 
that all social benefits are a kind of fraud against the well-being 
and prosperity of society as a whole.” (ibid p.117)
He suggests that this is then used to justify more intensive surveillance and more 
punitive action. This can also be seen in prisons with the greater use of 
occupational assessment, management scrutiny and disciplinary responses to 
absenteeism.     
So far, the discussion has focussed on managers and their perceptions of 
attendance. However, it is also important that the experience of those who were 
being managed is considered. As has been described earlier, people did admit 
abusing the sick leave system, sometimes in the past as part of a wider ‘overtime 
culture’, but also as a form of resistance to what were perceived as unfair 
managerial decisions or behaviours. Other members of staff talked about more 
mundane absences and how they were treated. Two officers described how they 
had been affected by being challenged about their sick absence. At one prison, an 
officer described that after completing their probation without any health 
problems, they had then had some short term absences due to an ongoing medical 
condition:
“In two or three months, I had three sets of two days off. I wasn’t 
happy with how that was dealt with when I came back because I 
was told ‘you got through your year probation without being 
sick, now you’re sick all the time. If you are sick one more time 
you’ll be put on this monitoring’…I did feel a bit intimidated and 
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I got a bit upset because if I was able to come to work I would 
come to work…I said this to them and they said ‘fair enough’, 
but I did then feel that if I was ill I had to come to work. I felt a 
bit pressured that I was letting the side down by being sick and it 
was being noticed by people, so I would come in if I was feeling 
absolutely rubbish, if I was feeling miserable and ill…I did feel 
that he pushed us on whether it was a valid reason not to be at 
work. I did feel like I was being called a liar. I did feel 
uncomfortable and I did have a little cry afterwards… I felt 
bullied, very much so.” (W17 officer)
In this comment can be seen the scepticism and ‘robustness’ of the management 
response, with the attendance being challenged directly. There was also the 
cultural pressure to support the team and not let anyone down. This created a 
feeling in the individual that they had to attend work even when unwell. These 
practices were being pressed on this officer at the earliest stage of their career in 
an attempt to shape and induct them.  
Another officer described that she was dismissed for taking sick leave during her 
probation period, although she was later reinstated. She described that this was 
linked to how she was perceived more generally and her view that she was not 
accepted by the staff group:
“When I first started the job…I had a very unfortunate run of 
five days off sick over four separate incidents. Because the wing I 
worked on was very cliquey and the staff were very established 
and had opinions that were put onto the PO, it was 
recommended that I was dismissed…I was sacked, it took me 
three months to get my job back for five days sick over four
[periods]. There was one where I wrote my car off on the way to 
work, I was back at work the next day…I just felt there would 
have been other ways for him to have dealt with it, and my line 
manager didn’t think it would go that far. Other senior officers 
on the wing had already made judgement of me. It has been said 
to me off the record that it was a personality thing rather 
anything else and the sick was just used as an excuse. That 
brings me round to their integrity and professionalism.” (S28 
officer) 
270
She also described that although her absences were for genuine reasons, there was 
scepticism about her attendance:             
“There were rumours and everything...everyone thought that I 
was pulling a fast one and the rumours went round I was 
blagging it…So the rumours, you get tarred as a blagger and if 
you are genuine it’s not right, if you are blagging then fair 
enough.” (S28 officer)
Again there was a pattern of scepticism, ‘robustness’ and early induction into a 
macho culture where sick absence was not tolerated.
Discussion
In concluding, the first observation is how the general perception of sick absence 
has changed over time. There was a time where sick absence was seen as 
beneficial both as additional annual leave for those taking it and additional 
earning opportunities through overtime for those who were at work. However, as 
overtime had been abolished and staffing levels had become more tightly 
managed, this meant that the interests of staff shifted. As a result, sick absence not 
only lost its benefits, but started to become problematic for the wider staff who 
found themselves having to work additional time (with no overtime payment but 
instead time off in lieu) or work harder to complete the work that was required. 
The general prison officer culture has therefore shifted from a pressure to take 
sick leave to a pressure to avoid it. This was reinforced through the managerial 
architecture, where managers were conscious of the impact on the organisational 
of sick absence.    
The issue of absenteeism had a particular intensity for managers due to the 
uncertainty that it engendered. They lacked the medical expertise to make 
informed judgement but instead relied upon the vagaries of self reported ill-health 
or medical certificates. This uncertainty then became emotionally charged and 
managers felt scepticism. The response of managers to this drew upon both 
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managerialism and traditional culture. In terms of managerialism, there was a 
wide range of obligations, assessments, warnings and sanctions that enabled the 
policing and control of individuals. In more traditional terms, there was a 
machismo and punitiveness in their responses, with absentees being recast as an 
out-group akin to prisoners. For those who took sick leave, there were some who 
admitted that they had used this as a form of resistance however others described
how they were stigmatised and felt that they were treated unreasonably.
Whilst the management of attendance has become a primary focus of 
contemporary prison managers, their approach has largely been informed by a 
greater focus on compliance with procedures and an emotional ‘othering’ of those 
who took sick leave. In this context, this change may have reduced the level of 
absenteeism, but did not appear to have done so by improving health, but instead 
had potentially done so by accepting, ignoring or even perpetuating harm.  
Non-operational managers
Not all managers belonged to what were known as the ‘unified grades’ i.e. officer 
or governors. Those managers who were not in uniform or were not governor 
grades were described in prison parlance as non-operational managers, or 
sometimes “civilians” or “civvies”. Their roles included posts such as finance, 
human resources, learning and skills, chaplaincy, psychology and offender 
management. These roles broadly encompassed organisational management and 
regime delivery for prisoners. 
In a traditional, insular and tight knit prison culture, they were perceived as being 
distinct. The term ‘non-operational manager’ defined them negatively, by what 
they were not rather than what they were, by what they could not do rather than 
what they could, and by their incompetence rather than their competence. This 
also represented them as a coherent group, rather than reflecting the diversity of 
skills and professions involved. The terms ‘civilian’ or ‘civvies’ emphasised that 
they did not belong to the inner culture but were outsiders. However, with the 
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development of managerialism, it could be anticipated that roles such as finance 
and human resource management would become increasingly important as they 
related to core management and organisational functions. Similarly, roles such as 
psychology and learning and skills could be anticipated to derive power from their 
expertise and their importance to ‘reducing reoffending’ and delivering targets in 
those areas. It could be anticipated that there may be some tensions between 
inclusion and exclusion, between managerial and traditional approaches. 
This section will explore the experiences of non-operational managers, focussing 
on what many of them described as the difficulties of adapting to and being 
accepted within the prison culture and how this influenced their professional 
identity. These effects will be particularly drawn out by using an example of the 
role of Head of Learning and Skills (HoLS). The experience of HoLS was 
described by one such post holder as one that: “shows all of the Prison Service’s 
desire to do good but exposes all of its weaknesses”. 
Case Study: Head of Learning and Skills
The HoLS role was originally introduced into all prisons in order to improve the 
quality of education provision and the availability of accredited work training and 
education (Bayliss and Hughes 2008). The posts were funded by the then 
Department of Education. The recruits generally were drawn from two pools, one 
being educationalists from the community coming into prisons for the first time, 
and the second being established education managers who transferred in from 
contract providers. 
There was a contrast between those who had previous experience of prisons and 
those who did not. Those that did not found that they experienced a wall of 
hostility to this centrally prescribed change, some of this related to resentment 
about pay and grading, and some revolved around confusion about the role. As 
one HoLS suggested, they were confronted with the questions: “well who are you, 
what are you, why are you here and where the hell am I going to put you?”. They 
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felt that they faced “brick walls” and resistance and as a result became frustrated. 
Some also found themselves not fitting in culturally because of the accents with 
which they spoke and the language they used. They were described as moving 
from a “touchy feely…hugely PC” working world in education into “a macho set 
up distrustful of academics”. Their expertise was contained, for example, some 
managers felt that as operational management took priority they were not afforded 
the recognition of their professional status, were unable to effect change as they 
carried little authority in the eyes of the general staff group, and that their 
expertise was generally undervalued. This could be reflected symbolically in, for 
example, which offices they were allocated, where they were based in the prison, 
whether their views were adopted in meetings and whether they were able to 
influence the organisation more generally.
Those who had previous prison experience were often more sanguine about the 
secondary position they held in the prison and were pragmatic about this. For 
example, one HoLS commented:
“The operational grades have to come first because that’s what 
we primarily do, then you’ve got personnel and finance, they are 
the people that can actually make things happen. Then you’ve 
got the other roles that are appreciated. I feel appreciated and 
valued, but to a certain extent I’ve got to be a bit on the edge 
because I’m not operational.”  (HoLS 1)
For those HoLS that entered the prison by external routes, they experienced 
‘culture shock’ as they were faced with resistance, marginalisation and a new 
cultural milieu, which was often in contrast with both their previous occupational 
experiences and their expectations. Similar experiences were also discussed in 
relation to other non-operational managers who had joined from external routes 
such as probation managers, psychologists and human resource specialists.
The HoLS also reported that over time their role changed in ways that conflicted 
with their expectations and diluted their expertise. Some of these changes were 
structural, for example many HoLS took on additional responsibilities for areas 
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such as workshops, health and safety and catering. However, some welcomed this 
as an opportunity to influence the prison more widely. As one HoLS described:
“Very soon, within a matter of weeks, this ring-fenced job called 
head of learning and skills, the clever governors thought, what 
the hell is a head of learning and skills?...They can take over 
activities, resettlement, regimes. Suddenly this individual was 
being spread far and wide. In some ways that was no bad thing 
[because] a head of learning of skills [could] start influencing 
heads of activities or industries, or resettlement or regimes to 
start saying, look you’ve got to start delivering qualifications in 
your contract packing shop and the guys that clean the landings 
have got to get BICS14… if you’re …actually there line managing 
it it’s a lot easier. But that wasn’t the intention.” (HoLS 2)
In more subtle ways, professional identity became diluted. In particular, HoLS 
found that their focus on quality and their professional expertise was not valued in 
itself. Their influence relied upon external political importance from senior 
managers and organisations such as HMCIP, or the importance of the targets that 
they were responsible for achieving. This was summed up by one HoLS as: “[The 
Governor] knows the value of, if not education per se, then the KPT’s I am 
responsible for”. This was also reported by other non-operational managers, 
including psychologists who were aware of the double edged nature of KPTs for 
offending behaviour programmes, which gave them influence but narrowed their 
professional range and reduced their role to that of a provider of specified 
product.      
By generalising the role of HoLS through expanding responsibilities and 
focussing on managerial targets, expertise and power was reduced. Ultimately this 
had led to resistance and subversion where managers with no educational 
background started to be recruited into some HoLS posts, indicating the degree to 
which they had been generalised.
                                               
14 Recognised qualifications in industrial cleaning
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Another way in which HoLS roles became diluted was in the relationship with 
their wider profession. HoLS described that they could become distanced and 
detached from the wider teaching community, describing themselves as “on a 
limb”. Whilst there was some connection through previous contacts and through 
professional events, this was not strong and enduring. As a result, they lacked 
collective cohesion and felt isolated. This atomisation of the professional group 
weakened their ability to collectively resist the changes that took place.  
Although HoLS felt detached from their profession and found their expertise 
diluted, that is not to say that they felt that they were powerless. They also 
described how they were able to overcome barriers in facilitating learning and 
skills and supporting creativity. Some HoLS saw their role as maintaining a 
diverse curriculum and “guarding against the unremitting diet of maths and 
English”.  For example, one manager introduced a music course by presenting it 
as “music with key skills”, so smuggling this within the restrictive contract for 
education provision. Non-operational managers were also able to import and 
maintain a space for dialogue that reflected their wider professional concerns. 
This could be heard in terms such as “defensible decisions”, “evidence based 
practice” and “reflective practice”, which were brought from probation and 
psychology, and reflected quality and professional expertise rather than 
pragmatism. As has been described above, some managers also used their 
managerial cache in order to exert influence, in particular through KPTs. Some 
roles were able to exert a sustained influence, in particular human resources and 
finance, where authority had been delegated and their skills were needed to 
manage prison performance generally.     
   
Discussion
In conclusion, traditionally non-operational managers had been marginalised as 
being outside of the prison officer occupational culture. The process of 
managerialism enabled them to enhance their influence and role, particularly 
through KPTs. However, there has also been a movement towards neutralising 
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their expertise and diluting their specialism. This process has taken place through 
broadening their responsibilities, focussing on targets and detaching them from 
their wider professional bodies. 
Conclusion
It was widely suggested by managers that managerialism, particularly through 
performance measurement, provided a ‘level playing field’, a means through 
which equality could be promoted through the objective or even scientific basis 
upon which it rested. However, the preceding discussion in this chapter has set 
out to explore groups who do not experience equality and fairness but instead 
reported experiences of psychological harms. The consequences of these harms 
included that individuals became alienated from their work and colleagues, had 
their potential curtailed, experienced a dilution in their sense of professional 
identity, and suffered ill-health. These were the hidden injuries of prison 
management.
Some of these injuries arose from the structural aspects of prison management. 
For example, the prominence that was given to absenteeism in measurements such 
as the weighted scorecard deliberately sent a strategic message to managers about 
the need to address and reduce this, and they were provided with tools such as 
medical assessments and warnings. Structures such as quantitative performance 
measures also provided the means through which professional expertise was 
diluted. These structures both directed and provided the means to perpetuate the 
harms disclosed.
However, most of the injuries could not be attributed to the structure of prison 
management alone, but also related to the cultural context. This could be seen in 
machismo that shaped a gendered workplace, the insularity and close knittedness 
of the staff that resisted ethnic diversity, and the valuing of ‘operational’ work 
that diminished the status of ‘non-operational’ employees. These harms emerged 
from a traditional prison officer culture.
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These two factors also combined to consolidate and perpetuate harms. In 
particular, performance management provided an appearance of objectivity. This 
did not take account of the resistance experienced by particular groups or their 
reduced power. Instead, this was masked and performance figures could provide a 
justification for less favourable treatment based on the ‘objective’ information 
available. The consequences of this were that managerialism could act to obscure 
and entrench harms.       
The hidden injuries of prison management were both new and old. Traditional 
harms, such as gender and ethnic discrimination, and the marginalisation of non-
operational staff were maintained. New harms were also created, or at least 
intensified, in particular ill-health had emerged as a new leviathan, created by 
both managerialism and aspects of traditional culture. All of this is not to suggest 
that prison management was unremittingly harmful. As has been described, there 
were those who found this empowering or successfully overcame obstacles or 
resisted effectively. However, what this discussion has attempted to do is to 
challenge the myth of the equality and objectivity and instead to expose how 
particular groups experienced harms that were hidden but nevertheless intense and 
painful.    
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Chapter 8
Prison Managerialism and Beyond
This study of prison managers has been situated in the wider context of 
contemporary social life. It has been an attempt to understand how the 
constellations of forces that have characterised late modernity have come to bear 
in a particular place and at a particular time. 
In an attempt to capture the lived experience, a novel methodological approach 
has been taken. In particular, the research strategy included not only interviews, 
but also observational data, taking an ethnographic approach, which has been 
noticeably absent from UK studies of prison managers. This study has sought to 
take a wider view of what constitutes a ‘prison manager’. It has not limited this 
to elites such as governing governors as most previous studies have (e.g. Bryans 
2007). Instead, it has sought to engage with the experiences of all managers, 
uniformed and non-uniformed, from senior officers to the most senior governors. 
The complexities of the work of prison managers have been revealed through this 
detailed and in-depth exploration of them as micro actors and the daily flow of 
their working lives. This has illuminated a series of dualities and dialectical 
relationships that are at the core of prison management. Most importantly, this 
has captured the tensions, accommodations and co-existence of globalised 
practices, particularly managerialism, with localised practices informed by a 
traditional prison officer culture. In addition it has shown how prison managers 
creatively negotiate a role balancing these forces so as to create a sense of 
professional identity. In doing so, they are at times both enabling and constrained 
by the forces pressing upon them.       
In this closing chapter, the main themes and implications of the study will be 
drawn together. The first part will define and discuss the central characterisation 
of contemporary prison management, which has been developed here. That has 
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been described as ‘prison managerialism’. The chapter will then go on to discuss 
the effects of this mode of practice for prison managers themselves, for prisoners 
and for society more generally. Finally, this chapter will close with some 
comments on developments following the completion of the study and considers 
potential futures as well as drawing out some ideas about how the findings of this 
study could be applied in practice in order to create alternative possibilities.            
What is prison managerialism?
The most significant finding of this study was that the role of prison managers, 
their occupational culture and identity was shaped by what has been called 
‘prison managerialism’. At the most general level, this described a combination 
of the forces of managerialism, such as performance measurement, efficiency 
and instrumental techniques, and a traditional prison culture shaped by an 
occupational insularity, a particular perception of staff-prisoner relationships as 
being distant with the prisoner cast as the ‘other’, and machismo. The term 
‘prison managerialism’ is intended to convey a sense of the dialectical 
relationship between an identifiable globalised pattern of practice, in this case 
managerialism, and elements of localised culture. The nature of prison 
managerialism will be considered further in this section.
The relationship between managerialism and the traditional prison officer culture 
was not rigid, fixed and impermeable. Nor was it solely characterised by new 
practices being met with conflict, subversion or resistance.  Instead, there was a 
dynamic and complex relationship which included tensions but also included 
adaptation and mutual reinforcement. In chapter 4, there was an examination of 
performance management architecture in prisons, which was the manifestation 
par excellence of managerialist practices. Whilst this had changed the practice of 
managers and the nature of their work, it had also been implemented in ways that 
reinforced and reflected traditional prison officer culture. For example, those 
measures that drew upon the direct contribution of prisoners or were perceived to 
be biased towards the interests of prisoners were denigrated and given less 
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attention than those that were seen to serve the interests of managers and prison 
staff. Machismo was also seen in the way that certain targets were pursued with 
aggression and a determination to succeed even if that was at a cost to the 
individual themselves or others. Whilst the development and operation of 
performance management had changed the nature of prison work, it was 
contextualised within and shaped by an existing local culture. In chapter 5, the
space for individualism and the exercise of choice by prison managers were 
considered. This illustrated that rather than being characterised by moral 
pluralism and competing ethical viewpoints as has been previously suggested 
(e.g. Rutherford 1993a), managers’ choices were largely patterned with a view 
towards the organisational priorities and the needs of staff. These concerns were 
embodied by prison managers and this was expressed through their professional 
practice. Again, though, the relationship was varied and complex, with managers 
often having to search for and create ways in which the managerial needs of the 
organisation and the cultural expectations of prison officers could be balanced 
and met. Chapter 6 offered an insight into the practices of managers in managing 
staff, teams and prisoners. It was possible to see ways in which managers acted 
in accordance with cultural expectations, such as consulting with staff and 
building good relationships, but also were aware of how these could have an 
instrumental benefit in achieving managerial ends. Equally, there were practices 
where traditional culture flourished, such as the ways that managers used cultural 
displays such as carrying out prison officer work or challenging prisoners in 
order to demonstrate their affinity with staff. This was largely independent of 
managerial concerns, but did gain some support from contemporary human 
resource management ideas of leadership and emotional connectedness between 
managers and staff. In relation to prisoners, both managerialism with its 
economic rationale and traditional culture with its ‘othering’ of prisoners both 
coalesced to maintain the dominant power relations between staff and prisoners. 
The effects of this were explored in chapter 7, which highlighted that ‘prison 
managerialism’, was not socially neutral and objective, but instead was 
embedded in both global and local power structures, including gender, ethnicity, 
and traditional occupational culture. This brief summary of the four empirical 
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chapters has been intended to provide a concise illustration of the complex but 
pervasive relationship between managerialism and traditional prison officer 
culture.              
This relationship reflected the nature of globalisation and the conditions of late 
modernity more generally. Managerialism has been a form of globalised practice, 
spreading across nations and organisations, forming a homogenised mode of 
practice. However, globalised practices have not swept away what has gone 
before but instead they have interacted with local traditions (Giddens 2002), 
which are “ubiquitous and commonplace” (Kennedy 2010 p.7).  It has been 
suggested that global forces have shaped employment practices less than has 
been commonly suggested and that traditional modes of practice such as secure 
tenure and inward national investment are still dominant (Doogan 2009). In 
affective and cultural terms, it has been argued that local practices exercised 
“powerful centripetal tendencies and attraction, pulling us inwards” (Kennedy 
2010 p.7). Further, it has also been suggested that the insecurity created by new 
managerial and global forms of operation has led people to cling more tightly to 
traditional cultural practices as a way of retaining a sense of place and identity 
(Sennett 1998). These arguments illustrated that globalisation was incomplete 
and coexisted with localised practices. That is what was reflected in this study, 
where traditional culture had remained strong and although had been changed 
and constrained by new practices of managerialism, it had also been adapted, 
incorporated and enlisted so that it had continued to form a central part of prison 
life. This suggested that the essential nature of the late modern prison should not 
be viewed as a complete transformation but instead should be seen as being 
located in the dialectical interaction between global and local factors.   
For prison managers, there have been changes in what can be described as their 
‘working personality’ or habitus, that is their sense of values, actions, practices 
and they way that they embody these. Managerialism has been adopted and 
absorbed by managers in their sense of professional identity. They recognised 
that this was important in their work; they were expected to meet targets and they 
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were accountable for this. However, this was not simply a quantitative or 
technical change in their practices, instead managers actively engaged with these 
new modes of operation and felt a deep personal commitment to achieving them. 
At times, this constrained them from acting in ways that they would otherwise 
have chosen to, at other times it gave them a thrill to pursue and meet targets and 
some also felt that meeting targets was more important than their own personal 
health and well being. Managerial practices had become embedded in the identity
of prison managers. 
However, this was not the whole picture. Traditional prison officer culture
retained an important place in prison managers’ working lives. The continuing 
importance of prison officer culture is something that has been neglected in 
previous accounts of prison management, for example it was absent from 
Rutherford’s (1993a) study of criminal justice managers, although elements of 
traditional culture may be discerned from what he described as those subscribing 
to ‘credo one’, which encompassed punitive attitudes. This may have been 
influenced by the time at which the research took place. In 1987, the hierarchical 
structure of prisons changed, so that the officer and governor grade ranks became 
unified (HM Prison Service 1987). Prior to that there were distinct rank 
structures and this meant that most governors had not worked as prison officers, 
but this changed as a result of the reforms. Rutherford’s work took place shortly 
after this change and therefore the changes would have had limited impact. By 
the time of Bryans (2007) research at the turn of the century, he was able to 
identify ‘Chief Officers’ who made much of their display of affinity with prison 
officer culture. However, he did not draw this out more broadly and largely 
restricted this to a particular ‘type’ of manager.  In the research sites, the majority 
of managers had worked as prison officers and carried not only their experiences 
with them, but also an embedded sense of the prison and those who lived and 
worked there. This was imported into their management role. This was also 
reinforced through their working relationships with prison staff. Managers 
needed the co-operation of staff to succeed and therefore actively sought to 
harness their support by appealing to their needs and values, but managers were 
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also influenced and shaped by those they managed through a dialectic of control. 
This was also part of the habitus or ‘working personality’ of prison managers. 
This study suggests that, despite the widespread transformations in practice 
through the growth of managerialism, traditional prison culture has retained its 
importance. As this aspect has often been overshadowed by the prominence 
given to the overpowering effects of globalised practices such as managerialism, 
it may not be immediately obvious why such localised practices should have 
been sustained. It is suggested here that there are three main reasons why this has
been the case. The first was that there was importation of prison officer culture 
into management grades as a result of organisational changes which created a 
unified structure and provided opportunities for progression (HM Prison Service 
1987). This had, over time, led to a blurring of distinctions and a smoothing of 
differences between managers and officers. The second reason was that 
engagement with prison officer culture was necessary for instrumental reasons. 
In order to achieve managerial targets, managers sought the co-operation and 
consent of those they managed. This required negotiation and involved a 
dialectic of control. As a result, managers used their cultural affinity, or at least 
displays of this, in order to secure consent. The third reason was that managers 
sought a sense of identity and belonging. Managerialism brought with it a more 
atomised occupational group, insecurity about reputation and position, and a 
reduced sense of professional distinctiveness. Prison officer culture provided 
certainty, familiarity and continuity in a more uncertain world.    
The nature of ‘working personality’, balancing as it did managerialism and local 
culture, was not fixed, rigid and impermeable. As was argued in relation to police 
working cultures: “[t]he strength of the lenses may be weaker or stronger 
depending on certain conditions, but they are ground on a similar axis” (Skolnick 
1966 p.42), and so in this case, the axis is provided by managerialism and 
traditional prison culture, but the balance between those elements is unstable and 
contingent. In his analysis of organisational culture, Parker argued that this could 
be characterised as a “contested local organization of generalities” (Parker 2000
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p.214), in other words, there were basic features of agreement about what is 
important but how these were pieced together into a coherent whole was 
contested, disputed and continually revised. Again, this analysis is relevant to 
understanding the ways in which prison managers made sense of the competing 
pressures that they faced. The ‘working personality’ or habitus of prison 
managers was less certain and clear cut than has been implied in the past, instead 
it was fragmented and was characterised by flux. Managers had to balance, 
review and rebalance competing priorities and do this in a way that was 
contingent upon circumstances and varied across grades, roles, and situations. 
Although managerialism and local culture formed the foundations, individuals 
had to make sense of the relationship between them and find ways in which to 
artfully balance the competing pressures and priorities. When discussing the craft 
of prison management, it has been argued that managers’ role was to: “fashion 
and re-shape an essentially punitive structure into one that was positive and 
optimistic” (Wilson 2000 p.12). Whilst this may have been helpful as a 
normative prescription, the observations in this study suggested that the craft as 
practiced was not centred on this explicit moral vision and leadership. Instead, 
the craft was demonstrated in fashioning, reshaping and continually recalibrating 
the balance between managerial targets and traditional cultural demands into a 
pragmatically sustainable mix.            
The term ‘prison managerialism’ has been intended to provide a means of 
appreciating the dominant pressures that shape the working lives of prison 
managers. However, this was also a concept that was full of tension and 
uncertainty. It was the centre of the intersection between global and local forces, 
between the past and the present, and between agency and structure. This was 
where prison managers lived their working lives.
The effects of prison managerialism
Having briefly described prison managerialism, it is now necessary to turn to the 
question of how this has shaped prisons. How has this influenced the ways that 
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individuals work? How has it shaped or recast the way the organisation operated? 
How has it changed the experience of the subjects including staff and prisoners? 
Has it changed the aims of the organisation? In short, what have been the effects 
of prison managerialism?
There have been some grand and profound claims made for the positive benefits 
of managerialism by senior prison managers. For example, it has been argued 
that managerial techniques have empowered managers so that they could ensure 
that what should be happening did happen (Wheatley 2005). Prior to this, it had 
been argued that “a mainly liberal and decent cadre of governors” had good 
intentions but were ineffective and so presided over and “supported a sorry state 
of affairs” including overcrowding, poor conditions, brutality and unsafe prisons 
(ibid p.33). In contrast, it has been argued that as well as enhancing the technical 
machinery of managerial control, managerialism has had a progressive moral 
effect. For example, Martin Narey, a former Director General of the Prison 
Service, stated:
“…show me a prison achieving all its K[ey] P[erformance] 
I[ndicator]s and I will show you a prison which is also treating 
prisoners with dignity” (Narey 2001 p.5)    
This was not an argument that as has been restricted to prison managers. Prison 
lawyers have argued that managerialism could provide a means through which 
the use of discretion could be made less arbitrary and more accountable 
(Livingstone et al 2003) and that legalistic compliance could be a means of 
preventing abuses and improving conditions (Whitty 2011).  
From these perspectives, the development of managerialism has tamed 
problematic localised cultures and has promoted a more progressive approach. 
However, this study has illustrated that such dualisms do not present an accurate 
picture of the working lives of prison managers. Localism has not been excluded 
by globalised developments, instead their interaction is characterised by duality 
and dialectical relationships. The question of effects is not therefore simply about 
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managerialism but is about that interaction with localism and the particular 
tensions and ways of operating that this created.  
Starting with the effects on prisoners, whilst there have been improvements in 
physical conditions and the availability of services during the last two decades 
(as described in chapter 1), there has also been a shift in the way that prisoners 
have been perceived and understood by managers. As has been argued in this 
study, traditional prison officer culture provided a lens through which prisoners 
were perceived as subordinate to prison staff. The defenders of managerialism 
quoted above, asserted that managerialism had shifted that perspective and that a 
more humanitarian approach had prevailed. However, this study has revealed that 
managers practice and embody many aspects of traditional culture. It has also 
shown that the newer managerial approach did not generally foster humanitarian 
concern in itself. Instead, organisationally sanctioned moral imperatives such as 
‘decency’ and ‘reducing reoffending’ had a managerial quality to them. 
Managers generally complied with them and enacted them because they were 
prescribed rather than through a personal commitment. As has been described 
earlier, this led to some managers describing morally-based policies such as race 
equality or the use of cell sharing risk assessments as a necessity of audit 
compliance rather than articulating an appreciation of their human impact. This 
way of thinking could also be detected in language, for example it has been 
argued that traditional prison culture was resistant to rights, supported legal cases 
being rigorously contested and viewed litigious prisoners as a nuisance, and that 
managerial approaches led to defensive approaches attempting to make processes 
‘ECHR proof’ rather than internalising the recognition of rights (Cheney et al 
2001). This mechanistic approach created affective distance and re-imagined 
prisoners as an amorphous, undifferentiated mass or parts of risk groups to be 
managed, controlled or accessed (Bettleheim 1960). Both traditional culture and 
managerialism acted to depersonalise and dehumanise prisoners, one from a 
moral perspective, positioning prisoners as undeserving, whilst the other from a 
technical perspective, objectifying prisoners and denying their full human 
character.  
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It may be argued that if the processes and policies were carried out effectively 
then it would make no difference what the motives of the person carrying them 
out and that if legalism or managerialism resulted in improved physical services 
or rights then this had some value (Liebling 2005, Whitty 2011) . However, it has 
been shown that the affective elements of ‘performance delivery’, such as the 
way prisoners were spoken to and whether they felt that staff cared, were also 
important in reducing suicide (Liebling et al 2005), improving quality of life for 
prisoners (Liebling assisted by Arnold 2004) and more broadly in the provision 
of effective human services (Brody 2000). As has been suggested here, prison 
managerialism does not in itself improve the affective qualities of interactions 
with prisoners or concern for the humane experience of imprisonment.      
For prison managers, there has been a change in the values that infuse their role 
and guide their actions. In the past, it has been argued that prison managers were 
a distinct group within prisons who offered a morally vibrant, value-laden and 
diverse form of leadership (eg. Rutherford 1993a, Bryans and Wilson 2000). In 
particular, it was claimed that they acted as moral interpreters of their working 
world and used this to craft the social aspects of imprisonment in creative and 
visionary ways (Wilson 2000). However, this study has illustrated that this role 
has been eroded, indeed replaced, both structurally and in the habitus of 
managers. The managers of the past have been delegitimised through 
representations of them as well intentioned but ineffective. Their individuality 
has been recast as anarchy and the past painted as a world where: “openly 
maverick governors ignored central instructions and little of that central 
instruction was translated into local action” (Wheatley 2005 p.33). The 
development of managerial techniques has sought to constrain managers to act in 
conformity with centralised prescription. Such an approach has important 
consequences for social power as it extends the reach of control through 
management at a distance (O’Malley 1994), displacing professional judgement, 
reinforcing management control, and subordinating other forms of power, 
knowledge and authority (Clarke, Gerwirtz and McLaughlin 2000). The values 
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that are perpetuated through these actions are not neutral but instead have 
“tended to subordinate other principles of judgement to the managerial calculus 
of economy and efficiency” (ibid p.10). This study has illustrated that centralised 
actions are not interpreted and adapted through the distinct moral creativity of 
prison managers but instead through the continuing strength of traditional prison 
officer culture. Rather than being a moral visionary, the contemporary prison 
manager more closely resembles a power broker, balancing and rebalancing the 
pressures from above and below. That is not to say that such a role is not without 
its creativity and complexity, but it is markedly different from the way that the 
role of prison managers has been previously described.   
There were risks that attached to the reduced relevance of individual moral 
creativity and its replacement with more pragmatic and instrumental concerns. In 
particular, this could lead to routinisation and “unthinking use” of practices, 
policies, processes and technologies (Bettleheim 1960 p.49). It has been argued 
that in social institutions such as places of custody, it was important to foster a 
questioning, curious, sceptical and challenging professional approach. Without 
this, shared assumptions could come to dominate, technical and social 
compliance spread and the ability of professionals to exercise independent 
thought atrophied (ibid). Whilst the unconstrained individualism of the past is 
itself problematic for its unaccountability and inconsistency, there is nevertheless 
an important role for an intellectually active, socially engaged, and self-reflective 
professional approach.   
For the organisation, prison managerialism has been argued to have increased 
management control and effectiveness and led to significant improvements in 
‘performance’. However, this study has indicated that below the surface more 
complex social forces could be exposed. In part there was what has been called 
‘carceral clawback’ (Carlen 2002b), where reforming or progressive aims were 
subject to adaptation and change to reflect a punitive approach. This could be 
seen in the ways that performance management methodologies were adapted to 
reflect traditional culture and the ways that in pursuing managerial ends, prison 
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managers subscribed to traditional culture. The organisation was drawn back and 
infused with the weight of its historical social construction. What was also seen 
was a similar clawback towards managerial concerns. For example, this could be 
seen in the ways that managers fell back on managerial aims in exercising 
discretion and other forms of agency, how they understood potentially 
humanitarian objectives such as ‘decency’ and ‘reducing re-offending’, and how 
they placed greater emphasis on ‘hard’ controllable measures such as quantitative 
targets and audits. These were all examples of how prison management was 
constructed so as to prioritise and foreground managerial practices. This was also 
illustrated in the ways that manipulation and distortion had become a chronic 
feature, where the appearance of compliance was more important than almost 
anything else, to the extent that a prison could become a ‘virtual’ construct 
(Owers 2007). This had become so deeply embedded that managerial clawback 
was as important to understanding contemporary prison management as carceral 
clawback. The dominance and pervasiveness of these features meant that the 
range of possibility for the organisation was constrained and alternatives became 
more difficult to create and sustain.   
There were strong claims made that prison managerialism has had a positive, 
reforming effect in prisons, including improving conditions, increasing 
consistency, enhancing management control and enriching prisoners’ 
experiences. However, this study has revealed that there have been deep and 
significant shifts in the social life of the prison that has effects for all of those 
who live or work in prisons, including prison managers. Whilst many of these 
changes were positive for some people, there were also problematic aspects and 
the nature of the transformations deserve the full exploration, exposition and 
discussion that has been offered here.    
Beyond prison managerialism
This final section will attempt to combine a number of aspirations. It is intended 
to provide an afterword which reflects upon changes that have taken place since 
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the field work was concluded and consider them in light of the analysis presented 
in this study. It is also intended to reflect upon further research that may be 
useful and also some of the ways in which this research could be used to inform 
practice. What draws these aspirations together is that they are intended to 
provide a discussion of how this research could move beyond the immediate 
study and into the prison world.
This study has highlighted a number of subjects that would merit further 
research. The wider range of managers that were involved in prisons, from 
accountants to HR professionals, to healthcare managers and psychologists 
marked a shift towards greater professionalization and specialisation. These all 
merited greater attention than could be given in this study. Similarly, closer 
attention could be given to some of the processes used, including performance 
management measures themselves such as IMB and HM Inspectorate of Prisons. 
Again a wider and more extensive exploration of their use and effects would be 
of interest. The most important issue was that this study has revealed that whilst 
prison managers hold power, they are also the subjects of it and those who are 
more senior also deserved closer sociological inquiry. Giving attention to how 
policy and practice was developed at the most senior level would have value. In 
addition, as this study was conducted in two public sector organisations, there are 
questions raised about how the balance and approach varies between prisons in 
the public sector and between the public sector and other providers in the private 
sector. Some existing research indicates that there may be different cultures and 
ways of operating that would benefit from further study in order to understand 
how prison managers operate in different contexts (Liebling assisted by Arnold 
2004, Liebling, Crewe and Hulley 2011).       
This study raised questions about the practice of prison management. How 
should performance management be deployed, if at all? What other structures 
should be given attention? How should managers be selected, trained, developed 
and supported? Should localism and individualism be developed or should 
compliance and consistency be favoured?   
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Since the field work for this study was completed, there have been a number of 
developments in prison managerialism15.
First, there have been significant changes in the structure of performance 
management in prisons. The weighted scorecard was replaced in 2010 by the 
‘performance hub’. Whilst this still created a ‘league table’ of prisons, it drew 
upon a wider range of measures including inspectorate assessments and MQPL 
results as well as KPTs. There have also been changes to the audit system, with a 
reduced number of in-house audits being completed. There has also been a 
change to the methodology of external audits, with a move away from a strict 
compliance approach towards a ‘risk assessment’ approach, which allowed 
greater qualitative judgement by auditors on the risk presented by non-
compliance. In 2011, it was also planned to reduce the number of KPTs. This all 
marked the slimming down and refocusing of performance management. This 
was partly motivated by the needs of efficiency and these changes have been 
used in order to generate cost savings, however, they were also aimed at 
refocusing management attention.
Second, there has been an increase in competition and marketisation of prison 
services. In 2011, it was announced that a private company, G4S, had won a 
competition to operate a new 1800 place prison in Featherstone and had also won 
the contract to operate HMP Birmingham, a prison that had up to that stage been 
operated by the public sector. This was the first time that a public sector prison 
had transferred to private operation. At the same time, another private sector 
company, SERCO, won the competition and retained the operation of HMP 
Doncaster. Their contract included a ‘payment by results’ provision, by which 
they had to reduce the level of reoffending by prisoners released from the prison 
or risk forfeiting part of their contractual payment. The expansion of competition 
for public services and the use of incentivised payments are two key strands of 
                                               
15 The following information is derived from internal documentation produced by the National 
Offender Management Service. There is no publically published information on these changes.
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government policy in criminal justice and more widely (Ministry of Justice 2010, 
HM Government 2011).  
Third, there has been a policy shift towards larger establishments. A review of 
prison management conducted by Lord Carter recommended that in order to 
create efficiency, large prisons holding up to 2500 prisoners should be created 
(Carter 2007). These so called ‘Titan’ prisons were widely criticised as being 
based upon a commercial, managerial model that placed efficiency before quality 
(Coyle 2008b, Liebling 2011).
These developments suggest a number of risks for prisons and prison managers. 
First, these changes appear to be leading towards reduced numbers of targets, but 
those that are left have greater importance, and the organisational risks are 
greater. This is likely to lead to an intensification of the focus on achieving these 
targets. Managers are likely to experience greater uncertainty, experience greater 
pressure to comply and become increasingly focussed on a narrow range of 
issues.
Second, the focus on key performance indicators and audits could lead to a focus 
on short-term goals. This was also reinforced by the short-term time frame of the 
prison officer, which generally focused on the day in hand (Liebling and Price 
2001). The recent changes to performance management mitigated this to some 
degree by giving greater prominence to inspection and MQPL, and so extending 
the time perspective. However, addressing culture could be a long and difficult 
process. It would also be likely to result in short-term deterioration in 
performance as the foundations of team cohesion were disturbed and resistance 
encountered. Focussing on short-term targets was likely to militate against this 
and therefore entrench the current way of doing things, closing down alternatives 
and solidifying the status quo.
Third, the shift towards larger prisons put at risk the quality of life for prisoners 
and prison staff. One former Chief Inspector of Prisons presented evidence to 
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suggest that smaller prisons provided better environments than larger ones 
(HMCIP 2009c) and this was also the recommendation of a review of women’s 
imprisonment (Corston 2007). Larger establishments would also be likely to lead 
to less personal relationships between staff and prisoners and between staff and 
managers, increasing social distance. The resistance led to Lord Carter’s 
proposals for Titan prisons being modified, although there are still plans to open 
a new prison holding 1800 prisoners (Liebling 2011).
              
Are there alternatives to this approach? Are there other ways of thinking about 
and approaching prison management?  I will end by suggesting four ways, which 
in combination, could provide a way forward that retains the benefits of 
measurement and monitoring but is also sensitive to the social and moral aspects 
of prison management.     
First, the amount of nationally prescribed performance measurement could be 
reduced. As well as the changes that have taken place to date, there may be scope 
for further reductions in the amount of performance measurement so that it 
would be less dominant in the thinking of prison managers and they would have 
the space to be creative.
Second, there should be more creative thinking about what is measured. There 
are benefits in performance measurement in the ways that they direct attention 
and improve accountability. However, measures are largely centrally prescribed. 
There should be greater scope for locally developed targets that reflect particular 
priorities and problems. This more localised approach would allow prison 
managers to take a role in developing measures to support a strategic vision. In 
addition, there is a case for developing measures more collaboratively with 
prison managers, staff, prisoners and others with an interest, including local 
community representatives. In this way they could take an active role in thinking 
about what was important and how best to address these issues.
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Third, it is suggested that there is a move towards smaller rather than larger 
establishments, in order to enable managers to be more responsive to the prisoner 
population and to staff. The professional resistance and the evidence presented in 
opposition to the proposals for Titan prisons illustrated that alternatives are 
available, based upon smaller establishments grounded in strong, affective 
relationships. Such establishments could be more responsive to the individual 
needs of prisoners and could be more closely linked with the local community 
(Woolf and Tumim 1991, Corston 2007).
Fourth, there is a case for the use of structured discretion amongst prison 
managers, who can then act to humanise the environment and to counter the 
dehumanising aspects of managerialism and traditional prison officer culture. For 
example, in his research on prison managers, Cheliotis (2006) suggested that 
they acted with agency by resisting or mitigating the excesses of managerialism 
and humanising practice. Similarly, Carlen (2001) has argued that prison 
managers could lead a ‘remoralisation’ of prisons by setting an ethical 
framework and directing practice to achieve this. This has also found support 
from senior prison managers, including the current Chief Executive of the 
National Offender Management Service, Michael Spurr, who has argued that:
“…targets are a means to an end and not an end in themselves… 
Measures are important but they are there to be able to move 
behaviour in the right way, to achieve compliance with process 
that is important, but they are not an absolute be all and end all. 
If anyone decides, for example, not to pay attention to a prisoner 
who is threatening self-harm because they are too busy with 
targets then we have lost sight of what we are about” (Spurr and
Bennett 2008 p.59-60)
   
This presented an alternative perception of how managerialism and managers 
should operate. This recognised the limitation and fallibility of performance 
measurement and highlighted the role of humane practice and agency to enable 
the achievement of the aims of measures, with sensitivity to the social, 
interpersonal and psychological aspects of prisons, rather than unthinking 
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compliance. That is not to say that there should be a return to unconstrained 
individualism, which would be problematic, but instead it is an argument for the 
creative application of skills informed by a clear moral framework. Such an 
approach needs to be developed, supported and nurtured if it is to flourish.
The occupational context of contemporary prison managers was not one which 
supported, fostered or nurtured the alternative approach suggested above. This 
study has proposed that prison managers do not exist in the value-laden 
enterprise of the past but instead their outlook and practice is shaped by 
managerialism and traditional culture. The alternative that has been articulated 
could be termed as a form of ‘craftsmanship’ (Sennett 2009), where practitioners 
do not simply comply with what they are asked to do and do not mechanically 
apply rules, but instead strive to do their job well for its own sake and take time 
to pause, reflect and critically explore their work in its context. In prisons this 
would involve reigniting moral debate and encouraging a more reflective and 
creative form of practice. This has significant implications for human resource 
practice including selection, development and appraisal.    
As has been illustrated throughout this study, prison management is located at 
the intersection between the past and present, global and local, agency and 
structure. Prison managers are neither all powerful nor are they powerless. The 
development of practice is constantly evolving and is contested. The future shape 
of prison management and prison managerialism is at least in part, in the hands 
of those who practice it.    
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Annex A
Management roles and responsibilities
This Annex briefly summarises the main roles and responsibilities of each 
management grade described in this study.
Governing Governor – The manager who is in charge of the whole prison. They 
line manage other senior managers and are accountable for the prison as a whole 
including safety, security, efficiency and performance. They are usually an 
experienced prison manager who has worked in a range of operational 
management roles, including uniformed roles.
Governor Grade – A senior operational manager who will normally be in 
charge of a part of the prison. Prisons are divided into ‘functions’ including 
residence (the living accommodation or wings), security, operations (such as 
gate, reception, visits), regime (including catering, work, gymnasium) or 
reducing reoffending (sentence planning, offender management, links with 
probation, psychology and external organisations). A governor grade is normally 
in charge of a function and will also be a member of the prison senior 
management team. They will periodically take operational charge of the prison as 
‘duty governor’. They are usually experienced prison managers who have 
worked in operational roles, including uniformed roles.
Principal Officer – The most senior uniformed grade. They generally run a 
department, which forms part of a function. This may for example be a number 
of wings, security intelligence, part of operations and this would usually involve 
managing a team of staff. Others manage discrete policy areas such as audit, life 
sentence prisoners or suicide prevention. Principal officers are also periodically 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the prison in the role of ‘orderly 
officer’. 
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Senior Officer – The first line manager of prison officers. They generally 
operate as shift managers in particular areas such as wings, visits, reception or 
activities. They are generally part of a team of senior officers who provide the 
day-to-day shift management of those areas.
Head of Learning & Skills – A senior non-uniformed manager responsible for
the management of the education contract and the broader development of 
learning and skills in the prison. However, their roles expanded in some prisons 
to encompass line management responsibility for areas such as workshops, 
gymnasium and catering. They generally have an education background and have 
not worked in other roles in prisons.
Human Resources Business Partner – A senior non-uniformed manager
responsible for the human resources aspects of the prison, such as recruitment, 
training, appraisal and attendance management. They also act as a strategic 
advisor to the Governing Governor and senior managers regarding change 
management and consultation. Some had previously worked in administrative 
roles in prisons whilst others were recruited directly without prison experience. 
They were expected to have relevant professional qualification and affiliations. 
Head of Finance - A senior non-uniformed manager responsible for the budget 
planning and resource management aspects of the prison. They also acted as an 
advisor to the Governing Governor and senior managers regarding financial 
management. Some had previously worked in administrative roles in prisons 
whilst others were recruited directly without prison experience. They were 
expected to have relevant professional qualification and affiliations.
Head of Psychology - A senior non-uniformed manager responsible for the 
psychological services provided by the prison, such as psychometric testing of 
prisoners, report writing and delivery of offending behaviour programmes. 
Generally they were experienced forensic psychologists who had worked in 
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prison psychology departments. They were expected to have relevant 
professional qualification and affiliations.
Area Manager – A senior civil servant responsible for a number of prisons in a 
geographical area. They acted as line manager to Governing Governors. They 
were generally experienced prison managers who had themselves been in the role 
of Governing Governor. 
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